Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On a Friday evening in December 2019, Razorpay's internal monitoring alerted on an unusually high number of 5xx errors. The SRE team found that the main application, called API, could not connect to its RDS MySQL database, but within about 110 seconds the application recovered by itself and the alerts stopped. The RDS logs showed that the master instance had gone through a Multi-AZ failover.

    Trigger

    The master instance of the API application's RDS MySQL database went through a Multi-AZ failover to its standby in another availability zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    An internal monitoring alert on unusually high 5xx errors, then alerts that replication had failed on all replicas. The data loss was found the next day by matching the database against the application trace logs.

    Remediation
    • Moved all read replica traffic to the master instance
    • Recreated all five read replicas after a six-hour full snapshot and moved traffic back to them
    • Recovered the missing queries from the binary logs and corrected the data stored in RDS
    • Changed innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit on the master from 2 to 1
    Lessons

    With innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit set to 2, Razorpay had been open to data loss on any failover all along, even though RDS Multi-AZ copies everything on the primary's disk to the standby. The incident also taught the team how RDS runs a Multi-AZ setup and its failovers.

  2. Symptoms

    At 10:24 AM EDT on April 5th, 2017, DigitalOcean began to receive alerts that its public services were not working, and by 10:27 the team had verified that the production database on the primary had been deleted. The control panel and the API were unavailable for four hours and fifty-six minutes: running Droplets kept working, but no new Droplets or other resources could be created or managed.

    Trigger

    A process performing automated testing had been misconfigured with production credentials, and the production primary database was deleted.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts at 10:24 AM EDT that public services were not functioning; within three minutes the team found that the primary database had been deleted.

    Remediation
    • Began recovery from a time-delayed database replica
    • Took a backup of the time-delayed replica
    • Copied the backup to the primary and recovered it
    • Copied the backups to the replicas until all systems were restored
    Action items
    • Drastically reduce access to the primary system for certain actions
    • Upgrade network connectivity between database servers
    • Update hardware to speed up recovery
    • Assess further safeguards against developer error
    • Improve the processes around data recovery
    • Explore ways to provide better real-time information to customers during future customer-impacting events
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database backups and snapshots. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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