Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases29 cases

12 to 16 of 29

  1. Symptoms

    Alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST on 11 December 2024, and from 3:16 PM every OpenAI service was significantly degraded or completely unavailable, including ChatGPT, the API and Sora. The status page reported API calls returning errors and difficulties logging in to platform.openai.com and ChatGPT. Customer impact peaked at 3:40 PM.

    Trigger

    At 2:23 PM PST a change introducing a new telemetry service, which collects detailed Kubernetes control plane metrics, was merged and the deployment pipeline started. Between 2:51 PM and 3:20 PM the change was applied to all clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    OpenAI's detection tools worked: alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST, a few minutes before customer impact began at 3:16 PM, and the root cause was identified at 3:16 PM.

    Remediation
    • Scaled clusters down to reduce the total Kubernetes API load
    • Blocked network access to the Kubernetes admin APIs so no new expensive requests arrived
    • Scaled up the Kubernetes API servers
    • Removed the telemetry service once enough control was back
    • Moved traffic from impacted clusters to healthy ones
    • Intervened manually in clusters where simultaneous resource downloads saturated resource limits
    Action items
    • Put every infrastructure configuration change through a phased rollout with continuous monitoring of both the service workloads and the clusters, including the Kubernetes control plane
    • Run fault injection tests in which the data plane runs without the control plane for longer, and tests that roll out bad changes on purpose to check detection and rollback
    • Build break-glass mechanisms so engineers can reach the Kubernetes API servers in any circumstances
    • Decouple the Kubernetes data plane from the control plane so that service discovery for critical workloads does not depend on the control plane
    • Speed up recovery with better caching and dynamic rate limiters for resources needed at cluster startup, and regular drills that rapidly replace an entire cluster
    Lessons

    Several systems and processes failed at once and interacted in unexpected ways: tests did not catch the change's effect on the Kubernetes control plane, DNS caching put a delay between the change and the failures, and being locked out of the control plane made remediation very slow. Because service discovery used Kubernetes DNS, the control plane was carrying load for product traffic even though the data plane was meant to be independent of it.

  2. Symptoms

    A team using Neco, the Kubernetes platform run by Cybozu's Cloud Platform team, reported what looked like a performance problem in the cluster DNS servers. An application in a pod that resolved cluster Services at hundreds of requests per second frequently got `no such host` and `i/o timeout` errors.

    Trigger

    The number of MySQL clusters watched by the monitoring application increased, and after that the name resolution errors became frequent.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A team using the platform contacted the Cloud Platform team, describing the errors as a performance problem in the cluster DNS server.

    Remediation
    • Raised the kernel parameter netdev_max_backlog on the nodes
    • Set up alerts on softnet
    • Wrote a runbook for the softnet alerts
    Action items
    • Evaluate Cilium's netkit device so pod packets bypass the backlog queue
    Lessons

    Raising netdev_max_backlog makes the same failure less likely and the new alerts catch it early, but it is not a root fix: a pod that sends more packets can fill the backlog queue again. Cybozu sees replacing the veth interface with netkit, which skips the backlog queue, as the root fix.

  3. Symptoms

    When MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining endpoints of its backend API sent to EKS from 1% to 25%, Sentry filled with errors saying the API could not reach the database and outside services. The errors were about DNS name resolution, and the traffic had to be shifted back to the EC2 version.

    Trigger

    MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining API endpoints routed by the ALB to the EKS version from 1% to 25%.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Sentry showed a large number of errors about connecting to the database and outside services right after the traffic share was raised.

    Remediation
    • Shifted the requests back to the EC2 version to stop the errors
    • Added an HPA to autoscale the CoreDNS pods as a stopgap, which let the migration to EKS finish
    Action items
    • Set ndots to 1 through dnsConfig in the application Deployments
    • Set cache 600 in the Corefile in the coredns ConfigMap to lengthen the CoreDNS cache TTL
    • Add lameduck 30s to the CoreDNS health plugin so CoreDNS keeps serving while it is scaled in
    • Consider reducing the differences between production and staging, weighed against cost
    Lessons

    MonotaRO assumed that a managed service would not cause problems and so skipped researching other companies' migrations, load testing and monitoring. Staging differed from production in its network layout, so ndots differed between them, and staging databases could not take a high-load test. Looking at the CoreDNS logs and resolv.conf instead of guessing found that ndots:5 made lookups of outside names try every search domain first.

