Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases17 cases

14 to 17 of 17

  1. Symptoms

    From around 19:00 UTC on 31 January 2017, load on GitLab.com's PostgreSQL database rose, which GitLab suspected was spam, and many users could not post comments on issues and merge requests. Around 23:00 UTC the replication of the PostgreSQL secondary fell behind and then failed, because WAL segments it still needed had already been removed from the primary.

    Trigger

    While trying to restore replication to the secondary, an engineer ran the removal of the PostgreSQL data directory on the primary, db1.cluster.gitlab.com, believing it was the secondary.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The engineer who ran the deletion on the primary noticed the mistake and stopped it a second or two later.

    Remediation
    • Raised max_wal_senders from 3 to 32 and lowered max_connections from 8000 to 2000 so PostgreSQL would restart
    • Stopped the deletion on the primary a second or two after noticing it
    • Restored the database from the LVM snapshot taken about 6 hours before the outage by copying the PostgreSQL data directory from staging
    • Restored the webhooks from a separate database built from the snapshot and imported them as a SQL dump
    • Incremented all database sequences by 100,000 so IDs used before the outage could not be reused
    • Re-enabled GitLab.com gradually
    • Rebuilt projects created after 17:20 UTC in basic form from their Git repositories on the NFS cluster
    Action items
    • Change the shell prompt (PS1) on all hosts to show more clearly which host and environment is in use
    • Monitor backups with Prometheus
    • Set PostgreSQL's max_connections to a sane value
    • Investigate point-in-time recovery and continuous archiving for PostgreSQL
    • Take LVM snapshots of the production databases every hour
    • Take Azure disk snapshots of the production databases
    • Move staging to the ARM environment
    • Recover the production replicas
    • Test recovery of PostgreSQL database backups automatically
    • Improve the PostgreSQL replication documentation and runbooks
    • Investigate pgbarman for PostgreSQL backups
    • Investigate WAL-E for database backup and realtime replication
    • Build a streaming database restore
    • Assign an owner for data durability
    • Set up multiple secondaries and balance load among them with pgpool-II
    • Provide a tool for developers to run and revert Rails migrations on staging
    • Build owned recovery procedures for the rest of the GitLab.com infrastructure, not only the database
    • Publish a backup monitoring dashboard and add more backup data to it
    • Improve the abuse reporting and response system so removal for spam does not hard delete
    • Redact engineers' names in future public incident documents
    Lessons

    GitLab split the incident into two problems: GitLab.com went down because the primary's data directory was removed by mistake during a manual, undocumented replication rebuild, and recovery took over 18 hours because the backups had failed silently, disk snapshots were not enabled and the only copy sat on slow staging disks. The backup procedure was never tested because no one owned it. GitLab chose to focus on fast, regularly practised recovery and on making it obvious which host an engineer is on, rather than on blocking commands, since a safer rm only protects against one of many ways to lose data.

  2. Symptoms

    On July 30th, a few minutes after the OSU Open Source Lab started reloading the MySQL server mysql2 to fix its replication errors, the team saw that databases were being dropped on mysql1 as well. The script was stopped, and the MySQL service behind mysql1-vip stayed down through a long restore.

    Trigger

    On July 30th at 4:00PM PDT the team stopped slave replication on mysql2 and began dropping its databases one at a time to reload it and fix replication errors.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team watching the reload noticed after a few minutes that mysql1 was also dropping databases; the delays between drops in the script gave them that time.

    Remediation
    • Stopped the script that was dropping databases
    • Restored the databases from the mysql-zrm backups
    • Pulled each database that failed to restore out of the 200GB backup file and restored it separately
    • Recovered most data with the binary logs from the 17th through the 30th
    Action items
    • Evaluate better replication strategies, including row-based replication
    • Store binlogs as a backup on a separate server
    • Take backups with Percona XtraBackup for much faster full restores
    • Use mydumper instead of mysql-zrm for faster logical backups
    • Improve documentation and training for complex systems
    • Test full restores regularly on a spare server as part of the backup process
    • Gather more accurate time estimates for the restore process
    • Audit the hosted databases regularly, since test and very large databases delayed the restore
    • Migrate to a bigger, more powerful MySQL cluster
    • Set a policy and tools to keep the community informed of outages, maintenance and resource use, with dashboards
    • Define and monitor capacity limits for core services
    • Implement redundancy and restore practices for core services, including staff drills
    • Migrate more core services to Chef
    • Review documentation, policies and performance metrics periodically
    • Find better ways to draw on community expertise
    • Raise funds to replace the oldest infrastructure and reduce technical debt
    Lessons

    The lab had stretched its resources to host as many projects as possible, and that came with tradeoffs such as heavily compressed backups to save disk and less redundancy than wanted; the heavy compression made this restore CPU-bound. The lab concluded that it needs to change how it plans, monitors and manages resources, and that the length of the outage and the lack of progress reports were not acceptable.

  3. Symptoms

    On Thursday, March 7th, all of Kickstarter's MySQL replicas on Amazon RDS stopped applying updates, not just one replica that could be replaced. Most of Kickstarter's traffic is served from these replicas, so the site ran on stale copies of the database.

    Trigger

    A later unsafe query on the backings table made MySQL switch to row-based replication for that query, and replaying the full row on the replicas collided with sequence values that already differed from the primary.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The team saw that the replicas had stopped updating, and SHOW SLAVE STATUS showed the duplicate-key replication error.

    Lessons

    Databases are intricate. In the Rails community they are sometimes treated as simple data stores hidden behind ActiveRecord and ActiveRelation, and Kickstarter's engineers concluded that it pays to learn how the database carries out what it is asked to do.

  4. Symptoms

    On Monday, September 10th, 2012, during a schema migration, the health checks on GitHub's MySQL master failed and Percona Replication Manager moved the 'active' role to another node of the new three-node cluster. That node's InnoDB buffer pool was cold and it performed poorly, its health checks failed in turn, and the role failed back to the original server. GitHub.com went down.

    Trigger

    A schema migration on Monday, September 10th put more load on the master database than earlier migrations had, and Percona Replication Manager's health checks on the master failed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On the morning of September 11th, a developer told the operations team that the 'standby' node was returning incorrect query results.

    Remediation
    • Enabled Pacemaker's maintenance-mode so no health checks or automatic failovers ran, and let the buffer pool warm
    • Powered off the out-of-date node 'c' to end the partition
    • Stopped Pacemaker and Heartbeat on nodes 'a' and 'b' and started them on node 'a' only
    • Started MySQL on node 'a' in the active role
    • Removed the events leaked to wrong dashboards and audited the wrongly routed repositories
    • Contacted the owners of the exposed private repositories
    Action items
    • Change the Pacemaker configuration so the active database role fails over only when an operations engineer starts it
    • Find a way to warm the InnoDB buffer pool of slave databases so failovers do not hurt performance
    • Audit the Pacemaker and Heartbeat stack, focusing on the code path behind the segfault
    • Run hardware tests on the server where the segfault happened
    Lessons

    GitHub concluded that automated failover is not the right strategy for its primary production database: for every failover in this incident, any member of the operations team would have said it should not happen. Failovers that must happen, in an emergency or during maintenance, should not hurt performance.

Check your cluster for this

These 17 cases involve Database and Database replication. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause8

Capacity exhaustion4 cases

  1. IL-0379 InfluxDB Cloud queries in Azure West Europe slowed and timed out as storage pods fell behind and kept restarting
  2. IL-0288 ZooKeeperWait rose to thousands of seconds on three redundant ClickHouse instances, degrading a CDN77 data pipeline
    CDN772026
  3. IL-0305 Replicas of one Intercom Vitess shard hit 100% CPU and fell up to 2.2 hours behind, serving stale inbox data
  4. IL-0443 A Repro Aurora MySQL reader restarted unexpectedly and writer insert latency rose about sevenfold for a day or more
    Repro2019

Cloud provider outage2 cases

  1. IL-0322 A GCP storage incident degraded the disk under GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL and caused two bursts of site-wide 503s
    GitLab2026
  2. IL-0368 PlanetScale's control plane went down and some database branches failed queries during the AWS us-east-1 outage

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0569 After an MHA master failover, one of three MySQL replicas failed with a malformed binlog error and could not catch up
    DeNA2026

Software defect3 cases

  1. IL-0527 OpenStreetMap.org made no replication diffs for 16 hours as PostgreSQL logical decoding failed on a memory alloc error
  2. IL-0589 Every Kickstarter MySQL replica on Amazon RDS stopped replicating on a duplicate-key error in the backings table
  3. IL-0303 GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went down
    GitHub2012

Configuration change2 cases

  1. IL-0392 MariaDB replication of section x1 between eqiad and codfw broke on a missing heartbeat row during a cookbook run
  2. IL-0331 An RDS MySQL Multi-AZ failover lost 5 seconds of committed data and broke replication on all five read replicas

Hardware failure1 case

  1. IL-0323 A RAID battery backup unit failure crashed db1075, the MariaDB primary of section s3, and every s3 wiki went read-only

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0210 GitHub's MySQL clusters failed over to the US West Coast and the site served slow, stale, inconsistent data for 24 hours
    GitHub2018

Operator error3 cases

  1. IL-0431 During Mackerel's move to AWS, PostgreSQL failed over to a replica that had stopped replicating, losing an hour of data
    Hatena2017
  2. IL-0218 GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL data was wiped by mistake and, with no working backup, the site was down about 18 hours
    GitLab2017
  3. IL-0319 Dropping databases on the MySQL replica mysql2 also dropped them on mysql1, as the pair actually ran master-master