Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    Shortly after incident.io moved its infrastructure fully into Google Cloud, the application saw a larger-than-normal number of Postgres connection timeouts, and new database connections per second were in the hundreds, spiking up and down. At the same time, the memcached instance used for transient data and faster API responses had sporadic connection timeouts.

    Trigger

    After the move to Google Cloud, the application opened hundreds of new Postgres connections per second, and an accidental database join made it send thousands of duplicate calls to an external third party in parallel.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An incident was declared when the number of Postgres connection timeouts rose above normal. The remaining cache timeouts were traced through the logs of the Kubernetes node that served an affected request, the request's trace and the node's metrics.

    Remediation
    • Doubled the maximum Postgres connection lifespan from 15m to 30m
    • Made the Postgres connection pools static so they always keep N connections open
    • Raised the memcache client's MaxIdleConns from 2 to 20
    • Moved temporarily from Google's hosted memcached to a memcached inside the Kubernetes cluster
    • Shipped the fix for the accidental database join that made thousands of duplicate external calls
    Action items
    • Set more sensible concurrency limits for outbound network calls
    Lessons

    Network timeouts are not always local to one request or pod: when they appear, the whole activity of the node, including other pods on it, needs to be checked. Staying within a provider's rate limits does not keep outbound calls from affecting a node, so outbound network calls need more sensible concurrency limits.

  2. Symptoms

    At 7:12pm Eastern Time on 5 July 2016, logs.cloud.gov, the cloud.gov log search service, sent users into a login redirect loop, so they could not log in to the service.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Moved Redis on the logsearch service to a much larger memory instance so it could keep logs while Elasticsearch was down
    • Corrected the Elasticsearch memory limits and the /tmp noexec hardening setting and redeployed the cluster
    • Redeployed the Kibana instance and verified the logs once the cluster deployment was complete
    Action items
    • Add a failure alert that checks whether logs are coming through
    • Make Redis auto-scaling or highly available so that failures in more fragile downstream components do not cause data loss
    • Extend the incident response plan to start with events that are not security-specific
    • Create a chaos bot for the logs.cloud.gov service
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve In-memory cache and CNI plugin. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1