Cases14 cases

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1. IL-0187 A brief Spring Cloud Config Server downtime failed every client application's liveness probe, because the actuator health check included the config server, and Kubernetes restarted the pods in a kill loop

   Yonghyun Kim2025

   Symptoms

   While the Spring Cloud Config Server was briefly down for an upgrade, every client application began to answer its liveness probe with a failure saying it could not reach the config server.

   Probe failuresContainer crash loopService outage

   Trigger

   A downtime upgrade of the Spring Cloud Config Server made it stop responding for a short time.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Liveness and readiness probes

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsAutomation amplificationExcessive blast radius

   Lessons

   A liveness probe that includes an external dependency turns a short outage of that dependency into a restart loop of every client. Keep external dependencies out of liveness checks and handle temporary problems with readiness probes. Libraries can add health indicators to Spring Boot's actuator health endpoint automatically, so check what the probe path actually reports. The author ran another Kubernetes environment for two years without liveness probes, relying on strict readiness probes and on the application terminating itself on unrecoverable faults.

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2. IL-0202 A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recover

   Honeycomb2023sev1

   Symptoms

   Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

   High error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopService outageDatabase overload

   Trigger

   An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Application databaseIn-memory cache

   Contributing factor

   Retry stormAutomation amplification

   Detection

   Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

   Remediation

   • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
   • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
   • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided

   Action items

   • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
   • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths

   Lessons

   Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

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3. IL-0198 An automatic Ubuntu security update restarted systemd-networkd, which flushed the IP rules Cilium relied on and cut more than 60 percent of Datadog's Kubernetes nodes off the network across regions and cloud providers

   Datadog2023

   Symptoms

   Between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC on 8 March 2023, Kubernetes nodes in several Datadog regions lost network connectivity at the same time, on AWS, Google Cloud and Azure. All services across multiple regions were affected, including the regions that host Datadog's CI/CD and automation tools. Datadog's regions are not connected to each other and changes are rolled out one region at a time, so a simultaneous failure on several cloud providers looked implausible at first.

   Node NotReadyService outageThroughput degradation

   Trigger

   On 7 March 2023 Ubuntu published a systemd patch for a CVE (249.11-0ubuntu3.7). Ubuntu's default unattended upgrades installed it on the nodes between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC on 8 March, and installing it restarted systemd-networkd.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   systemd-networkdCiliumNode operating system image

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsChange with a delayed effectNo staged rolloutAutomation amplification

   Remediation

   • restarted thousands of disconnected instances on Google Cloud and Azure through the cloud APIs, keeping their local disks
   • rebuilt the data lost with terminated AWS instances' local disks through replication, reprocessing and restores from backup

   Lessons

   A change in a base operating system component can stay dormant for months until something restarts that component. Here the trigger was a security patch, and the change reached every region at once because automatic OS updates ran outside the progressive, region-by-region process used for every other change. Cloud providers react differently to an instance that loses its network. Google Cloud and Azure left the instances running, so a restart recovered them with their disks; AWS replaced them quickly, which brought stateless services back fast but destroyed the local-disk data the stateful services needed.

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4. IL-0109 A retried node rollover on a DFDS EKS cluster set the Auto Scaling group back to 15 instances, and the default termination policy removed every healthy worker node, leaving the cluster with no nodes

   DFDS2023sev1

   Symptoms

   At 09:33 UTC on 14 February 2023 end users told the platform team that Kubernetes logs were not arriving in CloudWatch as expected. The investigation went through fluentd and found that the nodes were running containerd as their container runtime instead of docker-shim. A scheduled node rollover the day before, at 07:30 UTC on 13 February, had set containerd as the default runtime by accident.

   Service outageResources deletedMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   A scheduled node rollover had accidentally made containerd the default container runtime, which stopped log shipping to CloudWatch; the unscheduled rollover to revert it timed out, and the pipeline run that followed reduced the Auto Scaling group from 30 to 15 instances.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Container runtimeNode launch templateNode poolTerraformTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationUnreviewed defaultsUnrepresentative stagingNo configuration testsNo runbookHarmful manual action

   Detection

   End users reported the missing CloudWatch logs that started the work. The postmortem lists 2 minutes as the time to detection of the node failure.

