Cases1 case
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- Symptoms
From 7:30 AM PST on 7 December 2021, AWS services in us-east-1 that communicate between AWS's internal network and its main network saw rising latency and errors. The AWS operations teams lost real-time monitoring data at once, and the first thing found in the logs was elevated internal DNS errors.
- Trigger
At 7:30 AM PST an automated activity that scales the capacity of one AWS service hosted in the main AWS network triggered unexpected behaviour from a large number of clients inside the internal network.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The congestion immediately cut off real-time monitoring data for the AWS operations teams, who turned to logs and first identified elevated internal DNS errors.
- Remediation
- Moved internal DNS traffic away from the congested network paths
- Isolated the top sources of traffic onto dedicated network devices
- Disabled some heavy network traffic services, including EventBridge event delivery
- Brought additional networking capacity online
- Disabled the automated scaling activities that triggered the event
- Action items
- Keep the triggering scaling activities off until all remediations are deployed
- Fix the latent issue that kept networking clients from backing off
- Deploy network configuration that protects the affected networking devices in a similar congestion event
- Keep API Gateway servers healthy when the internal network is unavailable and speed up their recycling
- Release a new Service Health Dashboard that makes service impact easier to understand
- Run the support system actively across multiple AWS regions
This case involves Automated capacity manager and Transit gateway or network interconnect. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Software defect1 case
- Contributing factor
- Organisation