Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases8 cases

3 to 7 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    From April 11, 2022 at 13:17 UTC customers and Gitpod staff reported that Gitpod workspaces were intermittently becoming unresponsive. CPU usage of nodes and pods looked normal, with nothing maxed out, and at 13:58 UTC the team found that the workspaces were IO bound rather than CPU bound.

    Trigger

    The ws39 generation of workspace clusters, released to all regional clusters on April 8th at 20:08 UTC and to the XL clusters on April 9th at 17:45 UTC, split the 1TB disk into smaller RAID0 disks, changed CPU limiting and workspace networking, and moved to faster machine types.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers and Gitpod staff reported on April 11th at 13:17 UTC that workspaces were intermittently unresponsive, and the team opened an incident in Slack through its incident.io integration. On April 17th the team noticed increased CPU load on the workspace nodes and opened an internal incident.

    Remediation
    • Shifted workspace starts back to the ws38 clusters on April 11th
    • Built ws39a clusters with c2d machines and local SSDs and moved traffic to them
    • Requested a limit increase from Let's Encrypt
    • Routed EU XL traffic to the regional EU cluster and built ws-eu39bxl to replace the crashed ws-eu39xl
    • Cleaned up workspaces stuck in a stopping state so users could start them again
    • Released ws40 with 1TB boot disks to get more IO bandwidth
    • Removed the workspaces that consumed excessive CPU time for crypto-mining
    • Blocked the fraudulent users behind the crypto-mining from using Gitpod
    • Rolled back the ws-daemon change that broke CPU limiting and shipped the fix in the ws34 clusters
    • Blocked ACME HTTP requests to workspace ports so Let's Encrypt rate limits would not be hit again
    • Rolled out IO limiting with the ws41xl and ws41 clusters and moved traffic to them step by step
    Action items
    • Invest in test automation so that test results stop releases like this one
    • Vary the interval between traffic shifts to new clusters, with more time for larger releases
    • Add a risk assessment stage, to be automated, that governs changeset size and rollout speed of workspace cluster rollouts
    • Reduce the impact teams have on each other
    • Add review criteria that find backwards incompatible changes before pull requests are merged, and split such pull requests
    • Recommend rollback as the primary means of mitigation in the incident procedures, and look at automating it
    • Make the status page show the workspace service as down when it is, and update the playbooks
    • Keep incident communication in a single Slack channel and Google Meet
    • Put 10% of the engineering staff on the on-call rotation from May 9th and use that time on observability, alerting and stability
    Lessons

    Gitpod concluded that it should have committed to rolling back on April 11th instead of building and shipping fixes, which kept customers on degraded workspaces longer than necessary. A large release so soon after the previous one needed a risk assessment and slower traffic shifts, and backwards incompatible changes that block a rollback need to be found before pull requests are merged. Failure-free operations require experience with failure.

  2. Symptoms

    Two or three days after Enigmo created EKS managed node groups and moved its pods there from the old node groups, the cluster suddenly became unstable: pods restarted again and again or could not stop and stayed around indefinitely, node CPU and memory load rose high, and the nodes became unusable from the cluster.

    Trigger

    Enigmo created EKS managed node groups that used an AMI containing the bug and moved its pods onto them, as preparation for upgrading EKS from 1.15 to 1.16.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Changed the managed node groups' AMI version to the fixed release
    • Ran the managed node group update through CloudFormation
    • Watched the pods across all namespaces during the update
    • Force-deleted every pod that stayed in Terminating with kubectl delete --grace-period=0 --force
    Action items
    • Check the latest releases of the cluster's modules quarterly or monthly and upgrade them regularly
    Lessons

    As long as a team uses Amazon EKS or Kubernetes, it has to keep track of upgrades of the cluster and of modules such as ingress controllers, because a release with breaking changes can be announced without warning after a long stable period. Checking releases and upgrading on a regular schedule keeps the effect of each upgrade on the service small.

  3. Symptoms

    At 08:52 PM IST a report came in from WER that many students could not access the JupyterHub and that it was frozen; pages were stuck and nothing was usable. A rise in activity was visible by 09:02 PM, but the usual fixes, such as opening an incognito window and restarting servers, did not help.

    Trigger

    WER students' pods used a good chunk of their memory limit (tests had shown they almost always use just under 1G of their 2G limit, against a 512M guarantee) on nodes shared with the hub's core pods.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    WER reported stuck pages and students unable to reach the hub in a GitHub issue (2i2c-org/docs#27).

    Remediation
    • removed memory overcommit for the WER students
    • raised resource guarantees for all core pods, which restarted them and moved some to a new node
    Action items
    • Put user pods in a separate pool so they do not create pressure on the core pods (infrastructure#89)
    • Set limits on the support infrastructure (Prometheus, Grafana, ingress) as well (infrastructure#90)
    • Document and think about overcommit ratios for memory usage (infrastructure#91)
    • Set up better Grafana dashboards to monitor resource usage (infrastructure#92)
    • Document how people can get kubectl access to the cluster so others can look into issues too (infrastructure#87)
    Lessons

    Core pods without resource guarantees get whatever is left on a node, so when user pods on the same nodes fill the CPU and memory, the hub that serves everyone freezes. The memory overcommit ratio has to come from measured use: WER students used just under 1G against a 512M guarantee, which a 4x overcommit could not hold.

  4. Symptoms

    Datadog alerted the DevOps team to a high normalised load average, first on the staging cluster (Day 0, 21:06 EST) and the next day on the development cluster (Day 1, 16:53 EST). The load was first put down to a legitimate service that kept scaling up and down in both environments, and because of the volume of identical alerts they were muted until things settled.

    Trigger

    An automated crawler found the Weave Scope dashboard on a public load balancer that required no authentication. Weave Scope can open a shell in running containers, and its scope-agent containers ran privileged, as root and with the host's root filesystem mounted, so a command started there could run on the host.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Datadog alerts on high normalised load average, muted at first as noise from a legitimate service; on Day 3 an engineer ran top on a node and found the gcc process at 100% CPU.

    Remediation
    • stopped Weave Scope and removed its deployment from all Kubernetes clusters
    • checked access logs for unauthorised access to the instances
    • confirmed the miner's outbound connections went only to a mining pool
    • isolated one affected node for later investigation
    • rotated out every node in each cluster so all affected hosts were destroyed and rebuilt
    Action items
    • Audit all Kubernetes and deployment YAML files and security groups for services that are unintentionally public or misconfigured
    • Replace load-average alerts with more meaningful monitors and tune them to signal a real anomaly
    • Research tools such as falcon or sysdig for behavioural monitoring and anomaly and intrusion detection
    • Evaluate Istio and Linkerd for observing and controlling end-to-end network traffic
    • Analyse the cost of scanning Docker images and containers for known vulnerabilities
    • Set aside time in architecture discussions to revisit older choices such as running containers as root
    • Share knowledge of large projects, such as Kubernetes version migrations, across the whole team
    Lessons

    Load average was not a useful signal for spotting a problem in the clusters, and muted noisy alerts nearly hid the miner. A load balancer that Kubernetes creates belongs to Kubernetes: a manual security group edit in the AWS console is reverted, so internal exposure must be declared in the Kubernetes YAML. A dashboard that can open shells, in front of privileged agents that mount the host's root filesystem, gives whoever reaches it root on every node.

  5. Symptoms

    On 8 February 2019 the Kubernetes project's Prow instance at prow.k8s.io became very slow: its controllers took about five minutes to respond to the hook, bot commands such as the cat command stopped working, and the prow.k8s.io site was hard to reach. GitHub status was normal, and the Prow service nodes were found running above 100% of CPU and memory.

    Trigger

    At 13:20 PST an auto-generated bump PR for Prow was merged and deployed, and Prow started scheduling workloads onto the service cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    While working on a PR, a maintainer noticed the bot's cat command failing, found GitHub status normal, learned on Slack that the Prow nodes were above 100% CPU and memory, and then found 600 pending pods in the test-pods namespace.

    Remediation
    • Rolled Prow back to v20190206-b01b288 and cleaned up the pods and ProwJobs in the service cluster
    • Applied the revert by hand with kubectl apply after the deployment permission was missing
    • Sent a fix, PR 11209, so the client no longer overwrites a provided literal default client
    • Rolled Prow back to v20190125-2aca69d, from before the bug was introduced
    • Cleaned up the wrongly scheduled pods and ProwJobs again and confirmed Prow was healthy
    Action items
    • Find out why the bug did not show deterministically
    • Be more careful with sweeping Prow changes, with more end-to-end tests or a real staging Prow
    Lessons

    The behaviour was not deterministic, and the change was deployed on a Friday afternoon. Prow instances are set up differently, for example in how build clusters are defined, so another project's Prow running a version fine does not show it is safe for the Kubernetes Prow, which needs a staging environment that looks like it.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve Node pool and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries
  2. IL-0094 Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub
    2i2c2020
  3. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0087 After a cold reboot of RKE2 nodes, pods could not get IP addresses because Multus could not reach the Kubernetes API, and further reboots spread the failure to every node

Faulty deployment2 cases

  1. IL-0591 Gitpod workspaces in all regions became IO bound and unresponsive for days after the ws39 workspace cluster release
    Gitpod2022
  2. IL-0466 Prow scheduled test job pods onto its service cluster, leaving hundreds Pending and starving Prow's own services

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0449 Pods on Enigmo's new EKS managed node groups kept restarting or stuck Terminating and the nodes became unusable
    Enigmo2020

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard