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1. IL-0229 bunny.net's DNS servers crashed in a loop on a corrupted routing database file and could not fetch a fix from its CDN

   bunny.net2021

   Symptoms

   On 22 June 2021, within minutes of an update released at 8:25 AM UTC, bunny.net's global fleet of close to 100 DNS servers kept crashing and restarting, more than 60% of traffic was lost, hundreds of Gbits of throughput disappeared, and over 750,000 websites were affected. After 10 minutes the team realised that the DNS servers were restarting and dying and that nothing could bring them back up in that state.

   Container crash loopDNS resolution failuresService outageMisrouted requestsLoad imbalance

   Trigger

   At 8:25 AM UTC bunny.net released an update meant to reduce the download size of the SmartEdge optimization database, and it uploaded a corrupted file to Edge Storage.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Authoritative DNS servers and recordsCDN and edge networkObject storage

   Contributing factor

   Circular dependencySingle point of failureAutomation amplificationIneffective rollbackHarmful manual action

   Detection

   About 10 minutes after the release, the team realised that the DNS servers were restarting and dying.

   Remediation

   • Deployed by hand an update that disabled the SmartEdge system on the DNS nodes
   • Routed all requests through Frankfurt instead of Madrid on a couple of DNS servers
   • Migrated the deployment systems and files to a third-party cloud storage service
   • Rewired the deployment system and DNS software to the new storage and deployed
   • Synced the databases and deployed the newest file sets through the third-party service

   Action items

   • Phase out the BinaryPack library as a hot-fix
   • Test third-party libraries more extensively
   • Migrate the internal APIs to an independent third-party service
   • Find how to stop non-critical software from becoming a single point of failure across clusters
   • Make the DNS system keep a local copy of all backup data with automatic failure detection

   Lessons

   bunny.net had built its systems to rely on each other, including the critical parts of its internal infrastructure, so one corrupted file brought down several layers of redundancy with no way back. A part of the infrastructure treated as non-critical turned out to be a single point of failure for several clusters at once, which canary deployments did not catch. Building infrastructure inside its own ecosystem lets one failure cascade through all of it. In the rush to fix the outage the team made typos and mistakes, and the final deployment came after it calmed down and double-checked everything.

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2. IL-0351 Heroku apps in the EU and US had slow and failed requests as DNS round-robin sent traffic to single router hosts

   Heroku2017

   Symptoms

   Between 3 and 7 June 2017, Heroku customers in both the EU and US regions had periods of high latency: some requests failed and others took an excessive time to pass through the Heroku Routing Layer. All customers in the EU and US were affected at various times.

   High latencyHigh error rateLoad imbalance

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   Authoritative DNS servers and recordsCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumption

   Remediation

   • Found the sources of high-volume traffic and worked with those apps' owners to distribute their requests better
   • Replaced the legacy DNS records with new, corrected DNS records

   Action items

   • Make monitoring alert engineers sooner to unevenly distributed traffic
   • Investigate how to configure DNS and load balancers to reduce the effect of high-volume and bursting traffic
   • Work with caching Add-on partners on the DNS configuration issues that affect them, to achieve proper load balancing

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