Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    The on-call engineer for a high-traffic service was alerted that requests were failing in large batches every 30 seconds.

    Trigger

    DEBUG level logging was on in production when traffic surged, raising log volume to about 100 times normal while the service logged synchronously.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The on-call engineer was alerted that requests were failing in large batches every 30 seconds.

    Action items
    • Replace synchronous logging with TraceAwareAsyncAppender, which captures trace_id and span_id on the calling thread and drops logs instead of blocking when the queue is full (neverBlock=true)
    • Keep the amount of log output at a sustainable level, since an asynchronous queue still fills under sustained overload
    Lessons

    Removing AsyncAppender to keep trace IDs also removed the protection that kept request threads away from stdout back-pressure. A company-wide standard applies the same side effect to dozens of services, so check what a standard rests on and what working behaviour it takes away. ThreadLocal context does not cross into an asynchronous worker, but capturing it on the calling thread before handing the event off keeps both the IDs and the asynchronous output. Under extreme load, dropping log lines is preferable to stopping request handling.

  2. Symptoms

    An upgrade of the network subsystem under Target's datacenter OpenStack, meant to cause only a brief disruption, ran into problems and left network connectivity disrupted for several hours. Kafka, which runs on that OpenStack, became intermittently available.

    Trigger

    A network subsystem upgrade in the datacenter OpenStack infrastructure disrupted connectivity for several hours and made Kafka intermittently available.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • enabled gossip encryption on Consul so messages from the poisoned mesh were rejected
    • stabilized the deployment engine and redeployed the development environment with encryption, terminating instances without it
    • upgraded Consul in place to 1.2.3 and then to 1.3.0
    Action items
    • Reduce how much of an outage a single Docker daemon can cause, together with running smaller and more numerous clusters
    Lessons

    Smaller and more numerous clusters limited the damage: the smaller development clusters and production were not hit the same way as the one large cluster, and dev and prod on one cluster would have been far worse. A Docker daemon shared by many workloads is a brittle failure point. Per-workload logging and metrics sidecars were judged the right design; a shared cluster-level agent would almost certainly have made the problem worse and harder to fix.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Container runtime and Telemetry agent. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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