Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases6 cases

3 to 6 of 6

  1. Symptoms

    From about 03:00 UTC on 30 June 2023, Fastmail and a fraction of the internet could not communicate with each other, and Fastmail first heard of it from customers through support tickets and social media. The problem lasted about 19 hours and affected an estimated 3-5% of customers as well as some email servers.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers told Fastmail through support tickets and social media. Fastmail's own monitors in multiple locations and its staff were not on affected networks and saw nothing.

    Action items
    • Select a provider for a second transit connection directly into Fastmail's servers, via Megaport or a provider present in 365's New Jersey datacenter, so that Fastmail controls the outbound path and can route around a network with problems
    Lessons

    With a single path for outbound traffic, Fastmail could not route around a provider's network problem and could not fix it itself. Being able to choose between several outbound paths would let Fastmail get everyone back online faster.

  2. Symptoms

    On 10 January 2023 at 16:37 UTC Icinga reported "BGP status on cr3-eqsin is CRITICAL: BGP CRITICAL - AS1299/IPv6: Active - Telia, AS1299/IPv4: Active - Telia", and from 16:45 the hosts in Wikimedia's eqsin site went DOWN with "PING CRITICAL - Packet loss = 100%". Users normally directed to eqsin, mostly in the APAC region, could only read Wikipedia pages already cached in eqsin.

    Trigger

    Planned maintenance by the transport provider took down eqsin's second transport link while the first was still down from a long fiber cut.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring: Icinga BGP status alerts for cr3-eqsin at 16:37 and cr2-eqsin at 16:44, followed by a flood of host-down alerts and three pages at the same time.

    Remediation
    • Depooled eqsin from DNS
    • Repooled eqsin
    Action items
    • Create a backup GRE tunnel for eqsin (T327265)
    • Ensure the long-down transport link comes back up properly once it is fixed (T322529)
    • Automatically parse maintenance notifications and alert on conflicting maintenance (T230835)
    Lessons

    The site was depooled quickly, and "depool first, investigate later" was the right attitude. A flood of host-down alerts usually means a network problem. eqsin stayed too long on a single working transport link, SREs did not catch that the downtime of the two transport links overlapped, and the provider's planned maintenance was not recorded in a task or reminder.

  3. Symptoms

    From 20:18 UTC on 11 June 2022, OpenStreetMap.org was unavailable: all of its services hosted in Amsterdam, including www, the API, the wiki and planet, had no connectivity to the Internet. The outage began 18 minutes into Equinix's planned maintenance of power feed A at the Amsterdam data centre.

    Trigger

    Equinix's planned 5-year maintenance of power feed A in Amsterdam, which started at 20:00 UTC on 11 June 2022.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Waited for the end of the Equinix power feed A maintenance window instead of failing over to Dublin or moving the uplink; connectivity returned at 03:45 UTC
    Action items
    • Acknowledge ongoing outages faster
    • Add monitoring and alerting of switch PSU and FAN states
    • Replace the Cisco SG550X-48 switches and the Redundant Power System with Juniper EX4300 switches with redundant power supplies
    • Install out-of-band access equipment with dual power feeds in Amsterdam
    • Install redundant uplinks
    • Make site failover easier, less manual and lower risk
    • Introduce an on-call pager system for the operations SRE
    • Expand the SRE team
    • Continue and formalise fail-over tests for power, network, upstream link and service outages
  4. Symptoms

    At 8am PST on Monday, August 22, 2016, Netlify got alerts that its central load balancer, the single public IP that users point A records at, had stopped responding. Rackspace had null-routed the load balancer, so all traffic to that IP hung before it reached Netlify's servers.

    Trigger

    A DDoS attack against Netlify's central load balancer in Rackspace's Chicago datacenter, after which Rackspace null-routed the load balancer's public IP.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts at 8am PST reported that the central load balancer had stopped responding, and Rackspace then confirmed it had null-routed the load balancer.

    Remediation
    • Started a new cluster of CDN machines in Google Compute behind a Google network load balancer
    • Gave clients who had contacted support the new public IP and told them to change their A records
    • Updated the documentation and announced the new IP on Twitter, Gitter and the status page
    Action items
    • Keep the new Google-based network IP running in place of the Rackspace load balancer
    • Release Netlify's own DNS hosting, integrated with the CDN, so domains do not depend on a fixed IP
    • Fix the status page publishing process so it is updated straight away during an issue
    • Build a mailer that sends targeted mails to all paying clients during an outage
    Lessons

    Netlify judged Rackspace's load balancer too vulnerable to DDoS and Rackspace's DDoS processes not up to the standard of other cloud providers, and expected Google's anycast-based Maglev load balancer to be more resilient. In the end, the only way to protect a domain from DDoS-related outages is not to expose any fixed IP address for it, which is why sites should use the www domain with a CNAME, or Netlify DNS, rather than a single A-record IP.

Check your cluster for this

These 6 cases involve ISP and transit networks and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3

Dependency failure4 cases

  1. IL-0526 OpenStreetMap.org went offline, then read-only, for 56 hours after HE.net routing equipment cut both fibre uplinks
  2. IL-0509 SourceHut was down for 170 hours after a DDoS led its upstream network to null-route the PHL datacenter's subnet
  3. IL-0259 Outbound packets from Fastmail did not reach part of the internet for about 19 hours, cutting off 3-5% of customers
  4. IL-0267 Wikimedia's eqsin cache site went unreachable when both of its transport links to the core data centers were down

Hardware failure1 case

  1. IL-0525 OpenStreetMap.org went offline for 7h 27m when its uplink switch lost power during a data-centre power feed maintenance

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0494 Netlify's central load balancer IP stopped responding when Rackspace null-routed it in a DDoS, and A-record sites hung