IL-0358 Packet · 2019-06-02networking
Packet Public Cloud locations had high latency and unreachable paths from routing loops and blackholed traffic
On 2 June 2019 a trans-continental US backbone link at Zayo, Packet's upstream network provider, failed in hardware and blackholed the IP traffic routed over it. Even after the link was removed from service, traffic kept being blackholed because of lingering control plane problems and stale routes in Zayo's network, which greatly extended the outage. Packet's monitoring alerted at 08:49 UTC on reachability problems across several global locations, and engineers found routing loops and blackholed traffic, with provisioning affected in NRT1 and SJC1. At 12:10 the cause was confirmed as the Zayo outage. Packet's network engineers moved traffic onto an alternative network, removed Zayo from the provider mix and applied route filters, and connectivity began to return; afterwards they tuned specific routing policies to improve latency across the backbone with the new traffic mix. A fix was in place at 13:32 and the incident was resolved at 15:22 UTC.
- Severity
- –
- Scope
- Intermittent loss of connectivity and degraded routing for Packet Public Cloud locations, affecting traffic between specific source and destination address pairs, especially from US datacenters to broadband ISPs; provisioning and deprovisioning in NRT1 and SJC1
- Users affected
- –
- Region
- Global Cloud Locations
- Time to detect
- 0m
- Time to resolve
- 6h 33m
Symptoms
At about 08:49 UTC on 2 June 2019, Packet's internal network monitoring alerted on serious reachability and performance problems in several of Packet's global datacenter locations. The first investigation found routing loops and traffic being blackholed to specific internal and Internet destinations.
The damage was uneven. Only traffic between particular, seemingly random pairs of source and destination IP addresses was hit while other customer traffic flowed normally, and delivery from Packet's US datacenters to broadband ISPs suffered the most. Server interface connectivity was never affected. Customers first lost upstream connectivity briefly in some Packet Cloud regions, then for the rest of the outage had poor routing with high latency and some paths that could not be reached at all.
Provisioning was affected too: from 09:18 engineers investigated provisioning and deprovisioning problems in the NRT1 availability zone, and at 10:11 found SJC1 device provisioning affected as well. The routing issue was identified at 10:13, and at 12:10 network engineers confirmed it came from an outage at Packet's upstream network provider Zayo. Even after Zayo was taken out of Packet's provider mix, some large broadband and cellular networks that also depend on Zayo kept degraded connectivity to Packet and to other destinations.
Root cause
Root cause Dependency failure
- Trigger
- A trans-continental US backbone link in the network of Packet's upstream provider Zayo had a hardware failure and blackholed IP traffic routed over it.
Detection
Packet's internal network monitoring alerted at 08:49 UTC on reachability issues in several global datacenter locations, and engineers confirmed them at 08:52.
Remediation
- Migrated traffic to an alternative network and removed Zayo from the provider mix
- Applied route filters to return service to normal
- Optimised specific routing policies to improve latency across the backbone with the new traffic mix
Action items
- Expand internal connectivity monitoring and alerting of on-call operations teams
- Expand network automation and routing so traffic can be balanced across all available backbone paths and an operator can trigger automated re-routes across all Packet datacenters in a major provider incident
- Make Packet's provisioning systems less dependent on third party network providers and inter-datacenter connectivity
Lessons
–
Sources
- https://status.equinixmetal.com/incidents/tp130h5m6px0 · official-status
Related cases
IL-0267Wikimedia's eqsin cache site went unreachable when both of its transport links to the core data centers were downWikimedia Foundation · 2023same root cause · shared BGP routing, Backbone network (WAN)
IL-0255Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat37signals · 2020same root cause · shared BGP routing, Backbone network (WAN)
IL-0509SourceHut was down for 170 hours after a DDoS led its upstream network to null-route the PHL datacenter's subnetSourceHut · 2024same root cause · shared BGP routing
IL-0258FastMail was unreachable for almost two hours when the GRE tunnels carrying its traffic from Level 3 went downFastmail · 2016same root cause · shared BGP routing
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