Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
- Symptoms
Nodes that already existed kept running, but every new node, spot or standard, on either v1.32 or v1.33, failed to initialise and could not join the cluster. Spot nodes that were preempted and recreated never came back, so services degraded progressively: background workers on spot instances, reporting services and order allocation stopped completely, and the APIs on existing nodes kept answering but could not scale for load spikes.
- Trigger
Google upgraded the GKE control plane from v1.32.x to v1.33.2 at the version deprecation deadline, although auto-upgrade was disabled on the node pools.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Remediation
- Created a new GKE cluster at v1.33, the version of the forced upgrade
- Upgraded Istio to 1.27.1 for Kubernetes 1.33 compatibility
- Updated the cert-manager configuration for Kubernetes 1.33
- Migrated all production workloads to the new cluster and verified pod scheduling, DNS resolution, PVC mounting and external integrations
- Decommissioned the broken cluster
- Action items
- Configure all clusters to use the GKE stable release channel
- Implement a separate management cluster for Argo CD, monitoring and other control components (Q4 2025)
- Review spot instance usage for critical workloads and add on-demand fallback pools
- Document the SRE upgrade procedure: management cluster first, production after a monitoring period of several days
- Document a Kubernetes, Istio and cert-manager compatibility matrix
- Create an automated upgrade testing pipeline
- Reserve static IPs for quick migrations
- Pin versions of Istio, cert-manager, CSI and DNS addons
- Stay current with stable releases and regularly check GKE alerts and announcements to avoid deprecation deadlines
- Lessons
GKE upgrades the control plane at a version's deprecation deadline even when auto-upgrade is disabled, so staying inside the supported version window is how to avoid a forced upgrade. A control plane upgrade can leave existing nodes healthy while every new node fails, and spot nodes that cannot rejoin after preemption turn this into cascading failures. Relying heavily on spot instances for critical workers turned a node join failure into a progressive outage. Kubernetes upgrades have to be planned together with dependent components such as Istio and cert-manager, and without a standby cluster on the same provider there was no immediate failover; the only recovery left was building a new cluster.
IL-0144A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOffMicrosoft Azure2022- Symptoms
From 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, Azure VMs running Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic) with unattended-upgrades enabled began failing DNS resolution and losing network connectivity. Several Azure teams, among them the AKS and Azure Container Apps teams, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the update packages were published.
- Trigger
Unattended-upgrades on Ubuntu 18.04 VMs installed a Canonical security update published at 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, including systemd version 237-3ubuntu10.54.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Several Azure teams, including AKS and Azure Container Apps, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the packages were published; incoming support cases then confirmed which Ubuntu versions were affected.
- Remediation
- pointed customers to Canonical's description of the systemd bug and its fix
- recommended rebooting affected VMs or running a template script that repairs DNS resolution
- built automatic detection and remediation for AKS nodes and rolled it out across all regions
- mitigated the remaining AKS customers manually through support
- Action items
- Review the process that lets critical security updates bypass Safe Deployment Practices
- Improve monitoring of the AKS data plane to alert on an uptick of errors
- Review AKS monitoring algorithms so that similar VM errors are detected and alerted on
- Establish an improved escalation path to Canonical during outages and add it to internal Technical Service Guides
- AKS takes full control of the node security patch mechanism, with additional testing and controlled release of patches (estimated December 2022)
- Work with Canonical to run dedicated tests on proposed packages before they are published for Azure IaaS VMs
- Establish a process with Canonical to close the testing gap for the upgrade scenario (estimated March 2023)
- Give AKS customers maintenance window control and environment staging for these patches (estimated December 2023)
- Lessons
Security patches applied automatically by unattended-upgrades, once a day by default, and outside Azure's Safe Deployment Practices reached Ubuntu 18.04 VMs in every Azure region, so one systemd regression became a DNS outage across Azure. On AKS, lost node DNS showed up as image pull failures such as ImagePullBackoff, because kubelet could not resolve the registry. Azure plans to put node security patching under AKS's control with testing and controlled release; customers can use automatic node image upgrade for AKS, or automatic VM guest patching for VMs, instead of unattended-upgrades.
These 2 cases involve Client-side DNS resolver and cache and ConfigMaps and Secrets. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Breaking change in an upgrade2 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
IL-0101After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hoursWealthy2025IL-0144A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOffMicrosoft Azure2022