Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    At 9:34 UTC on November 23, 2022, RevenueCat started moving traffic from its Aurora PostgreSQL 10.x cluster to a new Aurora PostgreSQL 14.x cluster. By 9:39 UTC all traffic was on the new cluster, latency was bad, and the RevenueCat dashboard and the endpoints used by the RevenueCat SDK stopped working.

    Trigger

    At 9:34 UTC production traffic was switched from the Aurora PostgreSQL 10.x cluster to the new Aurora PostgreSQL 14.x cluster, before ANALYZE had run on its largest tables.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 9:39 UTC, with all traffic on the new cluster, latency looked bad and the infrastructure team began to investigate.

    Remediation
    • Added a statement timeout to the database user so queries could not hold a connection too long
    • Shed 90% of traffic by returning 503s from the load balancer
    • Dropped indexes that the planner was using wrongly and that were not needed
    • Stopped accepting Apple webhooks for a time
    • Rolled out a release without New Relic to stop its EXPLAIN queries
    • Ran ANALYZE by hand on the biggest tables
    • Raised the values of the affected primary key sequences with a prepared script
    • Stopped the integration event dispatcher by hand
    • Replayed the webhooks that were dispatched but not recorded
    • Restored integration event dispatching, ETLs and other non-web server jobs
    Action items
    • Consider change freezes during business-critical periods
    • Explain better how the SDK behaves during backend outages
    • Tell customers about maintenance and outages in the developer dashboard and by direct email to technical contacts
    • Replay a subset of write traffic in migration dry runs to mimic the cutover
    • Move costly processes to asynchronous work to keep the API fast and stable
    • Re-evaluate table indexes, including unused ones the database may choose for queries
    • Show the load of each endpoint and system in the database dashboards
    • Involve support and customer communications staff during outages
    Lessons

    The new cluster had not been analyzed, and the tests missed it because the test cluster had been up long enough to gather statistics. Dry runs replayed no write traffic, on the belief that writes are simpler than reads, and the team assumed sequence state was replicated with the data. Rolling back at the start would have been better than fixing forward. The migration, timed to finish before Thanksgiving and Black Friday, should have been delayed until the week after, because the US had entered a sensitive period and part of the US support team was already on holiday.

  2. Symptoms

    At 22:54 UTC on 21 October 2018 GitHub's internal monitoring started alerting on many faults at once. By 23:02 UTC the first responders saw that the replication topologies of many MySQL clusters were in an unexpected state: the Orchestrator API showed topologies made only of servers in the US West Coast data center. When connectivity came back, the application tier had immediately started sending writes to the new West Coast primaries.

    Trigger

    At 22:52 UTC on 21 October, routine maintenance to replace failing 100G optical equipment cut connectivity between GitHub's US East Coast network hub and its primary US East Coast data center for 43 seconds.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    GitHub's internal monitoring raised alerts on numerous faults at 22:54 UTC, two minutes after the partition. By 23:02 UTC the first responders had found, by querying the Orchestrator API, that many database clusters had a topology with only US West Coast servers.

    Remediation
    • Locked the internal deployment tooling to stop further changes
    • Paused webhook delivery and GitHub Pages builds to stop jobs writing metadata
    • Restored the affected MySQL clusters from backups into the US East Coast data center and let them replicate from the West Coast
    • Found ways to restore directly from the West Coast to get around the throughput limits of downloading from off-site storage
    • Moved all database primaries back to the US East Coast data center
    • Spread read traffic over additional MySQL read replicas in the US East Coast public cloud so replication could catch up
    • Failed over to the original topology once the replicas were in sync
    • Processed the backlog of webhook events and Pages builds, pausing to raise an internal TTL after about 200,000 webhook payloads were dropped
    Action items
    • Reconcile the writes from the captured MySQL binary logs that were not replicated, automatically where possible and with user outreach otherwise
    • Make sure status updates can be published even when GitHub Pages builds are paused
    • Give more accurate public estimates of the time to repair
    • Configure Orchestrator so it cannot promote database primaries across regional boundaries
    • Move to a status reporting mechanism that shows the status of each component of the platform
    • Serve GitHub traffic from multiple data centers in an active/active/active design with N+1 redundancy at the facility level
    • Test assumptions about the system more proactively
    • Validate failure scenarios systematically, with investment in fault injection and chaos engineering tooling
    Lessons

    Orchestrator did what it was configured to do, but the application tier could not work with primaries on the other side of the country: leader election within one region is generally safe, while the sudden cross-country latency was a major contributing factor. The behaviour emerged from a partition larger than any GitHub had seen. Replication caught up along a power decay curve, not a straight line, so the linear estimates of recovery time were wrong. GitHub concluded that tighter operational controls and faster response are not enough on their own and that failure scenarios have to be validated before they happen.

  3. Symptoms

    Reports came in of more WORKER_JOB_ERROR errors, which tell Transloadit there is a communication problem between its Uploaders, the machines that receive files and orchestrate Assemblies, and its Drones, the machines that run encoding tasks. Many Assemblies became much slower because retries with exponential back-off kicked in, and a few could not be replayed.

    Trigger

    A steep increase in HLS traffic, together with more Drones online processing the same volume faster, which put more load on the central Redis nodes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Reports of an increased number of WORKER_JOB_ERROR errors.

    Remediation
    • Re-added lost messages and relaxed heartbeat monitoring as a stopgap
    • Upgraded Redis to the latest stable version
    • Doubled the Redis cluster to six nodes and then added three more, which made it worse
    • Brought the number of read replicas down to one, which cut traffic and failure rates
    • Capped how far Drones scale up in each region
    Action items
    • Add logging and alarms for approaching saturation
    • Find ways to decentralise the traffic between the Redis nodes and the Drones and Uploaders
    • Add sharding per Uploader on top of the sharding per region
    Lessons

    To handle more traffic Transloadit had to use fewer Redis nodes, not more: each added replica multiplied the replication traffic from the single leader that takes every write, so scaling up the number of nodes was the wrong call. Bandwidth had not been among the monitored Redis metrics.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Database replication and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3