Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases9 cases

2 to 6 of 9

  1. Symptoms

    Between 12 AM and 8 AM CEST on 11 May 2025, every ZenML Pro workspace server was unreachable, so customers could not use workspace UIs or pipelines. The ZenML Pro dashboard was not affected.

    Trigger

    At 23:38 on 10 May, secrets encryption with AWS KMS was enabled through Terraform as part of the EKS module upgrade.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers found the cluster degraded when they resumed the upgrade at 06:00.

    Remediation
    • deleted and recreated the EKS node group with the correct IAM permissions and configuration
    • restored service access across all affected ZenML Pro environments
    Action items
    • Upgrade all Terraform modules (EKS, VPC) to current supported versions
    • Complete the EKS cluster upgrades as planned
    • Review the strategy for periodic Kubernetes and infrastructure upgrades to prevent a recurrence
    Lessons

    A successful upgrade on a much smaller staging cluster understated the risk of the same change in production. Skipping Kubernetes and module versions let upgrade complexity build up until one upgrade carried many changes at once.

  2. Symptoms

    On 20 September 2024 at 11:24 the Cloud Platform team received high priority Pingdom alerts for services on the live cluster, and from 11:26 teams reported in the #ask channel that services were unavailable. Users reported that services could not be resolved.

    Trigger

    At 11:21 the infrastructure-vpc-live-1 pipeline was unpaused, and a pull request that had been waiting in its queue ran automatically.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    High priority Pingdom alerts for live cluster services reached the Cloud Platform team at 11:24, and users reported that services could not be resolved.

    Remediation
    • Ran terraform apply locally to rebuild the subnet route table associations
    Action items
    • Review and update the process for pausing and resuming infrastructure pipelines so every team member knows its implications
    • Find a way to hold queued pull requests while manual infrastructure updates are under way
    • Find ways to isolate the plan and apply tasks of infrastructure pipelines better
  3. Symptoms

    At 10:23 on 6 June 2023 a user of the Cloud Platform reported that all of their production pods had been deleted at the same moment. Several users received Pingdom alerts that their applications were down for a few minutes.

    Trigger

    The team changed the instance type of the cluster's worker nodes through Terraform.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their production pods had been deleted at once and that Pingdom alerts showed their applications down; the incident was declared at 11:00.

    Action items
    • Ask AWS, through a support ticket, for the steps to change the node instance type without an outage
    • Plan how to make instance type changes through Terraform without downtime and add a runbook with the steps for changing the node instance type
  4. Symptoms

    At 09:33 UTC on 14 February 2023 end users told the platform team that Kubernetes logs were not arriving in CloudWatch as expected. The investigation went through fluentd and found that the nodes were running containerd as their container runtime instead of docker-shim. A scheduled node rollover the day before, at 07:30 UTC on 13 February, had set containerd as the default runtime by accident.

    Trigger

    A scheduled node rollover had accidentally made containerd the default container runtime, which stopped log shipping to CloudWatch; the unscheduled rollover to revert it timed out, and the pipeline run that followed reduced the Auto Scaling group from 30 to 15 instances.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    End users reported the missing CloudWatch logs that started the work. The postmortem lists 2 minutes as the time to detection of the node failure.

    Remediation
    • ran the node rollover script to add new nodes, which failed on a timeout from Docker Hub
    • ran the node rollover script a second time, which added new nodes that the load balancer marked healthy at 11:01 UTC
    Action items
    • Document the rollover process, especially what can be done when it goes wrong
    • Investigate options for improving the rollover process
    • Add fluentd log collection to the QA test suite so logs are covered end to end
    • Add alarms for fluentd when too little or no log data is sent
    • Implement a staging environment
    • Implement guards against selecting an invalid container runtime
    Lessons

    When a change goes wrong, rolling back to a known working configuration is safer than rushing a fix, which can make the damage worse. Launching new worker nodes depends on the cloud-init script not failing in any way. The QA configuration differed from production, there was no staging environment, the QA tests did not cover fluentd log collection, and the rollover process had no documentation for when it fails.

  5. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

Check your cluster for this

These 9 cases involve Terraform and Node launch template. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3

Operator error2 cases

  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025
  2. IL-0244 A queued pull request destroyed the EKS subnet route table associations and Cloud Platform services went offline

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0078 Enabling EKS secrets encryption with KMS through Terraform removed worker node IAM permissions and took down all ZenML Pro workspaces
    ZenML2025
  2. IL-0112 The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeouts
    DFDS2022

Configuration change5 cases

  1. IL-0091 Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods together
  2. IL-0109 A retried node rollover on a DFDS EKS cluster set the Auto Scaling group back to 15 instances, and the default termination policy removed every healthy worker node, leaving the cluster with no nodes
    DFDS2023
  3. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021
  4. IL-0365 A Terraform change to auto-scaling groups detached all worker nodes from both ALBs and cut off every cluster service
    DFDS2020
  5. IL-0061 A Terraform pull request merged out of order deleted a production GKE cluster, and recreating it deleted a second one