Cases11 cases
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By root cause1
Capacity exhaustion11 cases
- Component
- CoreDNS3Application database3Node pool3In-memory cache2Container CPU limit2Client-side DNS resolver and cache2Horizontal pod autoscaler2Container memory limit2Pod scheduling and placement2etcd1GKE control plane1Karpenter1Kubernetes API server1kube-dns1kube-proxy1kubelet1Language runtime settings1Prometheus1Service discovery1Telemetry agent1
- Contributing factor
- Unreviewed defaults3Monitoring blind spot3Retry storm3Automation amplification2Single point of failure2Unverified assumption1Change during peak hours1Unknown limit1Harmful manual action1No alert on limit1No caching1No capacity planning1No staged rollout1Ineffective rollback1Unrepresentative staging1
IL-0181A traffic spike from an external community post pushed product API pods into CPU throttling under a 1-core limit, and an e-commerce product page slowed down while every pod stayed RunningKevin2026IL-0100PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queriesPostHog2025IL-0082Losing one CoreDNS pod during a planned EKS node reroll overloaded the remaining CoreDNS pods, causing DNS timeouts and errors across multiple services at RebelMouseRebelMouse2025IL-0027All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went downBackpackr2025IL-0182Too few CoreDNS replicas on EKS were overloaded during traffic spikes, raising latency and cutting the network for task pods, and the over-provisioned, tightly spread CoreDNS pods added later blocked Karpenter consolidation이언철2024IL-0202A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recoverHoneycomb2023IL-0028Temporal History service latency rose because its pods were CPU-throttled while CPU usage read below 60 percentTemporal2023IL-0140The GKE API in us-central1 returned errors and high latency for 3 hours 19 minutes after an unexpected rise in backend traffic that client retries made worseGoogle Cloud2022IL-0206Consul agents in GitLab.com's GKE pods were repeatedly OOM-killed, so the Rails pods lost database replica discovery and sent every query to the primaryGitLab2022IL-0033Uneven load across kube-dns pods and a DNS packets-per-second limit pushed service latency to 20 secondsAirbnb2019IL-0075Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the APICivis Analytics2019