Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    Hours after a routine switch between two clusters of Retriever, Honeycomb's storage and query engine, late on 24 July 2023, the internal SLO for Shepherd, the ingest service, began to burn slowly. The performance was only marginally slow and inconsistent, with no good explanation, so engineers treated it as minor and left it for the morning.

    Trigger

    Late on 24 July Honeycomb switched between two Retriever clusters to avoid a subtle bug, and the new cluster stopped writing the last-written timestamps the schema cache depends on. On the morning of 25 July a feature flag flip meant to move those writes back stopped the remaining writes entirely.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Hours after the cluster switch, the internal SLO for the ingest service Shepherd started burning slowly. Engineers left it for the morning, when a chart showed that Retriever's database calls updating the last-written records had stopped.

    Remediation
    • Flipped only the writes back to the other Retriever cluster with a feature flag, which did not fix the problem
    • Set up circuit breakers that denied all Shepherd traffic with a 5xx error to protect the database
    • Failed the hard-locked database over to a replica
    • Restarted all Retriever hosts so they could provide data for the cache
    • Set the last-written timestamp of every schema with traffic in the last day to now, so the schema store reloaded the cache
    • Removed the circuit breaker and restarted the query hosts that failed internal checks
    Action items
    • Finish the Retriever cluster migration and remove all code that could disable writes behind the cache
    • Explore ways to strengthen the cache further
    • Lower the contention put on the database during update storms from new schemas
    • Stabilise the performance costs of some operations in the system
    • Study instrumentation and experimentation that detect and handle such edge cases better
    Lessons

    Locally good decisions combined into the outage: the query engine wrote the timestamps because it already saw all the data, the shared cache helped scale ingest and untangle the main database, the cluster switch was done to avoid a bug, frequent deploys hid the feature flag bug, pausing deploys during the investigation kept hosts from restarting, and past near-misses made the team expect a slow failover. Feature flags, frequent deploys, pausing deploys during incidents and learning from near-misses all contributed, although they are among the practices Honeycomb trusts most. For a rare lockup of this kind a database failover is the fastest recovery. Several recent Honeycomb incidents started from trying to avoid a subtle bug.

  2. Symptoms

    On the afternoon of 28 October 2021 (13:37 PST), Vault performance at Roblox degraded and a single Consul server showed high CPU load. Consul cluster metrics showed that writes to its key-value (KV) store had a 50th percentile latency of 2 seconds instead of the usual under 300 ms. Players were not yet affected.

    Trigger

    On 27 October at 14:00, one day before the outage, Roblox enabled the Consul streaming feature on the backend service responsible for traffic routing and, to prepare for end-of-year traffic, added 50% more nodes to traffic routing.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Roblox engineers began investigating when Vault performance degraded and a single Consul server had high CPU load, before players were affected. Consul cluster metrics then showed elevated KV write latency.

    Remediation
    • Replaced one Consul cluster node on the suspicion of degraded hardware
    • Replaced all Consul nodes with 128-core machines with faster NVMe SSDs
    • Shut down the Consul cluster and reset its state from a snapshot taken at the start of the outage, with access blocked by iptables
    • Blocked external traffic, disabled all non-essential Consul use, scaled services down and lowered health check frequency from 60 seconds to 10 minutes
    • Moved the Consul cluster back to 64-core servers
    • Disabled the streaming feature for all Consul systems, which brought KV write latency back to 300ms
    • Kept the slow Consul servers from staying elected as leader
    • Redeployed the caching system and fixed its wrong scheduling data and failed deployments
    • Restarted the stopped services at the right capacity levels
    • Let players back in with DNS steering in roughly 10% steps while checking database load, cache performance and stability
    Action items
    • HashiCorp builds laboratory benchmarks and scale tests that reproduce the streaming contention
    • HashiCorp improves the design of streaming so it does not contend under extreme load
    • Compact the BoltDB database with existing BoltDB tooling
    • Remove the circular dependency between the telemetry systems and Consul
    • Extend telemetry with targeted alerts on Consul and BoltDB performance and with visibility into traffic between services and Consul
    • Run the backend in an additional, geographically distinct data center and in multiple availability zones
    • Split critical services into their own dedicated Consul clusters
    • Move data that core services keep directly in the Consul KV store to a more suitable storage system
    • Delete obsolete KV data from Consul
    • Upgrade to a Consul version that replaces BoltDB with bbolt, in Q1
    • Redesign cache deployment so the cache system can be brought up quickly from a standing start
    • Deploy Nomad enhancements that make it easier to turn up large jobs after a long period of unavailability
    • Use mechanisms for faster machine configuration changes
    • Reintroduce streaming only after a new implementation has been tested at Roblox's scale and workload
    Lessons

    Two mostly unrelated problems deep inside Consul, contention in streaming under very high read and write load and BoltDB freelist growth, were hard to diagnose, and that difficulty was the main reason the outage lasted so long. A single Consul cluster serving every workload made the impact larger, and monitoring that depended on Consul hid the cause when it was needed most. Faster hardware did not help and may have hurt, because the contention was worse on NUMA machines. HashiCorp had benchmarked streaming at a similar scale, but the problem needed both a large number of streams and a high churn rate. Restarting a platform from a fully stopped state, including warming caches, took a long time and needed tools built for bootstrapping rather than incremental change.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve In-memory cache and Coordination and key-value store. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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