Cases2 cases
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IL-0386After a move to Google Cloud, Postgres connection timeouts and memcached i/o timeouts spiked on GKE nodesincident.io2023- Symptoms
Shortly after incident.io moved its infrastructure fully into Google Cloud, the application saw a larger-than-normal number of Postgres connection timeouts, and new database connections per second were in the hundreds, spiking up and down. At the same time, the memcached instance used for transient data and faster API responses had sporadic connection timeouts.
- Trigger
After the move to Google Cloud, the application opened hundreds of new Postgres connections per second, and an accidental database join made it send thousands of duplicate calls to an external third party in parallel.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
An incident was declared when the number of Postgres connection timeouts rose above normal. The remaining cache timeouts were traced through the logs of the Kubernetes node that served an affected request, the request's trace and the node's metrics.
- Remediation
- Doubled the maximum Postgres connection lifespan from 15m to 30m
- Made the Postgres connection pools static so they always keep N connections open
- Raised the memcache client's MaxIdleConns from 2 to 20
- Moved temporarily from Google's hosted memcached to a memcached inside the Kubernetes cluster
- Shipped the fix for the accidental database join that made thousands of duplicate external calls
- Action items
- Set more sensible concurrency limits for outbound network calls
- Lessons
Network timeouts are not always local to one request or pod: when they appear, the whole activity of the node, including other pods on it, needs to be checked. Staying within a provider's rate limits does not keep outbound calls from affecting a node, so outbound network calls need more sensible concurrency limits.
IL-0472Node-to-pod traffic and DNS failed on Tinder's 605-node Flannel cluster when every node's ARP cache passed gc_thresh3Tinder2019- Symptoms
In the early morning of 8 January 2019 Tinder's platform had a persistent outage. Communication from nodes to pods failed, and so did DNS lookups, because DNS ran inside the Kubernetes cluster.
- Trigger
Earlier that morning, pod and node counts on the cluster were scaled up in response to an unrelated increase in platform latency.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Remediation
- Raised gc_thresh1, gc_thresh2 and gc_thresh3 on the nodes
- Restarted Flannel so it re-registered the missing networks
- Lessons
Tinder lists the outage among its learnings about network fabric limits: with Flannel over VXLAN, every node, and every pair of nodes that exchange pod traffic, adds entries to each node's ARP table, so at 605 nodes the default gc_thresh3 hard cap was exceeded on all nodes.
These 2 cases involve CNI plugin and In-memory cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Capacity exhaustion2 cases
- Contributing factor
- Organisation