Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    During a team dinner, a Slack alert reported that one node of the CockroachDB cluster behind Cookie Run: Kingdom had gone down. The DevOps engineers were not worried at first, because CockroachDB is built to survive the loss of some nodes.

    Trigger

    A cooling system failure in an AWS Tokyo region data centre overheated the servers in one availability zone, which held CockroachDB nodes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack alert reported that a database node had gone down.

    Remediation
    • copied the data outside the broken ranges into new tables with INSERT INTO ... SELECT queries that skipped the affected ranges
    • ran debug unsafe-remove-dead-replicas together with Cockroach Labs engineers, recovering one of the two lost data ranges
    • restored the last data range with the storage-layer recovery method from the previous incident
    Action items
    • Configure CockroachDB Locality so data is spread evenly across availability zones
    • Deploy with one chart and a separate values file per availability zone to set Locality
    • Replace nodes by adding Locality-configured nodes, confirming replicas in every zone, then retiring the old nodes
    Lessons

    A replication factor sized for random instance retirements does not protect against a whole availability zone failing; for a game of this scale a multi-AZ placement is required, not optional. Keeping one uniform Helm chart made zone topology hard to set, which is part of why it was left out. A repetitive chart with a values file per zone sets it reliably.

  2. Symptoms

    Right after an updated RedisFailover resource was rolled out, the large Redis database lost all its data and the service went down; the data had to be restored from a backup taken just before the change.

    Trigger

    A RedisFailover change that raised the number of Redis replicas from one to two and, in the same rollout, lowered the containers' memory requests and limits from 22 GB to 19 GB.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • restored the Redis data from the backup prepared before the rollout
    Action items
    • Report the readiness probe flaw to the Redis Operator project and test the developers' fix
    • Reconsider the use of the Spotahome Redis Operator
    • Clean up the Redis databases and fix the application code that created the excess keys
    • Consider Redis built-in clustering and sharding
    Lessons

    Changing the replica count and the pod resources in one rollout turned a seemingly harmless change into a rolling restart of the only pod with data while the new replica was still empty. A readiness probe that only checks that Redis answers a ping does not tell whether a replica has finished syncing. Operators for critical stateful components need to be evaluated for maturity before production use, and the dump.rdb file should be backed up before any change to the Redis cluster.

  3. Symptoms

    At about 1 AM on 9 February 2017, UC Berkeley's DataHub was reported down: users trying to log in got a proxy error. The hub pod was running, but its log was full of sqlite errors.

    Trigger

    While debugging, an operator ran `.save jupyterhub.sqlite` in sqlite3 inside the hub pod without having attached the database, which replaced the JupyterHub database file with an empty one.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DataHub was reported down at about 1 AM, when users got a proxy error at login. At 1:12 AM a user reported that he could log in but all his notebooks were gone.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the hub to 0 replicas
    • Rebuilt the JupyterHub sqlite database by matching Kubernetes PVC names back to user ids
    • Set cookie_id to null instead of a dummy value and attached the rebuilt database to the hub
    • Changed the cookie secret in the hub pod and restarted it to log all users out
    • Deleted all user pods to log everyone out
    • Ran a script that filled in cookie_id for all users, restarted the hub and deleted all user pods again
    • Dropped the new users with a '.' in their name and renamed the older users from '-' to '.'
    Action items
    • Report upstream that JupyterHub uses only part of the cookie secret and discards the rest
    • Report upstream that the cookie_id column of the users table should have UNIQUE and NOT NULL constraints
    • Ask KubeSpawner to support username hashes in PVC and pod names so the names stay the same when the database is deleted
    • Ask OAuthenticator to support using the id from the Google authenticator as the user id, giving stable user ids
    • Switch to Google Cloud SQL, a hosted and managed MySQL database
    • Take regular and tested backups of the database
    • Start an operational FAQ of things to do and not to do
    • Set up better monitoring and paging
    • Document escalation procedures explicitly
Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Database and Persistent volumes and stateful sets. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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