Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
IL-0102CoreDNS pods on a production EKS cluster ran out of memory under a burst of new pods, endpoints and nodes, taking down the Buildkite web UI, APIs and job dispatchBuildkite2026- Symptoms
From 22:47 UTC on 25 August 2026 the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, job queue and notifications stopped working for every customer. No one could create a build from the UI or the REST API, job dispatch was delayed, and some builds that were already running when the outage began stayed stuck until the services recovered.
- Trigger
At 22:44 UTC an application deploy created a surge of new pods, which used up the free capacity on the existing nodes and made the EKS cluster scale out. Background worker pools with unusually high maximum replica counts were scaling out at the same time and kept asking for more pods while new nodes were still being provisioned. Together they produced an unusually high rate of change in applications, network endpoints and nodes, and with it a sudden rise in demand on CoreDNS.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The first status post, at 22:55 UTC, eight minutes after the outage began, said something had gone wrong, and at 23:05 UTC the status page said a sitewide outage was being investigated. CoreDNS query duration had been rising as the cluster grew, but a defect in a key monitoring query and too little monitoring of query volume meant this went unnoticed before the outage.
- Remediation
- paused further application deploys
- scaled CoreDNS from three to twelve pods
- raised each CoreDNS pod's memory limit from 512 MiB to 2 GiB
- expanded the system node pool that runs CoreDNS
- Action items
- Increase immediate CoreDNS headroom: twelve pods instead of three, a 2 GiB memory limit instead of 512 MiB, and a larger system node pool
- Enable EKS-managed CoreDNS autoscaling with a tested minimum replica count and enough capacity to spread the replicas across nodes and availability zones
- Add direct alerts on CoreDNS query duration, query volume, goroutine growth, memory pressure, OOM restarts and available replicas, and track longer-term trends in capacity planning
- Find other cluster-critical services that lack tested capacity, direct alerting, spread across failure domains, and either safe autoscaling or documented static headroom, and fix them
- Lessons
A CoreDNS deployment sized once and left at a fixed size can carry a growing cluster for months and then fail on the first burst of churn it cannot absorb. When query processing slows, pending queries take up memory, the pods hit their limits and restart, and client retries keep the service down after the restart. Server-side DNS query duration and volume need their own alerts: here client-side latency was masked by unrelated application speed-ups, and a broken monitoring query hid the server-side trend. Maximum replica counts raised as a temporary measure remove the cap that normally stops runaway scaling when new nodes are slow to arrive.
IL-0049Partial DNS outage after CoreDNS scaled down and kube-proxy failed to delete stale conntrack entriesPreply2020- Symptoms
Prometheus detected a high rate of 5xx responses on three services, called A, B and C in the write-up, and paged the on-call engineers through VictorOps at 22:18 EET. The 5xx rate was also visible in Kibana.
- Trigger
Because load in the cluster was low, the CoreDNS autoscaler reduced the number of CoreDNS pods from 3 to 2.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Prometheus alerted on a high 5xx rate on services A, B and C and paged on-call through VictorOps.
- Remediation
- reverted the latest release of the affected service
- a regular deploy created new nodes, the CoreDNS autoscaler added CoreDNS pods, and the conntrack table was rewritten
- Action items
- Disable the autoscaler for CoreDNS
- Run a DNS cache server in production
- Monitor conntrack usage
- Lessons
Scaling CoreDNS down is not free: if kube-proxy fails to clear conntrack entries for the removed pod, clients keep sending DNS queries to it. Known DNS weaknesses in a cluster should be prioritised before they cause an outage, and fixes that only treat consequences leave the underlying conntrack problem in place.
These 2 cases involve CoreDNS and conntrack table. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause2
Capacity exhaustion1 case
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
DNS or network fault1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation