Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases11 cases

8 to 11 of 11

  1. Symptoms

    Jetstack was upgrading the master of a development cluster that many teams use to test their apps during the working day, a regional Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) cluster in europe-west1. The upgrade ran through Jetstack's GKE Terraform pipeline and did not finish before the 20-minute Terraform timeout, while the GKE console still showed the cluster as upgrading.

    Trigger

    A planned master upgrade of the shared development cluster. The same upgrade had been done on another pre-production environment earlier that day, and no API downtime was expected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first sign was the master upgrade missing the 20-minute Terraform timeout; re-running the pipeline returned the kube-apiserver unhealthy error. The cause was identified with the help of Google Support.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the OPA ValidatingAdmissionWebhook resource during a window of API server access
    Action items
    • Limit the OPA webhook to the namespaces where the policy applies and development teams have access
    • Enable the webhook only for Ingress and Service resources, the only resources the policy validates
    • Add a liveness probe so OPA is restarted when it stops responding, and update the OPA documentation
    • Follow the open upstream Kubernetes issue about this behaviour
    Lessons

    With alerting on API server response times, the team might have seen CREATE and UPDATE requests slow down across the board as soon as the OPA-backed webhook was first deployed. Every workload needs probes: OPA looked so simple to deploy that the team skipped the Helm chart, which adds a livenessProbe for the admission controller containers among other adjustments to the tutorial configuration. Others had hit the same problem, and an upstream issue to improve it was still open.

  2. Symptoms

    Terraform, applied from the shared cluster configuration repository after a merge, deleted Spotify's production GKE cluster in Asia. While the team tried to recreate it, Terraform deleted a second production cluster, so two of the three production clusters were gone.

    Trigger

    A feature team's pull request that added three users to an existing RBAC role binding file was merged before the cluster operators' pull request that imported the Asia cluster into Terraform state. The review build of the import pull request had already written the cluster into the shared state file, and the merged configuration had no definition of the Asia cluster, so Terraform removed it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal service discovery could not reach the deleted cluster and the cluster operator team was paged.

    Remediation
    • removed the deleted clusters from the service discovery configuration and restarted service discovery so clients fell back to the instances outside Kubernetes
    • one team that ran half on Kubernetes and half on VMs created more VMs outside Kubernetes to handle the load
    • recreated the clusters, using the hourly backups
    • updated the places where the old clusters' master IPs were hardcoded
    Action items
    • Post the Terraform dry-run output as a comment on each pull request
    • Require a status check that the branch is up to date with master, so the dry run reflects what will actually happen
    • Require an approving review on pull requests
    • Fail reviews automatically when certain keywords such as destroy appear; cluster deletions are done manually outside this repository
    • Add linters and validators for the cluster configuration
    • Schedule and announce disaster recovery tests that cover a cluster going away and smaller failures
    Lessons

    Plan for failure from the start and migrate large infrastructure gradually, so there is redundancy and a way back. A backup whose restore has never been tested is not a backup. Practising disaster recovery paid off: restoring the first deleted cluster took three and a quarter hours, and the team can now restore a larger cluster in one hour. What matters is not who made the mistake but what was learned from it.

  3. Symptoms

    On the evening of a long-overdue upgrade of a loveholidays production GKE cluster from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, planned to take 2 to 2.5 hours, the master upgrade and the first two 7-node NodePools went smoothly. After that the NodePool upgrades slowed to a crawl. Each node is cordoned, drained and upgraded in turn. Even a 14-node cluster at about 5 minutes per node took over an hour, and with about 100 more nodes to go, some of them taking over 15 minutes to drain, the sequential drains were too slow to finish at a reasonable hour.

    Trigger

    A manual upgrade of the GKE masters and NodePools from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, two versions at once, on 19 March 2019; GKE's release notes of 14 March had already said that version was no longer available for new clusters or master upgrades because masters showed elevated error rates, but it could still be selected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The slow drains, zombie nodes and stuck NodePool were seen by the engineer running the upgrade; the broken Ingress was noticed after the upgrade and explained by Google support; the HPA problem was noticed the next day.

