Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases6 cases

1 to 5 of 6

  1. Symptoms

    On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

    Trigger

    On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
    • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
    • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
    • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
    • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
    • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
    • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
    • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call
    Action items
    • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
    • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
    • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
    • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
    • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
    • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
    • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
    • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
    • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
    • Build a production-scale load testing framework
    • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
    • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms
    Lessons

    Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

  2. Symptoms

    At 10:01 UTC on 2024-03-13 a Kubernetes node entered NotReady state, with CPU requests at 78% and memory requests at 82%. An alert fired in Slack at 10:03 and was picked up at 10:05. An attempt to SSH into the node at 10:13 failed because it was unresponsive; it started responding again at 10:19.

    Trigger

    Pods of a dev container that used Hangfire to trigger jobs failed with OOM and crash-looped on a node where a Grafana Agent pod was already using a lot of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack alert fired two minutes after the node went NotReady and was picked up two minutes later; the second node's NotReady at 15:03 also raised a Slack alert.

    Remediation
    • marked the EC2 instance unhealthy so a new node started
    • cordoned and force-drained the NotReady node and terminated its EC2 instance
    • removed the new LimitRange from the Grafana Agent namespace and restarted the Grafana Agent pod
    • scaled the dev container to 0 replicas, after which EC2 network traffic returned to normal
    • after the second NotReady, scaled the dev container to 0 replicas again and added a new node
    • emailed the team that owns the dev container, which confirmed it was working on a fix
    Action items
    • Move grafana-agent to the monitoring node group
    • Add alerts for when bandwidth across the cluster reaches a certain threshold
    • Investigate whether memory limits can be set on the grafana-agent Helm chart
    • Investigate grafana-agent memory usage
    • Ask Grafana support whether grafana-agent should use a PVC
    • Consider pushing node logs to Loki with limited retention
    • Create a wiki page with common metrics and log queries to check when investigating issues with Kubernetes nodes
    Lessons

    Dev workloads mixed with production let one crash-looping dev container take down nodes that production also used, and a monitoring agent outside its dedicated node group added to the memory pressure. Scaling the suspect container back up before its owners had fixed it brought the failure back on the replacement node. The team also noted that action items from earlier post-mortems need follow-up, and that knowledge of useful CloudWatch metrics had not been shared, which made the diagnosis harder.

  3. Symptoms

    Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

    Trigger

    An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
    • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
    • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided
    Action items
    • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
    • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths
    Lessons

    Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

  4. Symptoms

    On 2022-04-25 the Sidekiq Apdex (the share of background jobs that finish within a target time) dropped, and an engineer declared an incident in Slack at 15:13 UTC. Users saw intermittent slowness across GitLab.com, and asynchronous work such as pipeline creation and import and export took unusually long.

    Trigger

    The Consul agent in GitLab.com's GKE pods had memory demand spikes that did not fit in the pods' 500MB memory limit, and the agent was killed again and again.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    An engineer declared the incident in Slack at 15:13 UTC after the Sidekiq Apdex dropped; the second event was found when monitoring detected an elevated error rate at 01:21 UTC on 2022-04-26.

    Remediation
    • planned at 16:13 to raise the per-user connection limit for the gitlab database user and the pgbouncer backend pools for the main database; changes were applied at 17:26 and confirmed at 17:47
    • raised the pod memory limits from 500MB to 1GB so the Consul agents survive memory spikes
    Action items
    • Monitor the Consul agents on GKE pods to see whether the 1GB memory limit keeps them healthy
    • Investigate the Consul memory demand spikes and what can be done beyond raising the hard memory limit
    Lessons

    When the local Consul agent that Rails uses for database service discovery keeps dying, Rails does not fail; it sends every query to the last known primary. What engineers saw was database saturation and slow background jobs, which pointed the investigation first at a recent pgbouncer pool change. The memory limit of the Consul agent in every pod therefore decided the load on the primary database.

  5. Symptoms

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.

    Trigger

    A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.

    Remediation
    • replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
    • reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
    Action items
    • Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
    • Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
    Lessons

    The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.

Check your cluster for this

These 6 cases involve Application database and In-memory cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Capacity exhaustion6 cases

  1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries
  2. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  3. IL-0202 A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recover
  4. IL-0206 Consul agents in GitLab.com's GKE pods were repeatedly OOM-killed, so the Rails pods lost database replica discovery and sent every query to the primary
    GitLab2022
  5. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances
  6. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down