Cases20 cases

11 to 15 of 20

1. IL-0437 Old pods from an unfinished Argo Rollouts canary could not start with a Helm-updated ConfigMap and died in a cascade

   Gunosy2023

   Symptoms

   During a traffic surge from a breaking news alert, pods of a Gunosy service on Kubernetes could not start because the containers could not read their settings from the ConfigMap. The pods that kept running took the extra load and were restarted, failed to start again, and pod after pod died.

   Container crash loop

   Trigger

   A breaking news alert increased traffic and pods were scaled out automatically while a release that removed an old database's settings from the ConfigMap had been rolled out to only one canary pod.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   ConfigMaps and SecretsHelmProgressive delivery controller

   Contributing factor

   Partial rolloutAutomation amplification

   Action items

   • Configure Argo Rollouts to roll out automatically, with setWeight 1, a one-hour pause and then setWeight 100
   • Add the "helm.sh/resource-policy": keep annotation so Helm keeps past versions of the ConfigMap
   • Build and use a Helm plugin, helm-clear, that keeps only the last few ConfigMap versions by the revision number in their names, set to keep 5 in CD

   Lessons

   Gunosy holds that a review that only resolves to be careful next time would soon be followed by the same failure, because human attention cannot be relied on, so each incident gets a permanent fix built into the system. Keeping past ConfigMap versions also made it possible to roll back quickly without going through CI/CD, which a ConfigMap change had previously prevented.

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2. IL-0163 An API change that slipped through a gap in automated testing made LKE clusters resize to the wrong number of nodes and added billable worker nodes to customer accounts

   Linode2023

   Symptoms

   Resizing an LKE cluster produced an incorrect number of nodes, so some customer clusters were resized in unexpected ways and the extra worker nodes were billed to the customer accounts. The clusters themselves kept functioning. Linode's first status update, at 05:07 UTC on 1 June 2023, advised customers to avoid resizing their clusters if possible.

   Autoscaler misbehaviour

   Trigger

   At about 16:00 UTC on 31 May 2023 a change to the API that caused LKE clusters to scale improperly was pushed to production.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Node pool

   Contributing factor

   Gap in automated tests

   Detection

   The first status update, at 05:07 UTC on 1 June, said Linode had been made aware of an issue when resizing LKE clusters, about 13 hours after the change went out.

   Remediation

   • advised customers to avoid resizing their clusters
   • deployed a hotfix at 09:40 UTC on 1 June that corrected the scaling behaviour
   • left the extra worker nodes in place to avoid disrupting customer workloads
   • contacted affected customers by ticket about credit adjustments and further mitigation

   Action items

   • Audit the automated tests
   • Add pre-deployment checklist items so the same failure does not happen again

   Lessons

   An API change that alters scaling behaviour resized customer clusters and added cost while the clusters themselves kept working; Linode announced the issue about 13 hours after the change went out. Removing the extra nodes would have disrupted workloads, so the cost was handled through credits instead.

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3. IL-0164 An incremental Linode Kubernetes Engine production update that was missing changes from the previous release made cluster upgrades and node additions fail silently

   Linode2022

   Symptoms

   From about 18:30 UTC on June 15, 2022, customers of the Linode Kubernetes Engine (LKE) who tried to upgrade a cluster or add nodes saw those operations fail silently, without an error. The status page opened an investigation of an LKE issue at 19:54 UTC, and the affected list covered LKE in eleven regions.

   Upgrade stall

   Trigger

   An incremental update pushed to the LKE production environment at about 18:30 UTC.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Node pool

   Contributing factor

   –

   Detection

   The status page began investigating at 19:54 UTC, 1 hour 24 minutes after the update.

   Remediation

   • Released a follow-up LKE update at about 21:00 UTC that contained the missing changes

   Action items

   • Add steps and automation to the update process

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4. IL-0591 Gitpod workspaces in all regions became IO bound and unresponsive for days after the ws39 workspace cluster release

   Gitpod2022

   Symptoms

   From April 11, 2022 at 13:17 UTC customers and Gitpod staff reported that Gitpod workspaces were intermittently becoming unresponsive. CPU usage of nodes and pods looked normal, with nothing maxed out, and at 13:58 UTC the team found that the workspaces were IO bound rather than CPU bound.

   Throughput degradationSustained high node CPUNode NotReadyData loss

   Trigger

   The ws39 generation of workspace clusters, released to all regional clusters on April 8th at 20:08 UTC and to the XL clusters on April 9th at 17:45 UTC, split the 1TB disk into smaller RAID0 disks, changed CPU limiting and workspace networking, and moved to faster machine types.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Node root diskContainer CPU limit

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutGap in automated testsUnrepresentative stagingUnknown limitOverlapping failuresIneffective rollbackHarmful manual actionLimited debug access

   Detection

   Customers and Gitpod staff reported on April 11th at 13:17 UTC that workspaces were intermittently unresponsive, and the team opened an incident in Slack through its incident.io integration. On April 17th the team noticed increased CPU load on the workspace nodes and opened an internal incident.

   Remediation

   • Shifted workspace starts back to the ws38 clusters on April 11th
   • Built ws39a clusters with c2d machines and local SSDs and moved traffic to them
   • Requested a limit increase from Let's Encrypt
   • Routed EU XL traffic to the regional EU cluster and built ws-eu39bxl to replace the crashed ws-eu39xl
   • Cleaned up workspaces stuck in a stopping state so users could start them again
   • Released ws40 with 1TB boot disks to get more IO bandwidth
   • Removed the workspaces that consumed excessive CPU time for crypto-mining
   • Blocked the fraudulent users behind the crypto-mining from using Gitpod
   • Rolled back the ws-daemon change that broke CPU limiting and shipped the fix in the ws34 clusters
   • Blocked ACME HTTP requests to workspace ports so Let's Encrypt rate limits would not be hit again
   • Rolled out IO limiting with the ws41xl and ws41 clusters and moved traffic to them step by step

   Action items

   • Invest in test automation so that test results stop releases like this one
   • Vary the interval between traffic shifts to new clusters, with more time for larger releases
   • Add a risk assessment stage, to be automated, that governs changeset size and rollout speed of workspace cluster rollouts
   • Reduce the impact teams have on each other
   • Add review criteria that find backwards incompatible changes before pull requests are merged, and split such pull requests
   • Recommend rollback as the primary means of mitigation in the incident procedures, and look at automating it
   • Make the status page show the workspace service as down when it is, and update the playbooks
   • Keep incident communication in a single Slack channel and Google Meet
   • Put 10% of the engineering staff on the on-call rotation from May 9th and use that time on observability, alerting and stability

   Lessons

   Gitpod concluded that it should have committed to rolling back on April 11th instead of building and shipping fixes, which kept customers on degraded workspaces longer than necessary. A large release so soon after the previous one needed a risk assessment and slower traffic shifts, and backwards incompatible changes that block a rollback need to be found before pull requests are merged. Failure-free operations require experience with failure.

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5. IL-0086 A deployment meant for a CircleCI test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from the production cluster, taking down the CircleCI UI and runner.circleci.com

   CircleCI2021

   Symptoms

   At 15:35 EST on 11 March 2021 the CircleCI web UI and runner.circleci.com became unavailable. The API, which uses a separate ingress point, stayed reachable, and builds kept running.

   Service outageResources deleted

   Trigger

   An update deployed to a test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from CircleCI's primary production cluster.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Ingress controllerCalico

   Contributing factor

   Excessive blast radiusNo runbookMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   CircleCI engineers were alerted and began investigating. The status page posted its first notice at 20:45 UTC.

   Remediation

   • restored Traefik in the production cluster
   • restored Calico in the production cluster, after which pods served customer requests again

   Action items

   • Improve network-level documentation and runbooks to cover every layer of the Kubernetes networks
   • Improve monitoring and alerting for the network infrastructure
   • Add guardrails that isolate the production and staging clusters so they cannot interfere with each other

   Lessons

   A deployment path that can reach both a test cluster and production can remove shared networking components from production. When the ingress controller and the CNI are both affected, restoring the ingress alone is not enough: engineers had to find the link between Calico and Traefik and restore Calico before pods served traffic again. Time went to DNS and AWS red herrings because nothing linked the outage to the test deployment; CircleCI's answer is better network runbooks, network alerting and guardrails between clusters.

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