    Remediation
    • drained the remaining NodePool nodes ahead of the upgrade with kubectl drain --ignore-daemonsets --delete-local-data
    • deleted the zombie instances from the managed instance group with gcloud compute instance-groups managed delete-instances
    • cancelled the stuck UPGRADE_NODES operation with gcloud beta container operations cancel
    • used kubectl port-forward in place of the broken internal Ingresses
    • scaled down the older of two active ReplicaSets, or triggered a dummy deployment, to bring the HPA back
    Action items
    • Alert when a HorizontalPodAutoscaler is at 70% and at 100% of its capacity
    • Alert when a deployment has had two active ReplicaSets for 30 minutes and for 60 minutes
    • Re-evaluate termination grace periods that were set to arbitrary large values
    • Read the GKE release notes before every cluster upgrade
    • Use auto-upgrade in non-production environments, and manual cluster upgrades with automatic node upgrades in production
    • Keep environments as identical as possible, including resource names
    Lessons

    Read the release notes before upgrading: the target version had been withdrawn five days earlier. Drain time depends on pod configuration, so emptyDir volumes, long grace periods and missing disruption budgets turn a NodePool upgrade into hours. Pre-production only catches problems like the ingress bug if it matches production down to resource names. Auto-upgrades in non-production surface problems early, and a mix of manual cluster upgrades and automatic node upgrades in production keeps clusters current without much effort.

  4. Symptoms

    On 20 February 2019 at 08:03 CET, `kubectl logs -f <pod>` stopped working for every pod in the mybinder.org cluster on GKE. Because pod logs could not be read, build logs were no longer forwarded to users, although the builds themselves ran normally.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Cordoned node gke-prod-a-users-b921bb88-rd5d so it would be removed from the pool once empty
    • Drained the node and removed it from the pool, after which kubectl logs worked again
    Action items
    • Test that kubectl logs works and notify when it does not
    • Add the command for retrieving API server logs to the SRE guide
    • Describe in the SRE guide how to identify suspicious node networking status
    Lessons

    The root cause was very difficult to identify, partly because it appears to sit in the Kubernetes master or the GKE service itself. Capturing `kubectl describe node` for the suspicious node would have allowed a comparison with healthy nodes, and a node that reports no ExternalIP or InternalIP in its status was likely a direct symptom of the problem and can be used as a diagnostic in the future.

Check your cluster for this

These 11 cases involve GKE control plane and Kubernetes API server. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Cloud provider outage4 cases

  1. IL-0463 Secure Connect connectors timed out after a GKE control plane upgrade left Harness's internal load balancer unreachable
  2. IL-0542 Twingate authentication and authorization requests failed at higher rates after traffic moved onto a smaller GKE cluster
  3. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA
  4. IL-0505 kubectl logs failed on GKE with "No SSH tunnels currently open" and mybinder.org build logs stopped reaching users

Breaking change in an upgrade2 cases

  1. IL-0101 After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hours
  2. IL-0180 A GKE control plane auto-upgrade from 1.22 to 1.23 removed the v1beta1 Ingress and ValidatingWebhookConfiguration APIs that Istio 1.7.4 still used, and Istio stopped working in production

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0140 The GKE API in us-central1 returned errors and high latency for 3 hours 19 minutes after an unexpected rise in backend traffic that client retries made worse

Software defect1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0403 mybinder.org could not create pods for hours as the GKE gke-resource-quotas quota wrongly reported 15k pods in use

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0113 The managed GKE control plane of Webhook Relay's main cluster failed because its API server certificates had never been rotated, and a manual credential rotation reported success without taking effect

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node
  2. IL-0061 A Terraform pull request merged out of order deleted a production GKE cluster, and recreating it deleted a second one