Cases2 cases

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1. IL-0433 Shifting API traffic from EC2 to EKS on Fargate overloaded two CoreDNS pods and caused mass name-resolution errors

   MonotaRO2023

   Symptoms

   When MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining endpoints of its backend API sent to EKS from 1% to 25%, Sentry filled with errors saying the API could not reach the database and outside services. The errors were about DNS name resolution, and the traffic had to be shifted back to the EC2 version.

   DNS resolution failuresHigh error rate

   Trigger

   MonotaRO raised the share of requests for the remaining API endpoints routed by the ALB to the EKS version from 1% to 25%.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheContainer CPU limitHorizontal pod autoscalerPod termination

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsNo resource requests or limitsUnrepresentative stagingUnverified assumption

   Detection

   Sentry showed a large number of errors about connecting to the database and outside services right after the traffic share was raised.

   Remediation

   • Shifted the requests back to the EC2 version to stop the errors
   • Added an HPA to autoscale the CoreDNS pods as a stopgap, which let the migration to EKS finish

   Action items

   • Set ndots to 1 through dnsConfig in the application Deployments
   • Set cache 600 in the Corefile in the coredns ConfigMap to lengthen the CoreDNS cache TTL
   • Add lameduck 30s to the CoreDNS health plugin so CoreDNS keeps serving while it is scaled in
   • Consider reducing the differences between production and staging, weighed against cost

   Lessons

   MonotaRO assumed that a managed service would not cause problems and so skipped researching other companies' migrations, load testing and monitoring. Staging differed from production in its network layout, so ndots differed between them, and staging databases could not take a high-load test. Looking at the CoreDNS logs and resolv.conf instead of guessing found that ndots:5 made lookups of outside names try every search domain first.

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2. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

   Adevinta2023

   Symptoms

   On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresHigh latency

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsUnknown limitIgnored early signalUnverified assumption

   Detection

   A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

   Remediation

   • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
   • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
   • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
   • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
   • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls

   Lessons

   The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

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