Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
IL-0366Cloud Storage uploads and writes in us-central1 slowed and failed with HTTP 503 as traffic piled onto a few backendsGoogle Cloud2026- Symptoms
From 04:00 US/Pacific on 8 October 2026, Google Cloud Storage upload and write operations in the us-central1 region became slow and failed. Clients mostly saw HTTP 503 UNAVAILABLE errors on WriteObject operations and client-side timeouts.
- Trigger
A configuration update to the Cloud Storage load balancing layer turned on a traffic sorting optimization that was meant to deal with local capacity constraints. The recurrence on 9 October came from an incomplete rollback of an upload planner feature.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Google engineering teams monitoring system telemetry detected the problem at 04:50 US/Pacific on 8 October, 50 minutes after it began.
- Remediation
- Drained traffic from the most overloaded storage backend nodes
- Deployed a configuration change that disabled the traffic sorting optimization
- Rolled back a recent update to the metadata database service
- Redirected traffic and drained affected storage components again during the recurrence
- Fully reverted the load balancing configuration change, restoring capacity-aware routing
- Returned the drained nodes to service once resource use was back to normal
- Action items
- Validate load balancing logic changes in smaller regions before rolling them out to large, highly utilized regions
- Make the storage load balancing enforce capacity constraints so traffic cannot bypass pre-spilling safeguards
- Speed up internal data movement within highly utilized storage cells to absorb temporary load spikes
IL-0283Cloudflare's core proxy returned HTTP 5xx across its network after loading an oversized Bot Management feature fileCloudflare2025- Symptoms
From about 11:20 UTC on 18 November 2025, Cloudflare's network started failing to deliver core traffic, and Internet users visiting Cloudflare customers' sites got an error page that pointed to a failure inside Cloudflare's network. The volume of HTTP 5xx responses served by the network jumped far above its normal low baseline.
- Trigger
At 11:05 UTC Cloudflare deployed a ClickHouse access control change that made users' existing implicit access to the underlying tables in the r0 database explicit, so the metadata of those tables became visible in system tables such as system.columns. The change was being rolled out gradually across the cluster.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The first automated test detected the issue at 11:31 UTC, three minutes after the first errors on customer HTTP traffic at 11:28. Manual investigation started at 11:32 and the incident call was created at 11:35.
- Remediation
- Bypassed the core proxy for Workers KV and Access so they fell back to a prior proxy version, which reduced their impact
- Stopped the automatic creation and deployment of new Bot Management feature files
- Inserted a known good feature file into the distribution queue and deployed it globally
- Forced a restart of the core proxy
- Scaled control plane concurrency to clear the backlog of dashboard logins
- Restarted the remaining services that had entered a bad state
- Action items
- Harden the ingestion of Cloudflare-generated configuration files the same way as user-generated input
- Enable more global kill switches for features
- Stop core dumps and other error reports from being able to overwhelm system resources
- Review the failure modes for error conditions across all core proxy modules
These 2 cases involve Database and CDN and edge network. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Configuration change2 cases
- Contributing factor
- Organisation