Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases13 cases

6 to 10 of 13

  1. Symptoms

    At 18:56 PDT on 23 June 2022 (01:56 UTC on 24 June) several models went offline at once: some fine-tuned curie and davinci models, the Codex beta models code-davinci-001 and code-cushman-001, the legacy GPT models curie, babbage and ada, and all Embeddings models.

    Trigger

    A destructive operation on one of the three production clusters, caused by human error that the existing safeguards did not catch, took the whole cluster offline.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • re-allocated the models from the lost cluster to the remaining two clusters
    • rebuilt the VPN link with Azure support after losing the connection to AKS during cluster setup
    • built workarounds with Azure support after losing the connection to Azure Private Link
    • tore down the cluster and rebuilt it from scratch after the upgraded Kubernetes version broke the ingress
    • moved traffic back into the rebuilt cluster between 05:30 and 06:30 PDT
    Action items
    • Add checks and locks so that this and similar production-critical infrastructure cannot be modified by accident
    • Add better visibility into the operations being performed and make parts of the system more lexicographically distinct
    • Keep working with Azure on the AKS network connectivity issues so they do not disrupt new cluster operations
    • Update playbooks with the new cluster failure modes and change the setup steps for new clusters and infrastructure
    • Upgrade Kubernetes systematically and set aside time so the clusters do not fall behind again
    • Shard fine-tuned models across multiple clusters and work towards more automatic cross-cluster replication
    • Distribute and replicate Azure Blob Storage so fine-tuned models load faster and more reliably
    • Finish rolling out node-to-node caching to relieve Azure Blob Storage bottlenecks
    • Change how model weights are stored so they are more efficient and faster to load
    Lessons

    Losing one of three clusters exhausted the GPU headroom, and GPUs could not be added on short notice, so full recovery depended on bringing the same cluster back. Rebuilding it exposed a deferred Kubernetes upgrade: the newer version broke the ingress, and because AKS cannot downgrade there was no way back except a full rebuild. Recovering many large models at once is limited by the bandwidth of the storage they load from, and the caches that normally hide this do not help when everything moves to a different cluster.

  2. Symptoms

    At 08:00 UTC on 2021-09-06 every service in DFDS's Kubernetes cluster answered with 404. Investigation started five minutes later.

    Trigger

    The automated Kubernetes node rollover on 2021-09-06 restarted all the Traefik v2 pods, five days after a malformed IngressRoute manifest had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    All services returned 404 from 08:00 UTC and root cause investigation started at 08:05. Time to detection was 5 minutes.

    Remediation
    • changed the ALB health check path, which made the targets healthy but did not stop the 404s
    • rolled back by hand to Traefik v1 as the main ingress controller
    • deleted the malformed IngressRoute by hand and confirmed the Traefik v2 bug
    • applied the changes upstream
    Action items
    • Upgrade Traefik to v2.5, where the bug is fixed, and verify that it removes the bug
    • Change the Traefik v2 health check path to something more robust
    • Set up an external liveness probe on the ingress controller
    • Consider workload segmentation to limit the blast zone
    • Look into monitoring the Traefik v2 API for rapid changes
    • Look into smoke testing during and after node rollover
    Lessons

    A malformed IngressRoute did nothing visible for five days and then took down all ingress when every Traefik v2 pod had restarted during a node rollover. Because Traefik v2 failed gracefully, the first signals pointed at the ALB health checks instead of at Traefik. On incident handling, the team concluded that appointing an incident manager could have helped, that the war room meeting should be recorded and a log book kept, that people not involved should only make suggestions in writing, and that a short first round of sharing thoughts and gut feelings is useful.

  3. Symptoms

    After the switch to Traefik v2, functional tests indicated that everything was fine, and this was reported on Slack at 08:44 UTC. The first sign of trouble came at 09:26 UTC, when a developer reported a high count of HTTP 307 redirects, especially on the Okta service. At 09:32 UTC the team learned that the online booking system was down.

