Cases3 cases

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1. IL-0344 Linode's US-West data centers in Fremont and Santa Clara lost connectivity as the fibre circuits between them failed

   Linode2023

   Symptoms

   On 12 February 2023, customers in Linode's US-West region could not reach their Linodes. Santa Clara customers lost Internet connectivity after a change made at 8:45 UTC until it was reverted at 10:13 UTC, and later in the day the connection between the Fremont and Santa Clara data centers was cut completely, leaving both with degraded service or a full outage until 16:25 UTC; customers could also have trouble provisioning, powering down or rebooting services.

   Network unreachable

   Trigger

   A single link of the A-side fibre circuit between Fremont and Santa Clara went down on 11 February, the whole B-side circuit followed on 12 February, and during troubleshooting with the hardware vendor a non-intrusive command triggered a rare bug that took down all A-side links.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)NIC, cable and switch port link

   Contributing factor

   Overlapping failuresHarmful manual action

   Detection

   The response team began investigating when the A-side link went down on 11 February. The status page opened at 10:22 UTC on 12 February to investigate reports of connectivity issues in the US-West region.

   Remediation

   • Reverted the change that removed internet traffic from the Santa Clara border routers
   • Performed an emergency code upgrade of both circuits, restoring connectivity between the sites
   • Restored the B-side path with the hardware vendor and fiber provider, regaining full redundancy

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2. IL-0256 Basecamp was fully down twice in two days as hardware load balancers crashed and routers lost sync after failover

   37signals2020

   Symptoms

   On Tuesday 1 September 2020 Basecamp could not be loaded at all for 17 minutes, from 9:51am to 10:08am Central Time (14:51–15:08 UTC), and nothing seemed to work. On Wednesday 2 September it happened again for 15 minutes, from 10:50am to 11:05am Central Time (15:50–16:05 UTC).

   Service outageLink flappingHigh latency

   Trigger

   On 1 September the network links between the data centers went offline, and during the recovery a hardware load balancer crashed. On 2 September the primary load balancer in Virginia crashed again, and later its secondary crashed too.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   On-premises load balancerBackbone network (WAN)

   Contributing factor

   Overlapping failuresNo headroom

   Remediation

   • On 1 September, intervened by hand to get the network routers working with the standby load balancer
   • On 2 September, fixed the same router and load balancer desynchronization by hand

   Action items

   • Find the cause of the load balancer crash with the vendor and apply its bugfix
   • Replace the hardware load balancers
   • Reroute the redundant cross-datacenter network paths for proper circuit diversity
   • Evaluate moving from hardware to software load balancers, which can be deployed in minutes
   • Evaluate decentralizing the load balancer architecture to limit the impact of one failure
   • Assess the systems for resilience, fragility and risk, and review the assessment process itself

   Lessons

   Basecamp plans for failures like these and practises responses to catastrophic failures in its live systems, but three obscure issues in five days chained into overlapping failures. What caught the team by surprise were cascading failures that exposed unexpected fragility and hard paths to recovery, which Basecamp says it can prepare for.

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3. IL-0222 Google Cloud US regions had heavy packet loss and some went unreachable after the network control plane was descheduled

   Google Cloud2019

   Symptoms

   On Sunday 2 June 2019, with user impact beginning between 11:47 and 11:49 US/Pacific, Google Cloud projects in several US regions saw elevated packet loss from network congestion, and some regions became unreachable. Customers saw higher latency, intermittent errors and lost connectivity to instances in us-central1, us-east1, us-east4, us-west2, northamerica-northeast1 and southamerica-east1, while us-west1, Europe and Asia had no regional congestion.

   Packet lossNetwork unreachableHigh latencyHigh error rateMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   At 11:45 US/Pacific a relatively rare type of datacenter maintenance event started in one physical location, and the automation that runs it descheduled logical clusters that also held network control plane jobs in other physical locations.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Network control plane (SDN)BGP routingBackbone network (WAN)

   Contributing factor

   Excessive blast radiusCircular dependencyLimited debug accessIneffective rollback

   Detection

   Google engineers were alerted to the failure two minutes after it began and started the incident process used for the most serious production incidents. The first customer notice appeared on the status page at 12:53 US/Pacific.

   Remediation

   • Lowered the priority of less critical network traffic classes to reduce congestion
   • Halted the datacenter automation software responsible for the maintenance event
   • Rescheduled the network control plane and its supporting infrastructure in each location
   • Rebuilt and redistributed the lost network control plane configuration, rolling it out from 14:03
   • Directed service traffic away from the affected regions
   • Moved the Cloud VPN control plane in three regions out of its fail-safe state

   Action items

   • Keep the maintenance automation off until safeguards stop it descheduling jobs in several physical locations at once
   • Harden the cluster management software to reject such requests whatever their origin
   • Reconfigure the network control plane to reject maintenance requests of the type involved
   • Make the network control plane in each location persist its configuration
   • Let the network stay in fail static mode longer when the control plane is lost
   • Review, update and test emergency response tooling and procedures, including customer communication tooling, for such network failures
   • Extend continuous disaster recovery testing to this and similarly catastrophic failures

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