Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases8 cases

6 to 8 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    At 15:00 on 27 December 2016, while a developer was working on a payment system module, nine main tables of the billing database were dropped. The monitoring system turned red, failure alerts poured in, and payments in 배달의민족 (Baemin) stopped for a while.

    Trigger

    While developing a payment system module, the developer who wrote the post dropped nine main tables of the billing database by mistake.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The monitoring system turned red and failure alerts fired.

    Remediation
    • Pointed the application at a temporary database, which kept the outage short
    • Restored the dropped tables from the 6:00 mysqldump full backup
    • Replayed the binary log from 6:00 to 15:00 with mysqlbinlog, filtered to the nine tables and stopping before the DROP TABLE
    Action items
    • Replace mysqldump backups of the billing database with full backups taken by XtraBackup
    Lessons

    There are many points where such failures can be managed: separate database accounts for the service and for administration, check once more before running a query, and guard against rm -rf. Without the full backup and the binary log the data could not have been recovered, so every team should check that it has a full recovery point for a failure.

  2. Symptoms

    On July 30th, a few minutes after the OSU Open Source Lab started reloading the MySQL server mysql2 to fix its replication errors, the team saw that databases were being dropped on mysql1 as well. The script was stopped, and the MySQL service behind mysql1-vip stayed down through a long restore.

    Trigger

    On July 30th at 4:00PM PDT the team stopped slave replication on mysql2 and began dropping its databases one at a time to reload it and fix replication errors.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team watching the reload noticed after a few minutes that mysql1 was also dropping databases; the delays between drops in the script gave them that time.

    Remediation
    • Stopped the script that was dropping databases
    • Restored the databases from the mysql-zrm backups
    • Pulled each database that failed to restore out of the 200GB backup file and restored it separately
    • Recovered most data with the binary logs from the 17th through the 30th
    Action items
    • Evaluate better replication strategies, including row-based replication
    • Store binlogs as a backup on a separate server
    • Take backups with Percona XtraBackup for much faster full restores
    • Use mydumper instead of mysql-zrm for faster logical backups
    • Improve documentation and training for complex systems
    • Test full restores regularly on a spare server as part of the backup process
    • Gather more accurate time estimates for the restore process
    • Audit the hosted databases regularly, since test and very large databases delayed the restore
    • Migrate to a bigger, more powerful MySQL cluster
    • Set a policy and tools to keep the community informed of outages, maintenance and resource use, with dashboards
    • Define and monitor capacity limits for core services
    • Implement redundancy and restore practices for core services, including staff drills
    • Migrate more core services to Chef
    • Review documentation, policies and performance metrics periodically
    • Find better ways to draw on community expertise
    • Raise funds to replace the oldest infrastructure and reduce technical debt
    Lessons

    The lab had stretched its resources to host as many projects as possible, and that came with tradeoffs such as heavily compressed backups to save disk and less redundancy than wanted; the heavy compression made this restore CPU-bound. The lab concluded that it needs to change how it plans, monitors and manages resources, and that the length of the outage and the lack of progress reports were not acceptable.

  3. Symptoms

    During emergency maintenance on 5 January 2012, a bulk deletion of unneeded file systems on the Sakura Cloud storage device also deleted 53 disks that customers were using. The deleted disks could not be restored from backup.

    Trigger

    In the emergency maintenance on 5 January 2012, Sakura Internet ran a batch command written only for that maintenance to delete unneeded file systems on the storage device in bulk.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Action items
    • Simplify the process for deleting unneeded file systems
    • Do not run scripts that have not been reviewed and tested enough
Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve Database backups and snapshots and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Software defect1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0281 PostHog's Logs ClickHouse cluster silently deleted almost all its S3 data, losing US logs older than 3 days

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0380 A compaction change in InfluxDB Cloud us-east-1 dropped data from compacted files, and queries missed data for weeks

Operator error5 cases

  1. IL-0242 Both PostgreSQL servers behind matrix.org were lost during a disk expansion, and the homeserver was down for 24 hours
  2. IL-0218 GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL data was wiped by mistake and, with no working backup, the site was down about 18 hours
    GitLab2017
  3. IL-0573 A developer's mistake dropped nine main tables of the Baemin billing MariaDB database and payments briefly stopped
  4. IL-0319 Dropping databases on the MySQL replica mysql2 also dropped them on mysql1, as the pair actually ran master-master
  5. IL-0538 Sakura Cloud storage maintenance deleted 53 in-use customer disks, and the disks could not be restored from backup

Configuration change1 case

Contributing factor
–
Organisation
  1. IL-0331 An RDS MySQL Multi-AZ failover lost 5 seconds of committed data and broke replication on all five read replicas