Cases3 cases
1 to 3 of 3
IL-0308Most RevenueCat backend systems failed after cutover to a new Aurora PostgreSQL 14 cluster as queries became very slowRevenueCat2022- Symptoms
At 9:34 UTC on November 23, 2022, RevenueCat started moving traffic from its Aurora PostgreSQL 10.x cluster to a new Aurora PostgreSQL 14.x cluster. By 9:39 UTC all traffic was on the new cluster, latency was bad, and the RevenueCat dashboard and the endpoints used by the RevenueCat SDK stopped working.
- Trigger
At 9:34 UTC production traffic was switched from the Aurora PostgreSQL 10.x cluster to the new Aurora PostgreSQL 14.x cluster, before ANALYZE had run on its largest tables.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
At 9:39 UTC, with all traffic on the new cluster, latency looked bad and the infrastructure team began to investigate.
- Remediation
- Added a statement timeout to the database user so queries could not hold a connection too long
- Shed 90% of traffic by returning 503s from the load balancer
- Dropped indexes that the planner was using wrongly and that were not needed
- Stopped accepting Apple webhooks for a time
- Rolled out a release without New Relic to stop its EXPLAIN queries
- Ran ANALYZE by hand on the biggest tables
- Raised the values of the affected primary key sequences with a prepared script
- Stopped the integration event dispatcher by hand
- Replayed the webhooks that were dispatched but not recorded
- Restored integration event dispatching, ETLs and other non-web server jobs
- Action items
- Consider change freezes during business-critical periods
- Explain better how the SDK behaves during backend outages
- Tell customers about maintenance and outages in the developer dashboard and by direct email to technical contacts
- Replay a subset of write traffic in migration dry runs to mimic the cutover
- Move costly processes to asynchronous work to keep the API fast and stable
- Re-evaluate table indexes, including unused ones the database may choose for queries
- Show the load of each endpoint and system in the database dashboards
- Involve support and customer communications staff during outages
- Lessons
The new cluster had not been analyzed, and the tests missed it because the test cluster had been up long enough to gather statistics. Dry runs replayed no write traffic, on the belief that writes are simpler than reads, and the team assumed sequence state was replicated with the data. Rolling back at the start would have been better than fixing forward. The migration, timed to finish before Thanksgiving and Black Friday, should have been delayed until the week after, because the US had entered a sensitive period and part of the US support team was already on holiday.
IL-0240Cloudflare API requests failed and the dashboard slowed for hours after the authentication database lost its replicasCloudflare2020- Symptoms
On 2 November 2020 the Cloudflare API and dashboard were degraded for six hours and 33 minutes. The success rate of API queries dropped at times to 75%, and the dashboard was up to 80 times slower than normal, while Cloudflare's edge network kept working.
- Trigger
At 14:43 UTC a network switch in a control plane data center partly failed: it kept LACP and BGP running but stopped forwarding some packets, and it recovered on its own six minutes later.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
At 14:43 UTC alerts fired because the misbehaving switch was unreachable to pings. Engineers then saw that the primary authentication database was overwhelmed.
- Remediation
- Shed load from the primary authentication database by slowing SSL certificate pushes to the edge, emails and other features
- Moved API traffic that could use read replicas to the secondary data center by hand
- Sent authentication calls fully back to the primary data center when the dashboard got worse
- Rebuilt the first database replica, which put itself back into service at 21:20 UTC and returned performance to normal
- Ramped the turned-down services back up so asynchronous processing could catch up
- Action items
- Remove the cluster management limitation that requires rebuilding all replicas after a primary is promoted
- Redesign the user sessions system so dashboard traffic can be steered between data centers
- Change the auto-remediation configuration so a database replica is not promoted so quickly
- Tune each system involved to be more resilient to failures of its dependencies
- Lessons
Every system in the chain had redundancy and none failed completely; each only degraded, which made the chain of events much harder to model and foresee. Automating replica promotion so that it could trigger on a minute's notice had been a point of pride, but for at least one database a fast promotion can do more harm than the failure it answers. Most general-purpose cluster managers use Raft or Paxos rather than Byzantine fault tolerant protocols, accepting a rare failure mode in exchange for a protocol that is simpler to implement correctly and debug.
IL-0303GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went downGitHub2012- Symptoms
On Monday, September 10th, 2012, during a schema migration, the health checks on GitHub's MySQL master failed and Percona Replication Manager moved the 'active' role to another node of the new three-node cluster. That node's InnoDB buffer pool was cold and it performed poorly, its health checks failed in turn, and the role failed back to the original server. GitHub.com went down.
- Trigger
A schema migration on Monday, September 10th put more load on the master database than earlier migrations had, and Percona Replication Manager's health checks on the master failed.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
On the morning of September 11th, a developer told the operations team that the 'standby' node was returning incorrect query results.
- Remediation
- Enabled Pacemaker's maintenance-mode so no health checks or automatic failovers ran, and let the buffer pool warm
- Powered off the out-of-date node 'c' to end the partition
- Stopped Pacemaker and Heartbeat on nodes 'a' and 'b' and started them on node 'a' only
- Started MySQL on node 'a' in the active role
- Removed the events leaked to wrong dashboards and audited the wrongly routed repositories
- Contacted the owners of the exposed private repositories
- Action items
- Change the Pacemaker configuration so the active database role fails over only when an operations engineer starts it
- Find a way to warm the InnoDB buffer pool of slave databases so failovers do not hurt performance
- Audit the Pacemaker and Heartbeat stack, focusing on the code path behind the segfault
- Run hardware tests on the server where the segfault happened
- Lessons
GitHub concluded that automated failover is not the right strategy for its primary production database: for every failover in this incident, any member of the operations team would have said it should not happen. Failovers that must happen, in an emergency or during maintenance, should not hurt performance.
These 3 cases involve Database and Database replication. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause3
Breaking change in an upgrade1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
DNS or network fault1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
Software defect1 case
- Contributing factor
- Organisation