Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. Symptoms

    At 10:01 UTC on 2024-03-13 a Kubernetes node entered NotReady state, with CPU requests at 78% and memory requests at 82%. An alert fired in Slack at 10:03 and was picked up at 10:05. An attempt to SSH into the node at 10:13 failed because it was unresponsive; it started responding again at 10:19.

    Trigger

    Pods of a dev container that used Hangfire to trigger jobs failed with OOM and crash-looped on a node where a Grafana Agent pod was already using a lot of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack alert fired two minutes after the node went NotReady and was picked up two minutes later; the second node's NotReady at 15:03 also raised a Slack alert.

    Remediation
    • marked the EC2 instance unhealthy so a new node started
    • cordoned and force-drained the NotReady node and terminated its EC2 instance
    • removed the new LimitRange from the Grafana Agent namespace and restarted the Grafana Agent pod
    • scaled the dev container to 0 replicas, after which EC2 network traffic returned to normal
    • after the second NotReady, scaled the dev container to 0 replicas again and added a new node
    • emailed the team that owns the dev container, which confirmed it was working on a fix
    Action items
    • Move grafana-agent to the monitoring node group
    • Add alerts for when bandwidth across the cluster reaches a certain threshold
    • Investigate whether memory limits can be set on the grafana-agent Helm chart
    • Investigate grafana-agent memory usage
    • Ask Grafana support whether grafana-agent should use a PVC
    • Consider pushing node logs to Loki with limited retention
    • Create a wiki page with common metrics and log queries to check when investigating issues with Kubernetes nodes
    Lessons

    Dev workloads mixed with production let one crash-looping dev container take down nodes that production also used, and a monitoring agent outside its dedicated node group added to the memory pressure. Scaling the suspect container back up before its owners had fixed it brought the failure back on the replacement node. The team also noted that action items from earlier post-mortems need follow-up, and that knowledge of useful CloudWatch metrics had not been shared, which made the diagnosis harder.

  2. Symptoms

    During a team dinner, a Slack alert reported that one node of the CockroachDB cluster behind Cookie Run: Kingdom had gone down. The DevOps engineers were not worried at first, because CockroachDB is built to survive the loss of some nodes.

    Trigger

    A cooling system failure in an AWS Tokyo region data centre overheated the servers in one availability zone, which held CockroachDB nodes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack alert reported that a database node had gone down.

    Remediation
    • copied the data outside the broken ranges into new tables with INSERT INTO ... SELECT queries that skipped the affected ranges
    • ran debug unsafe-remove-dead-replicas together with Cockroach Labs engineers, recovering one of the two lost data ranges
    • restored the last data range with the storage-layer recovery method from the previous incident
    Action items
    • Configure CockroachDB Locality so data is spread evenly across availability zones
    • Deploy with one chart and a separate values file per availability zone to set Locality
    • Replace nodes by adding Locality-configured nodes, confirming replicas in every zone, then retiring the old nodes
    Lessons

    A replication factor sized for random instance retirements does not protect against a whole availability zone failing; for a game of this scale a multi-AZ placement is required, not optional. Keeping one uniform Helm chart made zone topology hard to set, which is part of why it was left out. A repetitive chart with a values file per zone sets it reliably.

  3. Symptoms

    An alert fired because some Metrictank instances could not drain their write queue, which meant they could not write to Cassandra. Google had not yet published an incident, but a team member's Discord server, also hosted on GCP, was down, which pointed at GCP; Google confirmed an SSD persistent disk incident about 90 minutes after it began.

    Trigger

    A Google Cloud incident in which SSD persistent disks performed so poorly that many I/O operations failed for an extended period.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert that Metrictank write instances could not flush their write queue to Cassandra. Error rates alone rose too slowly to notice quickly, because most queries were served from memory.

    Remediation
    • Added compute nodes hoping new nodes could attach the disks, which did not work
    • Deleted and recreated the Cassandra StatefulSet with an updated pod management policy, so all pods but one started
    • Raised Kafka topic retention to avoid data loss during the long downtime
    • Temporarily added nodes so Metrictank restarts were not slowed by CPU starvation
    • Restarted all Metrictank instances, which took more than 20 hours, so they connected to the new Cassandra IPs
    Action items
    • Re-instantiate the gocql connection in Metrictank when it is detected dead, so it reconnects even when all Cassandra IPs change
    • Fix the Metrictank write-queue deadlock by updating an internal data structure with atomics instead of a lock
    Lessons

    An OrderedReady StatefulSet cannot recover past a single pod whose volume will not attach; when every pod is down, the ordering that protects normal start-up blocks the whole cluster. A client that learns peer addresses only from live peers needs a way to go back to the service name when all peers are replaced at once. A long-tolerated bug with a config workaround can surface at the worst time; this one turned out to have a simple fix. Writing incoming data to a Kafka write-ahead log first meant all data could still be ingested after recovery, and Kafka on non-SSD disks escaped the disk incident. With both Metrictank bugs fixed, the team expects a similar event to take less than 3 hours to recover from instead of 23.

  4. Symptoms

    On Friday, January 18, Moonlight's API began returning occasional errors that looked like connection problems with its Redis database. The API checks Redis on every authenticated request to validate the session. At the same time the Kubernetes monitoring reported some nodes and pods as unresponsive.

    Trigger

    The Kubernetes scheduler put several CPU-heavy pods on the same node, including all three replicas of the website and the server-side rendering pods.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    API errors that looked like Redis connectivity problems, and Kubernetes monitoring that showed nodes and pods as unresponsive. Google Cloud Support later found the link between sustained 100% CPU and kernel panics.

    Remediation
    • added anti-affinity rules to all major deployments so their pods spread across nodes
    Action items
    • Keep working with Google Cloud support to find and fix the cause of the node kernel panics
    Lessons

    Three replicas give no fault tolerance if the scheduler places them all on one node; anti-affinity rules make the spread explicit. A node failure that comes from the workload itself moves with the workload when the scheduler reschedules it.

Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve Application database and Helm. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2