Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases7 cases

6 to 7 of 7

  1. Symptoms

    Dex, the OIDC proxy that handled Kubernetes authentication, stored its data in the Kubernetes API (storage type kubernetes, inCluster: true) and had built up a huge number of AuthRequest objects. Listing all AuthRequests timed out, and without the list they could not be deleted.

    Trigger

    The dex namespace was deleted so that Kubernetes would clean up the accumulated AuthRequest objects itself.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The speaker says he had got hints of the problem earlier. While the masters were down, plenty of alerts arrived in Slack, but monitoring could not be reached because authentication and port-forwarding no longer worked.

    Remediation
    • removed the kubernetes finalizer from the dex namespace by calling the API directly (kill-kube-ns)
    • deployed Dex to a new namespace with sane defaults
    Lessons

    Dex with Kubernetes as its storage keeps every AuthRequest as an API object, and with a long TTL they pile up until the API cannot list them. Deleting a namespace that holds that many objects makes Kubernetes list them in a loop and can overload the masters. Monitoring that is reached through cluster authentication is lost when authentication is what broke.

  2. Symptoms

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.

    Trigger

    A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.

    Remediation
    • replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
    • reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
    Action items
    • Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
    • Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
    Lessons

    The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.

Check your cluster for this

These 7 cases involve CoreDNS and Application database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Capacity exhaustion7 cases

  1. IL-0006 VPC subnets ran out of IP addresses because the AWS VPC CNI kept IPs on full nodes, and WARM_IP_TARGET changes then blocked pod starts after every pod deletion
    Neon2025
  2. IL-0204 An etcd memory spike overloaded the control plane of a Render Frankfurt cluster, and DNS then failed because CoreDNS ran on the rebooted control plane nodes and could not start without the API server
    Render2024
  3. IL-0182 Too few CoreDNS replicas on EKS were overloaded during traffic spikes, raising latency and cutting the network for task pods, and the over-provisioned, tightly spread CoreDNS pods added later blocked Karpenter consolidation
  4. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  5. IL-0093 Ingress controller pods crash-looped one after another because the leader pod had exhausted its shared memory
  6. IL-0076 Kubernetes masters went down after Dex filled etcd with AuthRequest objects and deleting its namespace started an endless list-and-timeout loop
  7. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances