Cases6 cases

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1. IL-0021 GKE GPU nodes on Container-Optimized OS could not download NVIDIA drivers (403 Forbidden) and came up without working GPUs

   Google Cloud2024

   Symptoms

   From 08:00 US/Pacific on 12 March 2024, GKE GPU nodes running Container-Optimized OS (COS) that were newly created or recreated came up with GPU drivers that did not work, so workloads that used the GPUs could not run. GKE showed elevated errors.

   GPU unavailableNode NotReady

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   GPU driverNode operating system imageNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplification

   Detection

   The report does not say how Google detected the issue. Affected users saw "Failed to download GPU driver installer, status: 403 Forbidden" on the GPU node when installing the driver.

   Remediation

   • Halted automatic node recreations, which attempt GPU driver downloads, until the issue was mitigated
   • Worked with the driver partner to resolve access to the driver download bucket

   Lessons

   The status page report states no lessons or follow-up actions.

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2. IL-0198 An automatic Ubuntu security update restarted systemd-networkd, which flushed the IP rules Cilium relied on and cut more than 60 percent of Datadog's Kubernetes nodes off the network across regions and cloud providers

   Datadog2023

   Symptoms

   Between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC on 8 March 2023, Kubernetes nodes in several Datadog regions lost network connectivity at the same time, on AWS, Google Cloud and Azure. All services across multiple regions were affected, including the regions that host Datadog's CI/CD and automation tools. Datadog's regions are not connected to each other and changes are rolled out one region at a time, so a simultaneous failure on several cloud providers looked implausible at first.

   Node NotReadyService outageThroughput degradation

   Trigger

   On 7 March 2023 Ubuntu published a systemd patch for a CVE (249.11-0ubuntu3.7). Ubuntu's default unattended upgrades installed it on the nodes between 06:00 and 07:00 UTC on 8 March, and installing it restarted systemd-networkd.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   systemd-networkdCiliumNode operating system image

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsChange with a delayed effectNo staged rolloutAutomation amplification

   Remediation

   • restarted thousands of disconnected instances on Google Cloud and Azure through the cloud APIs, keeping their local disks
   • rebuilt the data lost with terminated AWS instances' local disks through replication, reprocessing and restores from backup

   Lessons

   A change in a base operating system component can stay dormant for months until something restarts that component. Here the trigger was a security patch, and the change reached every region at once because automatic OS updates ran outside the progressive, region-by-region process used for every other change. Cloud providers react differently to an instance that loses its network. Google Cloud and Azure left the instances running, so a restart recovered them with their disks; AWS replaced them quickly, which brought stateless services back fast but destroyed the local-disk data the stateful services needed.

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3. IL-0112 The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeouts

   DFDS2022

   Symptoms

   On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

   Node NotReadyUpgrade stallIntermittent timeoutsIntermittent connection failures

   Trigger

   At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Node operating system imageLinux kernelkubeletAWS VPC CNINode launch templateTerraform

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutAutomation amplificationOverlapping failuresMonitoring blind spotNo health probes

   Detection

   The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

   Remediation

   • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
   • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
   • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline

   Action items

   • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
   • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
   • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
   • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
   • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
   • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
   • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
   • Collect logs from nodes centrally
   • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts

   Lessons

   When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

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4. IL-0144 A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOff

   Microsoft Azure2022

   Symptoms

   From 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, Azure VMs running Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic) with unattended-upgrades enabled began failing DNS resolution and losing network connectivity. Several Azure teams, among them the AKS and Azure Container Apps teams, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the update packages were published.

   DNS resolution failuresImage pull failuresMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   Unattended-upgrades on Ubuntu 18.04 VMs installed a Canonical security update published at 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, including systemd version 237-3ubuntu10.54.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   Node operating system imagekubeletContainer registry and its credentialsClient-side DNS resolver and cache

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutExcessive blast radiusAutomation amplification

   Detection

   Several Azure teams, including AKS and Azure Container Apps, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the packages were published; incoming support cases then confirmed which Ubuntu versions were affected.

   Remediation

   • pointed customers to Canonical's description of the systemd bug and its fix
   • recommended rebooting affected VMs or running a template script that repairs DNS resolution
   • built automatic detection and remediation for AKS nodes and rolled it out across all regions
   • mitigated the remaining AKS customers manually through support

   Action items

   • Review the process that lets critical security updates bypass Safe Deployment Practices
   • Improve monitoring of the AKS data plane to alert on an uptick of errors
   • Review AKS monitoring algorithms so that similar VM errors are detected and alerted on
   • Establish an improved escalation path to Canonical during outages and add it to internal Technical Service Guides
   • AKS takes full control of the node security patch mechanism, with additional testing and controlled release of patches (estimated December 2022)
   • Work with Canonical to run dedicated tests on proposed packages before they are published for Azure IaaS VMs
   • Establish a process with Canonical to close the testing gap for the upgrade scenario (estimated March 2023)
   • Give AKS customers maintenance window control and environment staging for these patches (estimated December 2023)

   Lessons

   Security patches applied automatically by unattended-upgrades, once a day by default, and outside Azure's Safe Deployment Practices reached Ubuntu 18.04 VMs in every Azure region, so one systemd regression became a DNS outage across Azure. On AKS, lost node DNS showed up as image pull failures such as ImagePullBackoff, because kubelet could not resolve the registry. Azure plans to put node security patching under AKS's control with testing and controlled release; customers can use automatic node image upgrade for AKS, or automatic VM guest patching for VMs, instead of unattended-upgrades.

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