Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 2 September 2025 the matrix.org homeserver went down at 17:45 UTC and stayed down until 18:00 UTC the next day. Both machines of its PostgreSQL cluster were out of action: the original primary had lost its RAID array during a disk expansion, and the data directory of the new primary had been deleted by mistake.

    Trigger

    During maintenance to add drives, an existing drive disappeared from the primary database server's RAID 10 array at 11:17 UTC, which led to a failover and a rebuild of that server. The outage itself began when the data directory of the new primary on db-01 was deleted while clearing a failed restore on db-02.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Monitoring fired when the drive disappeared from db-02's RAID array at 11:17 UTC, and Mythic Beasts confirmed the issue. The team realised it had deleted db-01's data directory, and the backend team was then paged, an incident was opened and an emergency was declared.

    Remediation
    • Created a fresh RAID 10 array on db-02
    • Unblocked WAL archiving from the new primary on db-01 to S3
    • Started restoring db-02 from the S3 backups with wal-g
    • Shut down Synapse and the damaged primary database
    • Remounted the data partition of db-01 read-only
    • Copied the WALs missing from S3 from db-01 to db-02
    • Updated wal-g and patched it to continue from the partial restore
    • Configured a restore_command wrapper that fetched WALs from S3 and the local files, and replayed them in standby mode
    • Promoted db-02 to primary and restarted Synapse
    • Ran backups against the primary while no replica existed
    • Rebuilt db-01 as a replica from a base backup of db-02
    Action items
    • Run pg_repack to reclaim free space
    • Take incremental backups more often, since they restore faster than WAL replay
    • Reduce Synapse's storage requirements
    • Consider changing the terminal background colour by the database's role, for example by watching for the standby.signal file
    • Consider wrapper scripts around sensitive commands, such as an alias for rm, and automating operations such as starting a base backup from primary to secondary
    • Shorten the recovery time, with infrastructure from service providers
    • Upgrade wal-g on all servers and repeat disaster recovery testing with it
    • Explore ZFS local snapshots at the next hardware refresh
    • Make status.matrix.org the source of truth during incidents and keep social media updated
    Lessons

    Most of the difficulty came from the size of the database: restoring 51TB and replaying WALs took far longer than hoped, and incremental backups restore much faster than WAL replay. Running a destructive command on the wrong server was the turning point, and Matrix.org looks for better tooling and processes rather than blaming the individual; working as a trio did not catch the mistake, and server names that suggest a role caused confusion because a primary and a secondary swap roles. The recovery lost no data, but the recovery time needs to be shorter, and the wal-g versions on the disaster recovery server and the production servers had drifted apart.

  2. Symptoms

    At 2:39 AM PDT (9:39 UTC) on 18 July 2013, services that relied on the redis-master of Twilio's billing system began to fail because the load on its host had become extreme. At 2:42 AM PDT monitoring alerted the on-call engineers to a failure in the Redis cluster.

    Trigger

    At 1:35 AM PDT on 18 July a loss of network connectivity disconnected all billing redis-slaves from the redis-master at once, and all of them requested a full synchronization at the same time. On-call engineers then restarted the overloaded redis-master.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 2:42 AM PDT monitoring alerted the on-call engineers to a failure in the Redis cluster. At 3:28 AM PDT the billing system monitoring reported the anomalous charges, and at 12:36 PM PDT monitoring detected the recurrence.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the redis-master to relieve the high load, which loaded a wrong configuration
    • Took the billing system offline to stop further credit card charges
    • Restored service to all suspended accounts
    • Restored the lost account balances from the independent double-bookkeeping record in the relational datastore
    • Took billing offline again after the recurrence and reactivated the newly suspended accounts
    • Refunded all erroneous credit card charges
    • Gave all affected accounts a credit of 10% of their last 30 days of spend
    • Replaced the original Redis cluster and corrected the redis-master configuration
    • Activated the billing system progressively for groups of customer accounts
    Action items
    • Disable Redis restarts on the redis-master and recover the master by pivoting a slave instead
    • Add fail-safes so the billing system neither suspends accounts nor charges cards when balances are missing or cannot be written
    • Validate the billing system against the double-bookkeeping databases in real time
    Lessons

    Losing the in-flight balances and the ability to write balances at the same time exposed a flaw in the auto-recharge system: it failed in a dangerous way, charging cards and suspending accounts instead of stopping.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database replication and In-memory cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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