Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases9 cases

2 to 6 of 9

  1. Symptoms

    CI jobs failed now and then because a hostname could not be resolved. The failures came from tensorstore, appeared on several different instances and did not repeat consistently. The error read: "./tensorstore/util/result.h:420: Status not ok: status(): UNAVAILABLE: CURL error Could not resolve hostname: Could not resolve host: company-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com".

    Trigger

    An administrative pod running with host networking called sudo in a loop. Each sudo call looked up the node's own hostname, and with ndots:5 and four search domains every lookup became five queries, for both A and AAAA records.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Reports of flaky CI jobs that could not resolve an S3 bucket hostname, followed by i/o timeout errors in the CoreDNS logs.

    Remediation
    • added 'Defaults !fqdn' in /etc/sudoers.d/00-no-fqdn (mode 440) to the container image so sudo stopped looking up the hostname
    Lessons

    Traffic from CoreDNS to the VPC DNS resolver is limited to 1024 packets per second per interface, and drops show up only as UDP timeouts; the linklocal_allowance_exceeded counter in ethtool shows them. Names that are not fully qualified are multiplied by the search domains under ndots:5, and AAAA lookups double them again. sudo looks up the host's own name on every call unless 'Defaults !fqdn' is set.

  2. Symptoms

    Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

    Trigger

    All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

    Remediation
    • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
    • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
    • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments
    Lessons

    The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

  3. Symptoms

    In January 2022 an etcd memory spike overloaded the Kubernetes control plane of one of Render's clusters in Frankfurt. At first only operations that need the control plane failed: new deploys and cron job runs.

    Trigger

    A memory spike in etcd overloaded the cluster's control plane.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Action items
    • Run CoreDNS on data plane nodes instead of control plane nodes
    • Run etcd on dedicated nodes
    Lessons

    CoreDNS can keep answering from its in-memory cache while the API server is down, but it cannot initialise without it. With CoreDNS on the control plane nodes, a reboot or restart during a control plane outage turned a failure of deploys and cron jobs into a failure of requests to services that were already running. The core problem was that the data plane was not isolated enough from the control plane: even without the reboot, the etcd memory spike alone could have forced CoreDNS to restart.

  4. Symptoms

    On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

    Remediation
    • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
    • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
    • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
    • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
    • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls
    Lessons

    The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

  5. Symptoms

    On May 10 the latency graphs of several services showed a few spikes of up to about one second, then latency climbed to five seconds and then to 20 seconds, and it stayed there for a long time. The same pattern appeared on many services, not just one.

    Trigger

    Several services sent a high volume of external DNS queries, all of which went through kube-dns.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Latency graphs of several services showed the rise; engineers then looked at load per kube-dns pod.

    Lessons

    By default a pod discovers DNS through the kube-dns cluster IP and uses the ClusterFirst policy, so even external lookups go through kube-dns. If a pod does not need cluster DNS, set its dnsPolicy to Default or None. Check the DNS policy early and often. iptables picks backends at random and is not a load balancer, so pods behind a cluster IP, kube-dns included, can carry very different loads.

Check your cluster for this

These 9 cases involve Client-side DNS resolver and cache and CoreDNS. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0104 After a CoreDNS pod was OOMKilled, the talk names three causes: Istio's aggressive DNS cache refresh on one reused client port, kube-proxy not cleaning up conntrack entries of terminated pods, and the 2-minute UDP conntrack timeout
  2. IL-0050 Pods on Kubernetes failed to resolve an external Redis hostname because of ndots:5, the musl resolver in Alpine images, and Netty's DNS resolver

Capacity exhaustion5 cases

  1. IL-0048 DNS lookups timed out in a large EKS cluster when CoreDNS hit the 1024 packets-per-second link-local limit, driven by sudo hostname lookups
  2. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down
  3. IL-0204 An etcd memory spike overloaded the control plane of a Render Frankfurt cluster, and DNS then failed because CoreDNS ran on the rebooted control plane nodes and could not start without the API server
    Render2024
  4. IL-0033 Uneven load across kube-dns pods and a DNS packets-per-second limit pushed service latency to 20 seconds
    Airbnb2019
  5. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries

DNS or network fault2 cases

  1. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS
  2. IL-0047 Pod-to-pod requests delayed by 5, 10 or 15 seconds because of DNS lookups lost to a conntrack race