Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases9 cases

4 to 8 of 9

  1. Symptoms

    At 10:23 on 6 June 2023 a user of the Cloud Platform reported that all of their production pods had been deleted at the same moment. Several users received Pingdom alerts that their applications were down for a few minutes.

    Trigger

    The team changed the instance type of the cluster's worker nodes through Terraform.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their production pods had been deleted at once and that Pingdom alerts showed their applications down; the incident was declared at 11:00.

    Action items
    • Ask AWS, through a support ticket, for the steps to change the node instance type without an outage
    • Plan how to make instance type changes through Terraform without downtime and add a runbook with the steps for changing the node instance type
  2. Symptoms

    At 09:33 UTC on 14 February 2023 end users told the platform team that Kubernetes logs were not arriving in CloudWatch as expected. The investigation went through fluentd and found that the nodes were running containerd as their container runtime instead of docker-shim. A scheduled node rollover the day before, at 07:30 UTC on 13 February, had set containerd as the default runtime by accident.

    Trigger

    A scheduled node rollover had accidentally made containerd the default container runtime, which stopped log shipping to CloudWatch; the unscheduled rollover to revert it timed out, and the pipeline run that followed reduced the Auto Scaling group from 30 to 15 instances.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    End users reported the missing CloudWatch logs that started the work. The postmortem lists 2 minutes as the time to detection of the node failure.

    Remediation
    • ran the node rollover script to add new nodes, which failed on a timeout from Docker Hub
    • ran the node rollover script a second time, which added new nodes that the load balancer marked healthy at 11:01 UTC
    Action items
    • Document the rollover process, especially what can be done when it goes wrong
    • Investigate options for improving the rollover process
    • Add fluentd log collection to the QA test suite so logs are covered end to end
    • Add alarms for fluentd when too little or no log data is sent
    • Implement a staging environment
    • Implement guards against selecting an invalid container runtime
    Lessons

    When a change goes wrong, rolling back to a known working configuration is safer than rushing a fix, which can make the damage worse. Launching new worker nodes depends on the cloud-init script not failing in any way. The QA configuration differed from production, there was no staging environment, the QA tests did not cover fluentd log collection, and the rollover process had no documentation for when it fails.

  3. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

  4. Symptoms

    At 08:29 UTC on 22 June 2021 alerts fired because all services in the Kubernetes cluster were returning 503. No inbound traffic was reaching the cluster. A customer reported the problem at 08:32.

    Trigger

    The pipeline replaced the AWS VPC CNI as part of a refactoring that moved EKS add-ons from kubectl to native Terraform management.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts fired at 08:29 UTC, eight minutes after the VPC CNI was replaced; a customer reported the issue at 08:32.

    Remediation
    • committed a fix that reverted the infrastructure-modules reference
    • re-triggered the pipeline after it failed on an AWS API timeout
    • let the pipeline reattach the target groups to the ALB
    Action items
    • Revert the ALB de-registration delay to the default of 300 seconds
    • Update the roll-over script to set the ALB de-registration delay to zero temporarily before a roll-over
    • Create an ingress test suite
    Lessons

    The change to the de-registration delay had been weighed mainly for performance. Critical pipeline runs should be watched while they run. Everyone should receive the alerts and react to them, and alert messages that were unclear should be reworded.

  5. Symptoms

    On 9 June 2020 at 12:25 CET a CloudWatch alert fired on a high count of 5XX responses from the AWS Application Load Balancers (ALBs) of DFDS's Hellman Kubernetes cluster, and at 12:28 the SRE team verified that no ingress traffic was reaching the cluster. Every service running inside the cluster was unreachable from outside it, because both ALBs, the authenticated one and the one without authentication, no longer had any Kubernetes worker nodes attached.

    Trigger

    Planned maintenance to split the Hellman cluster's auto-scaling groups by availability zone applied Terraform changes at 12:20 CET that removed the ALB instance attachments.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A CloudWatch alert detected a high count of 5XX responses for the ALBs, and the lack of ingress traffic was then verified.

    Remediation
    • Attached the worker node instances to the ALBs by hand
    • Implemented a permanent fix within the hour
    Action items
    • Implement alerts on healthy and unhealthy ALB targets for more precise and immediate notice
    • Reduce alert noise further
    • Implement host name resolution for Goldpinger
    Lessons

    General alert noise is still too high, there was no alert on healthy and unhealthy ALB targets, and test clusters should check ingress through the ALBs.

Check your cluster for this

These 9 cases involve Terraform and Node launch template. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3

Operator error2 cases

  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025
  2. IL-0244 A queued pull request destroyed the EKS subnet route table associations and Cloud Platform services went offline

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0078 Enabling EKS secrets encryption with KMS through Terraform removed worker node IAM permissions and took down all ZenML Pro workspaces
    ZenML2025
  2. IL-0112 The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeouts
    DFDS2022

Configuration change5 cases

  1. IL-0091 Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods together
  2. IL-0109 A retried node rollover on a DFDS EKS cluster set the Auto Scaling group back to 15 instances, and the default termination policy removed every healthy worker node, leaving the cluster with no nodes
    DFDS2023
  3. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021
  4. IL-0365 A Terraform change to auto-scaling groups detached all worker nodes from both ALBs and cut off every cluster service
    DFDS2020
  5. IL-0061 A Terraform pull request merged out of order deleted a production GKE cluster, and recreating it deleted a second one