Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    Shortly after 9am UTC on 17 July 2018, the disk space of the GitLab cluster behind gitlab.freedesktop.org was critical, and some API requests were failing because of the shortage. The administrator first learned of the failure when people mentioned it on IRC.

    Trigger

    Many recently created forks of Mesa, each about 2.1GB, filled the disk space of the GitLab cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    People mentioned the failure on IRC. Monitoring and alerting on disk usage and API error rate had not been set up yet.

    Remediation
    • Dropped all inbound traffic to GitLab at the firewall except from the administrator's IP
    • Took a manual backup by streaming tar over SSH to an encrypted partition on a local machine
    • Snapshotted all GCE disks behind the PersistentVolumes
    • Copied the data from the old disk snapshots to new enlarged volumes through a temporary GCE VM
    • Re-did the copy into new empty volumes with the correct directory structure and checked repositories, users and workflows
    • Restored public access to GitLab
    Action items
    • Set up monitoring, logging and alerts
    • Find ways to communicate outages much better; this one was announced only on IRC, and the lists were not told when it dragged on
    • Use the Cloud console clients instead of the slow Cloud Console web UI
    • Add more GitLab administrators, ideally someone familiar with Kubernetes deployments
    • Move from the single Omnibus container to GitLab's cloud native deployment with one container per service
    • Move storage to resizeable volumes or to Google Cloud Storage
    Lessons

    The backup step alone used up the outage window; backups had grown along with the disk problem, and a test run before announcing the window could have measured it. The changes had been tested on a scratch cluster, but not exactly as run, and tests of steps such as disk snapshots could have been more realistic. A single GitLab administrator who was new to Kubernetes was a single point of failure. Keeping at least three copies of the data from the first destructive step meant no data was lost.

  2. Symptoms

    From around 19:00 UTC on 31 January 2017, load on GitLab.com's PostgreSQL database rose, which GitLab suspected was spam, and many users could not post comments on issues and merge requests. Around 23:00 UTC the replication of the PostgreSQL secondary fell behind and then failed, because WAL segments it still needed had already been removed from the primary.

    Trigger

    While trying to restore replication to the secondary, an engineer ran the removal of the PostgreSQL data directory on the primary, db1.cluster.gitlab.com, believing it was the secondary.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The engineer who ran the deletion on the primary noticed the mistake and stopped it a second or two later.

    Remediation
    • Raised max_wal_senders from 3 to 32 and lowered max_connections from 8000 to 2000 so PostgreSQL would restart
    • Stopped the deletion on the primary a second or two after noticing it
    • Restored the database from the LVM snapshot taken about 6 hours before the outage by copying the PostgreSQL data directory from staging
    • Restored the webhooks from a separate database built from the snapshot and imported them as a SQL dump
    • Incremented all database sequences by 100,000 so IDs used before the outage could not be reused
    • Re-enabled GitLab.com gradually
    • Rebuilt projects created after 17:20 UTC in basic form from their Git repositories on the NFS cluster
    Action items
    • Change the shell prompt (PS1) on all hosts to show more clearly which host and environment is in use
    • Monitor backups with Prometheus
    • Set PostgreSQL's max_connections to a sane value
    • Investigate point-in-time recovery and continuous archiving for PostgreSQL
    • Take LVM snapshots of the production databases every hour
    • Take Azure disk snapshots of the production databases
    • Move staging to the ARM environment
    • Recover the production replicas
    • Test recovery of PostgreSQL database backups automatically
    • Improve the PostgreSQL replication documentation and runbooks
    • Investigate pgbarman for PostgreSQL backups
    • Investigate WAL-E for database backup and realtime replication
    • Build a streaming database restore
    • Assign an owner for data durability
    • Set up multiple secondaries and balance load among them with pgpool-II
    • Provide a tool for developers to run and revert Rails migrations on staging
    • Build owned recovery procedures for the rest of the GitLab.com infrastructure, not only the database
    • Publish a backup monitoring dashboard and add more backup data to it
    • Improve the abuse reporting and response system so removal for spam does not hard delete
    • Redact engineers' names in future public incident documents
    Lessons

    GitLab split the incident into two problems: GitLab.com went down because the primary's data directory was removed by mistake during a manual, undocumented replication rebuild, and recovery took over 18 hours because the backups had failed silently, disk snapshots were not enabled and the only copy sat on slow staging disks. The backup procedure was never tested because no one owned it. GitLab chose to focus on fast, regularly practised recovery and on making it obvious which host an engineer is on, rather than on blocking commands, since a safer rm only protects against one of many ways to lose data.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud block storage and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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