   Remediation

   • ran the node rollover script to add new nodes, which failed on a timeout from Docker Hub
   • ran the node rollover script a second time, which added new nodes that the load balancer marked healthy at 11:01 UTC

   Action items

   • Document the rollover process, especially what can be done when it goes wrong
   • Investigate options for improving the rollover process
   • Add fluentd log collection to the QA test suite so logs are covered end to end
   • Add alarms for fluentd when too little or no log data is sent
   • Implement a staging environment
   • Implement guards against selecting an invalid container runtime

   Lessons

   When a change goes wrong, rolling back to a known working configuration is safer than rushing a fix, which can make the damage worse. Launching new worker nodes depends on the cloud-init script not failing in any way. The QA configuration differed from production, there was no staging environment, the QA tests did not cover fluentd log collection, and the rollover process had no documentation for when it fails.

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5. IL-0009 A duplicated generated name made Argo CD replace the InfluxDB Cloud production Application and delete the whole production environment

   InfluxData2022

   Symptoms

   Right after a pull request to the infrastructure-as-code repository was merged, every API endpoint of one InfluxDB Cloud production cluster began returning 404 errors. Writes and reads failed alike: no one could collect data, scheduled tasks failed to run and external queries did not work.

   Service outageResources deletedHigh error rate

   Trigger

   A merged pull request whose rendered YAML added a new Argo CD Application and AppProject that an automation error had named app01-cluster01, the name of the existing production Application, instead of app02-cluster01; reviewers did not notice the app01 and app02 difference.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Argo CDPersistent volumes and stateful setsConfiguration templating

   Contributing factor

   Missed in reviewNo runbookNo safeguard on destructive changeMonitoring blind spotAutomation amplification

   Detection

   Monitoring and alerting did not detect the issue right away, so the team's first response was to try to roll the change back rather than plan a recovery. The write-up does not say how the team found out.

   Remediation

   • stopped the revert of the merged pull request
   • restored the etcd metadata cluster
   • recreated the missing Kubernetes objects so the retained PersistentVolumes became available, then recreated the StatefulSets
   • restored the Zookeeper volumes from an hourly Velero backup
   • rebuilt the Kafka StatefulSet one pod at a time with health and readiness checks disabled
   • accepted writes into the Kafka write-ahead log and scaled up the write path with more replicas and higher memory requests and limits
   • recreated the storage pods, which downloaded data from object storage, reindexed it and replayed the write-ahead log
   • re-enabled Argo CD, queries, dashboards and scheduled tasks, restored replica counts and ran final QA checks

   Action items

   • Write runbooks for restoring state when Kubernetes objects such as PersistentVolumeClaims are deleted but the data on the underlying volumes is preserved
   • Set every volume in every environment to retain data when its PersistentVolumeClaim is deleted
   • Improve the process for handling public-facing incidents
   • Store generated YAML as one object per file, so an overwrite of an existing object shows up as such in review
   • Detect duplicate objects when generating YAML and warn before review, treating objects with the same group, namespace and name as the same even when the apiVersion string differs
   • Add the Argo CD Prune=false annotation to all stateful resources and to Namespace objects managed by Argo CD
   • Set FailOnSharedResource=true on Argo CD Applications so Argo CD fails before changing an object another Application manages or managed

   Lessons

   The biggest gap was that monitoring did not notice the deletion quickly, which pushed the team toward a reflex rollback; in a stateful system a revert can create a new, empty instance instead of bringing the old one back. Retained volumes and clients that retry writes are what kept data loss at zero. Rendering many objects into one file let an overwrite of an existing object look like an addition, so generated configuration needs one object per file and duplicate detection that compares objects the way Kubernetes does. Stateful resources need protection from pruning, and that protection must cover their Namespace too, or deleting the namespace removes everything inside it.

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