    Trigger

    At 08:22 UTC the AWS load balancers were updated to send requests to the new Traefik v2 reverse proxy as part of the migration away from Traefik v1.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A developer reported a high count of HTTP 307 redirects, in particular on the Okta service, at 09:26 UTC, 64 minutes after the change; six minutes later the team was told the online booking system was down. The functional tests run after the switch had not caught it.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the switch to Traefik v2, putting rollback ahead of investigation because of how critical the booking system is
    Action items
    • Consider how critical announcements can be made more visible
    • Consider whether the ALBs used for testing should have been shared with the teams so they could test their own scenarios
    Lessons

    Cloud Engineering cannot test every application scenario on its own, even after testing its own applications for weeks. A header that changes value behind a new ingress controller, here x-forwarded-proto going from https to http, can break an authentication flow while basic functional tests still pass. DFDS asks whether diffing request headers before and after the migration would have shown the problem in advance.

  4. Symptoms

    At 15:35 EST on 11 March 2021 the CircleCI web UI and runner.circleci.com became unavailable. The API, which uses a separate ingress point, stayed reachable, and builds kept running.

    Trigger

    An update deployed to a test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from CircleCI's primary production cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    CircleCI engineers were alerted and began investigating. The status page posted its first notice at 20:45 UTC.

    Remediation
    • restored Traefik in the production cluster
    • restored Calico in the production cluster, after which pods served customer requests again
    Action items
    • Improve network-level documentation and runbooks to cover every layer of the Kubernetes networks
    • Improve monitoring and alerting for the network infrastructure
    • Add guardrails that isolate the production and staging clusters so they cannot interfere with each other
    Lessons

    A deployment path that can reach both a test cluster and production can remove shared networking components from production. When the ingress controller and the CNI are both affected, restoring the ingress alone is not enough: engineers had to find the link between Calico and Traefik and restore Calico before pods served traffic again. Time went to DNS and AWS red herrings because nothing linked the outage to the test deployment; CircleCI's answer is better network runbooks, network alerting and guardrails between clusters.

  5. Symptoms

    At 18:27 on 21 September 2020 the Cloud Platform team detected that some services running on the live-1 production cluster had gone down, and some users could not reach them. The incident was declared at 18:40.

    Trigger

    A script for deleting a test cluster was triggered while the kube context was pointing at the live-1 production cluster instead of the test cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first detection was at 18:27, and the incident was declared 13 minutes later, at 18:40.

    Remediation
    • restored the default ingress controller together with external-dns and kiam, which it depends on
    • corrected the owner field in the Formbuilder Route 53 TXT records so external-dns pointed their A records at the new NLB
    • restored the remaining components with a targeted apply
    • ran the apply pipeline to restore all certificates, ServiceMonitors and Prometheus rules from the environment repository
Check your cluster for this

These 13 cases involve Ingress controller and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause7

Breaking change in an upgrade2 cases

  1. IL-0092 Upgrading ingress-nginx from 1.12.0 to 1.14.3 brought a newer ModSecurity and OWASP Core Rule Set whose false positives blocked HMPPS Auth, so users could not sign in to their applications
  2. IL-0203 A routine Kubernetes cluster system update made the AWS Load Balancer Controller fail, so new pods were never registered with the ALB and Honeycomb's EU1 ingest and UI went down once the last old pods were replaced

Faulty deployment2 cases

  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy
  2. IL-0086 A deployment meant for a CircleCI test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from the production cluster, taking down the CircleCI UI and runner.circleci.com

Operator error4 cases

  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025
  2. IL-0115 One of OpenAI's three production AKS clusters went offline through a human error, and rebuilding it took 10½ hours because an AKS Kubernetes upgrade broke the ingress and AKS cannot be downgraded
    OpenAI2022
  3. IL-0089 A test cluster deletion script run with the kube context pointing at the live-1 production cluster deleted its ingress controller, monitoring, logging, cert-manager, kiam and external-dns
  4. IL-0054 All ingress traffic lost while draining a GKE node pool because the load balancer only targeted new nodes without ingress-nginx pods

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0170 During a Lunar New Year event, traffic more than three times normal filled the nf_conntrack table on the EKS node running the Istio ingress gateway, dropping packets and taking down Backpackr's web and app services

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021
  2. IL-0072 High etcd write latency made the API servers return stale data, and the production cluster flipped between two views of its state

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0111 Switching the main Kubernetes ingress controller from Traefik v1 to v2 stopped X-Forwarded headers being passed, which broke the Okta login flow for every service using Okta and stopped DFDS online bookings for over an hour
    DFDS2021

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA