Cases6 cases

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1. IL-0523 TANF-app production deployments were blocked for two months when a search-index migration ran out of database disk space

   U.S. Department of Health and Human Services2023

   Symptoms

   On 20 September 2023 the sprint 82 production deployment of TANF-app failed with a disk space error while it ran a large search-index migration, search_indexes 0017, against the production PostgreSQL database on cloud.gov. Production could not be deployed again until 9 November.

   Deploys failingNode disk full

   Trigger

   The sprint 82 deployment on 20 September 2023 recreated the deleted search_indexes migration 0016 and ran the large migration search_indexes 0017 against the production database.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   DatabaseSchema migration

   Contributing factor

   Overlapping failuresGap in automated testsUnrepresentative stagingNo runbook

   Detection

   The sprint 82 production deployment failed with a disk space error, and the large migration search_indexes 0017 was identified as the cause.

   Remediation

   • Increased the production database instance size and re-ran the migrations
   • Created a backup of the production database
   • Truncated all of the search_indexes tables
   • Redeployed the sprint 82 release
   • Fixed the bug that stored empty fields as blank strings

   Action items

   • Write troubleshooting steps for database problems into the technical documentation
   • Write wiki pages and operations playbooks that outline common problems and responses
   • Add a database section and the cf revisions command to the failed-deployment troubleshooting document
   • Keep a GitHub repository of changes made directly to production
   • Save terminal output from production debugging sessions
   • Create Django migration best practices to enforce in code reviews
   • Do not edit migrations that have been merged to develop; write a new migration instead
   • Rename auto-generated migrations to more descriptive names
   • Use one auto-generated migration per model change and regenerate when a pull request makes successive changes
   • Organise a discussion on database seeding and backups for testing

   Lessons

   The work was unplanned and pulled in many developers from a small team, so the team wants documentation and playbooks that let fewer people step away from current work. Large datasets and unexpected edge cases such as rows without space-fill had not been tested, and a copy of the production database with PII scrubbed would allow tests against real-world data. Deploying in-progress code to other environments and changing migrations afterwards had caused conflicts there.

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2. IL-0591 Gitpod workspaces in all regions became IO bound and unresponsive for days after the ws39 workspace cluster release

   Gitpod2022

   Symptoms

   From April 11, 2022 at 13:17 UTC customers and Gitpod staff reported that Gitpod workspaces were intermittently becoming unresponsive. CPU usage of nodes and pods looked normal, with nothing maxed out, and at 13:58 UTC the team found that the workspaces were IO bound rather than CPU bound.

   Throughput degradationSustained high node CPUNode NotReadyData loss

   Trigger

   The ws39 generation of workspace clusters, released to all regional clusters on April 8th at 20:08 UTC and to the XL clusters on April 9th at 17:45 UTC, split the 1TB disk into smaller RAID0 disks, changed CPU limiting and workspace networking, and moved to faster machine types.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Node root diskContainer CPU limit

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutGap in automated testsUnrepresentative stagingUnknown limitOverlapping failuresIneffective rollbackHarmful manual actionLimited debug access

   Detection

   Customers and Gitpod staff reported on April 11th at 13:17 UTC that workspaces were intermittently unresponsive, and the team opened an incident in Slack through its incident.io integration. On April 17th the team noticed increased CPU load on the workspace nodes and opened an internal incident.

   Remediation

   • Shifted workspace starts back to the ws38 clusters on April 11th
   • Built ws39a clusters with c2d machines and local SSDs and moved traffic to them
   • Requested a limit increase from Let's Encrypt
   • Routed EU XL traffic to the regional EU cluster and built ws-eu39bxl to replace the crashed ws-eu39xl
   • Cleaned up workspaces stuck in a stopping state so users could start them again
   • Released ws40 with 1TB boot disks to get more IO bandwidth
   • Removed the workspaces that consumed excessive CPU time for crypto-mining
   • Blocked the fraudulent users behind the crypto-mining from using Gitpod
   • Rolled back the ws-daemon change that broke CPU limiting and shipped the fix in the ws34 clusters
   • Blocked ACME HTTP requests to workspace ports so Let's Encrypt rate limits would not be hit again
   • Rolled out IO limiting with the ws41xl and ws41 clusters and moved traffic to them step by step

   Action items

   • Invest in test automation so that test results stop releases like this one
   • Vary the interval between traffic shifts to new clusters, with more time for larger releases
   • Add a risk assessment stage, to be automated, that governs changeset size and rollout speed of workspace cluster rollouts
   • Reduce the impact teams have on each other
   • Add review criteria that find backwards incompatible changes before pull requests are merged, and split such pull requests
   • Recommend rollback as the primary means of mitigation in the incident procedures, and look at automating it
   • Make the status page show the workspace service as down when it is, and update the playbooks
   • Keep incident communication in a single Slack channel and Google Meet
   • Put 10% of the engineering staff on the on-call rotation from May 9th and use that time on observability, alerting and stability

   Lessons

   Gitpod concluded that it should have committed to rolling back on April 11th instead of building and shipping fixes, which kept customers on degraded workspaces longer than necessary. A large release so soon after the previous one needed a risk assessment and slower traffic shifts, and backwards incompatible changes that block a rollback need to be found before pull requests are merged. Failure-free operations require experience with failure.

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3. IL-0566 Hot ranges after a Cookie Run: Kingdom guild update drove CockroachDB nodes to 100% CPU, forcing emergency maintenance

   Devsisters2021

   Symptoms

   About half an hour after the Cookie Run: Kingdom guild update maintenance ended at 11:00 on 6 March 2021, one CockroachDB node was using all 24 cores of its 24-core machine and server metrics began to show a significant number of errors. Soon two more nodes showed abnormal CPU use.

   Load imbalanceDatabase overloadHigh error rate

   Trigger

   During the guild update maintenance, new guild tables were added and pre-split across the cluster, and a new database node was added to replace one removed a few days earlier for a physical hardware issue. When the game reopened, all players at once wrote to existing tables whose primary-key prefixes were new or had changed in the update.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Database

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionOverlapping failures

   Detection

   Monitoring after the maintenance showed one node's CPU at the ceiling together with errors in server metrics. Later a Slack alert reported a node failing its Host Status Check, and the abnormal-log channel reported filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors.

   Remediation

   • Blocked new logins without kicking players already in the game, using the maintenance switch as a makeshift access queue
   • Put the game into full emergency maintenance at 14:50 when several nodes failed health checks
   • Backed up the game data table by table after the full database backup stalled
   • Paused writing play records to reduce load on the database before reopening
   • Split the problem tables from about 18:30
   • Decommissioned the node that failed its Host Status Check
   • Reopened the game and used the login-block queue again when a node reached 100% CPU
   • Terminated the node that kept returning to 100% CPU

   Lessons

   In a single-server relational database a change to the primary-key prefix is usually harmless, but in CockroachDB's distributed design such a change on a production cluster needs great care. The team had studied this in CockroachDB documentation, but living through it taught far more than reading about it.

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4. IL-0278 A weekly update put a Redis Cloud management process into an infinite loop, and most nodes of a GCP cluster failed

   Redis2016

   Symptoms

   On 8 February 2016 at 17:45 UTC, four nodes of the Redis Cloud cluster us-central1-1-1.gce.garantiadata.com on Google Cloud Platform stopped responding, four minutes after a first node had failed. The databases whose endpoints end in us-central1-1-1.gce.garantiadata.com went down.

   Service outageFailover failure

   Trigger

   The weekly upgrade of Redis Cloud's non-critical cluster components reached its first Google Cloud Platform cluster, us-central1-1-1.gce.garantiadata.com, at 17:30 UTC.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   In-memory cacheDatabase failover managerAuthoritative DNS servers and records

   Contributing factor

   Overlapping failures

   Remediation

   • Shut down and terminated all nodes of the cluster
   • Deleted all of the cluster's endpoints from its DNS zone, removing by hand the entries left by throttled deletes
   • Provisioned new cluster nodes from scratch without the weekly update
   • Reconnected the original nodes' storage to the new nodes so persistence-enabled databases could be recovered
   • Bootstrapped and launched the databases, recovering the ones with persistence from storage

   Action items

   • Suspend all automatic weekly upgrades until a procedure that prevents this kind of outage is in place
   • Revalidate the QA processes for DevOps code deployments
   • Improve the tooling so it handles throttling of DNS requests

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