Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    At about 17:00 JST on Thursday 16 July 2026, Datadog alerted, and at almost the same time 5xx errors began to rise on the Amazon CloudFront distributions that used VPC Origins connections. Builder Work, ANDPAD's job and career service for the construction industry, became almost entirely unreachable.

    Trigger

    The Amazon CloudFront VPC Origins feature failed; AWS Health later reported a capacity constraint in an internal shared subsystem that manages connections for VPC Origins.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Datadog raised an alert, and at about the same time 5xx errors were seen rising on the CloudFront distributions that used VPC Origins.

    Remediation
    • Decided to route traffic temporarily through an internet-facing ALB without CloudFront
    • Recreated the internet-facing Ingress, attached it to the Argo Rollouts Rollout resource and promoted it
    • Created a regional WAF for the ALB with the security team
    • Created a new IngressClass with the ACM certificate, the WAF and access log settings
    • Added Ingresses for normal traffic, the admin screens and redirects, which restored routing
    Action items
    • Return to the CloudFront and VPC Origins layout while keeping a way to switch to internet-facing in code
    • Keep the internet-facing ALB, limited to approved CIDRs through spec.inboundCIDRs in IngressClassParams, so commenting out securityGroupInboundCidrs in values.yaml opens it to 0.0.0.0/0
    • Point the Terraform-managed Route53 A record back to CloudFront and keep the ALB alias commented out in code, so uncommenting and applying switches DNS to the ALB
    Lessons

    VPC Origins keeps the ALB off the internet and simplifies the traffic path, but it makes the service depend on an AWS-managed shared subsystem, and when that fails the service stops even though CloudFront is healthy. ANDPAD kept VPC Origins and instead prepared the escape route ahead of time, accepting the cost of an ALB that always runs, because recreating the Ingress and attaching it to the Rollout had taken so long during this incident.

  2. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  3. Symptoms

    At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

    Trigger

    One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

    Remediation
    • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
    • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
    • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
    • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
    • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
    • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
    Action items
    • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
    • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
    • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
    • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
    • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
    Lessons

    A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

  4. Symptoms

    On 21 March 2025, between 21:10 and 21:41 UTC, part of the authentication and authorization requests to Twingate services failed with elevated error rates.

    Trigger

    Twingate saw anomalies in one of its GKE clusters and scaled down the deployments in that cluster to protect the rest of the system, which moved its traffic to the other clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Twingate observed anomalies in one of its GKE clusters at the start of the incident.

    Remediation
    • Reintroduced capacity in the cluster that had been scaled down, so traffic was rebalanced across regions
    Action items
    • Keep working with the cloud provider to find the cause of the unexpected timeouts and of the cluster update's impact
    • Run deployments in all regions with the same number of replicas in the HPA configuration
    • Raise the maximum node counts of the cluster node autoscalers to leave more room to scale up
    • Configure the HPA to scale up faster
  5. Symptoms

    LOTTE ON, Lotte E-commerce's online shopping mall of about 40 microservices on Amazon EKS, returned errors for a period of time whenever the Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA) scaled pods in after load dropped. Requests reached containers that had already been deleted and failed with 502 errors.

    Trigger

    HPA scale-in deleting pods, and the deletion of Blue pods after a blue/green switch of the Service label selector.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • delayed container shutdown on pod deletion (a wait in the SIGTERM handler or a preStop sleep, capped by terminationGracePeriodSeconds) so containers stop only after the pod has left the Service endpoints
    • switched some workloads' Ingress-created ALBs from instance mode to IP mode so traffic goes straight to pod IPs without iptables and conntrack
    Action items
    • Move all workloads to ALB IP mode gradually
    Lessons

    Removing a pod from Service endpoints and stopping its containers happen at the same time in Kubernetes, so a pod can stop while traffic is still routed to it unless shutdown is delayed with a preStop hook or in the application. With an instance-mode ALB, traffic passes through node iptables and conntrack, and established connections can keep going to a pod IP after its iptables rules are gone. IP mode avoids that path, within the limit of 1000 targets per target group.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Cloud provider outage2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0438 Builder Work became almost entirely unreachable with 504 errors when the Amazon CloudFront VPC Origins feature failed
    ANDPAD2026
  2. IL-0542 Twingate authentication and authorization requests failed at higher rates after traffic moved onto a smaller GKE cluster

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1
  2. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021

DNS or network fault1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0178 On EKS, HPA scale-in returned 502 errors because containers stopped before their pod IPs left the Service endpoints, and after blue/green switches conntrack kept sending established connections to deleted pods behind an instance-mode ALB

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0208 A GitLab chart bump that renamed Kubernetes Service and Deployment ports made the GCP load balancer reconfigure, and GitLab.com slowed down and returned intermittent 50x errors
    GitLab2022
  2. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021