Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From about 11:20 UTC on 18 November 2025, Cloudflare's network started failing to deliver core traffic, and Internet users visiting Cloudflare customers' sites got an error page that pointed to a failure inside Cloudflare's network. The volume of HTTP 5xx responses served by the network jumped far above its normal low baseline.

    Trigger

    At 11:05 UTC Cloudflare deployed a ClickHouse access control change that made users' existing implicit access to the underlying tables in the r0 database explicit, so the metadata of those tables became visible in system tables such as system.columns. The change was being rolled out gradually across the cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first automated test detected the issue at 11:31 UTC, three minutes after the first errors on customer HTTP traffic at 11:28. Manual investigation started at 11:32 and the incident call was created at 11:35.

    Remediation
    • Bypassed the core proxy for Workers KV and Access so they fell back to a prior proxy version, which reduced their impact
    • Stopped the automatic creation and deployment of new Bot Management feature files
    • Inserted a known good feature file into the distribution queue and deployed it globally
    • Forced a restart of the core proxy
    • Scaled control plane concurrency to clear the backlog of dashboard logins
    • Restarted the remaining services that had entered a bad state
    Action items
    • Harden the ingestion of Cloudflare-generated configuration files the same way as user-generated input
    • Enable more global kill switches for features
    • Stop core dumps and other error reports from being able to overwhelm system resources
    • Review the failure modes for error conditions across all core proxy modules
  2. Symptoms

    At 17:28 on 2024-08-14 the EC2 instance pageserver-7.us-east-1.aws.neon.tech stopped responding. Neon customer databases attached to that pageserver stalled whenever they needed to read data that was not already in their Postgres buffer cache.

    Trigger

    The EC2 instance hosting pageserver-7 in us-east-1 failed without the advance warning AWS usually gives before a hardware failure.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Several alerts fired at 17:38, in Slack and as automatic pages to the on-call engineers: the pageserver stopped answering metric scrapes, the control plane API error rate rose, and user operations such as starting endpoints and creating timelines got stuck.

    Remediation
    • Migrated the 17037 projects on pageserver-7 to other pageservers in the region with a semi-manual script
    • Brought back by hand about 20 projects whose in-flight operations blocked the migration
    Action items
    • Move all paying customers onto the storage controller sooner than planned
    • Finish moving the existing pageserver infrastructure under the storage controller
    Lessons

    Neon's first control plane design, in which operations always run to completion, cannot drive a fast response to node failures at scale, because operations that depend on physical machines may never complete. A human decision in the loop and alerts with several minutes of delay made the response too slow; the storage controller, with its own heartbeats and automatic rescheduling, moves work off a failed pageserver in seconds.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and CDN and edge network. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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