  4. Symptoms

    On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

    Remediation
    • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
    • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
    • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
    • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
    • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls
    Lessons

    The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

  5. Symptoms

    About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

    Trigger

    An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

    Remediation
    • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
    • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
    • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
    • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
    • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
    • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
    • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand
    Action items
    • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
    • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
    • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
    • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
    • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe
    Lessons

    Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

Check your cluster for this

These 29 cases involve CoreDNS and Client-side DNS resolver and cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Capacity exhaustion14 cases

  1. IL-0102 CoreDNS pods on a production EKS cluster ran out of memory under a burst of new pods, endpoints and nodes, taking down the Buildkite web UI, APIs and job dispatch
  2. IL-0155 Some DOKS clusters in NYC1 saw intermittent DNS timeouts and NodeNotReady events because CoreDNS ran on shared-CPU Droplet worker nodes
  3. IL-0048 DNS lookups timed out in a large EKS cluster when CoreDNS hit the 1024 packets-per-second link-local limit, driven by sudo hostname lookups
  4. IL-0080 kube-dns on Mercari's GKE clusters could not keep up with peak-hour DNS query rates, and a Sev1 production outage followed when several services failed DNS resolution
  5. IL-0082 Losing one CoreDNS pod during a planned EKS node reroll overloaded the remaining CoreDNS pods, causing DNS timeouts and errors across multiple services at RebelMouse
  6. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down
  7. IL-0204 An etcd memory spike overloaded the control plane of a Render Frankfurt cluster, and DNS then failed because CoreDNS ran on the rebooted control plane nodes and could not start without the API server
    Render2024
  8. IL-0440 Pods on Cybozu's Neco Kubernetes platform got frequent no such host and i/o timeout DNS errors from dropped packets
    Cybozu2024
  9. IL-0433 Shifting API traffic from EC2 to EKS on Fargate overloaded two CoreDNS pods and caused mass name-resolution errors
  10. IL-0445 Chatwork's service on EKS became unstable as conntrack tables on some nodes overflowed and connections were dropped
  11. IL-0033 Uneven load across kube-dns pods and a DNS packets-per-second limit pushed service latency to 20 seconds
    Airbnb2019
  12. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API
  13. IL-0472 Node-to-pod traffic and DNS failed on Tinder's 605-node Flannel cluster when every node's ARP cache passed gc_thresh3
    Tinder2019
  14. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries

Software defect4 cases

  1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1
  2. IL-0104 After a CoreDNS pod was OOMKilled, the talk names three causes: Istio's aggressive DNS cache refresh on one reused client port, kube-proxy not cleaning up conntrack entries of terminated pods, and the 2-minute UDP conntrack timeout
  3. IL-0050 Pods on Kubernetes failed to resolve an external Redis hostname because of ndots:5, the musl resolver in Alpine images, and Netty's DNS resolver
  4. IL-0074 All AirMap platform services down as worker nodes went NotReady and pods crash-looped on network and DNS failures
    AirMap2018

Breaking change in an upgrade4 cases

  1. IL-0101 After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hours
  2. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023
  3. IL-0230 kube-proxy sync failures during a Kubernetes upgrade corrupted node iptables, and CircleCI jobs stopped starting
  4. IL-0144 A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOff

Dependency failure1 case

Contributing factor
–
Organisation
  1. IL-0162 LKE users could not reach their cluster control planes or the LKE Dashboard because an earlier database update made the internal LKE DNS service hang
    Linode2025

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services
    OpenAI2024
  2. IL-0461 Every rollout of Datadog's metrics query service on Kubernetes raised errors that the logs blamed on DNS

DNS or network fault4 cases

  1. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS
  2. IL-0517 Gitpod workspaces failed to start worldwide and lost data when CoreDNS lookups to 8.8.8.8 timed out in its clusters
    Gitpod2022
  3. IL-0049 Partial DNS outage after CoreDNS scaled down and kube-proxy failed to delete stale conntrack entries
    Preply2020
  4. IL-0047 Pod-to-pod requests delayed by 5, 10 or 15 seconds because of DNS lookups lost to a conntrack race