Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    At about 14:01 PDT on 13 October 2017, Discord engineers were alerted to anomalies by real-time metrics and monitoring. A Redis instance that was the primary of a highly available cluster used by the API services had dropped offline after Google Cloud Platform migrated it automatically, and some API instances did not handle the failover to the secondary node correctly.

    Trigger

    Google Cloud Platform automatically migrated the Redis instance that was the primary of a highly available cluster used by the API services, and the node incorrectly dropped offline.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Real-time metrics and monitoring alerted engineers at 14:01 PDT. The second phase was seen at 15:41 as another anomaly in monitoring, and end user reports of servers appearing offline were escalated at 15:42.

    Remediation
    • Ran a rolling restart of all API instances to clear the Redis connection issues
    • Corrected the misconfigured edge caching rule for the expensive API route
    • Disabled the problem API endpoint on the edge network
    • Recovered the Cassandra cluster
    • Ran a second rolling restart of all API instances for the latency left by the Cassandra issues
    • Removed the misbehaving guilds node from the service hashring
    • Forcefully restarted the misbehaving guilds node
    • Restarted the whole service, forcing all users to reconnect
    • Blocked traffic that relied on the failing push component to reduce its load
    • Corrected the API setting that lets users reconnect quickly and safely
    Action items
    • Fix the known issues with Redis failover within the coming weeks
    • Change the cached route so this type of error does not degrade other services
    • Monitor the signals that would have warned of the cascading failure
    • Improve the reliability and failure handling of the affected services
    • Roll out an update of the library with the suspected flaws
  2. Symptoms

    On 8 February 2016 at 17:45 UTC, four nodes of the Redis Cloud cluster us-central1-1-1.gce.garantiadata.com on Google Cloud Platform stopped responding, four minutes after a first node had failed. The databases whose endpoints end in us-central1-1-1.gce.garantiadata.com went down.

    Trigger

    The weekly upgrade of Redis Cloud's non-critical cluster components reached its first Google Cloud Platform cluster, us-central1-1-1.gce.garantiadata.com, at 17:30 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Shut down and terminated all nodes of the cluster
    • Deleted all of the cluster's endpoints from its DNS zone, removing by hand the entries left by throttled deletes
    • Provisioned new cluster nodes from scratch without the weekly update
    • Reconnected the original nodes' storage to the new nodes so persistence-enabled databases could be recovered
    • Bootstrapped and launched the databases, recovering the ones with persistence from storage
    Action items
    • Suspend all automatic weekly upgrades until a procedure that prevents this kind of outage is in place
    • Revalidate the QA processes for DevOps code deployments
    • Improve the tooling so it handles throttling of DNS requests
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve In-memory cache and CDN and edge network. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2