Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases6 cases

1 to 5 of 6

  1. Symptoms

    On 19 August 2026 the first equipment-level signs in Nebius's us-central1 region appeared around 09:40 UTC: the InfiniBand fabric degraded and GPU over-temperature alerts began to accumulate. Customer reports followed shortly after 10:00. At 10:15 on-call engineers were paged on critical component temperature alerts, and the incident was declared at 10:21.

    Trigger

    A storm-related event at the data center building took the building management system offline and shut down the chilled-water cooling loop.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    No facility-level alert fired, because the storm also disabled the building management system that monitors the facility. Engineers acted on component over-temperature alerts that paged on-call at 10:15 UTC, after InfiniBand degradation, GPU over-temperature alerts and customer reports; the temperature rise from about 09:15 was visible on dashboards but had no alert.

    Remediation
    • had the facility operator switch cooling to manual bypass mode and opened rack rear doors to vent heat
    • re-energised tripped racks, control-plane racks first
    • restored the regional infrastructure control plane by manual intervention
    • restarted block-storage host components to clear stale disk attachment state
    • raised the VM recovery rate limits by hand for the region-scale recovery
    • started the affected Managed Kubernetes control-plane instances by hand
    • applied a controlled stop and start to control-plane instances whose data disk had been left unattached
    • identified and started 104 customer VMs that the incident had stopped
    Action items
    • Complete a joint resilience review with the facility operator covering redundancy of facility-management and monitoring systems, cooling that keeps running when those fail, electrical protection of cooling equipment and on-site response
    • Add facility-level environmental alerting on cooling plant state and room temperature trend that pages on-call independently of the building management system
    • Set up a documented emergency escalation path with the facility operator, with an on-call contact tree and guaranteed response times
    • Define an emergency heat-load reduction procedure with criteria, ownership and mechanics for shutting down or degrading workloads during a cooling loss
    • Establish a dependency-ordered region cold-start procedure with clear ownership for each service layer
    • Run regular region-scale recovery drills that cover VMs, storage attachments and Managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Fix the disk-attachment bug that extended the Managed Kubernetes outage and deploy the fix to all production regions
    • Improve the recovery policies Compute users can configure, and move all Managed Kubernetes control-plane nodes to the improved policy
    • Automate reconciliation of stale storage attachment state after abrupt host failures
    • Remove in-region dependencies from monitoring startup and recovery, and extend cross-region monitoring
    • Make regional health checks used for global traffic management reflect real service availability
    Lessons

    Facility monitoring that runs on the same system it watches goes silent in exactly the failure it should report, and with no alert on the room temperature trend there was no practical window to shed heat load in a controlled way. A cold start of a whole region exercised recovery paths built for isolated failures: single-attempt VM recovery, conservative rate limits and stale disk attachments all needed manual work. The longest part of the outage was restoring customer resources, Managed Kubernetes control planes above all, so Nebius is extending its recovery drills to that layer.

  2. Symptoms

    From 01:36 UTC on 12 March 2026, GitHub.com returned elevated error rates for Git operations, web requests and related services. At 01:54 UTC the GitHub status page said it was investigating reports of impacted performance for some services.

    Trigger

    During a planned infrastructure upgrade, a configuration issue made newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes run an incompatible version of etcd.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The status page opened the incident at 01:54 UTC, 18 minutes after errors began, citing reports of impacted performance.

    Remediation
    • paused deployments for the duration of the incident
    • identified the newly provisioned nodes running the incompatible etcd version and removed them, which restored cluster consensus
    • ran a validation deploy that confirmed all systems were healthy before resuming normal operations
    Action items
    • Enforce version compatibility programmatically during node replacements
    • Add monitoring that detects split-brain conditions earlier
    • Update the recovery tooling to reduce restoration time
  3. Symptoms

    About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

    Trigger

    An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

    Remediation
    • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
    • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
    • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
    • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
    • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
    • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
    • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand
    Action items
    • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
    • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
    • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
    • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
    • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe
    Lessons

    Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

  4. Symptoms

    After Civis released its new script infrastructure on Kubernetes internally in September 2018, developers reported that kubectl commands were slow, and users intermittently could not start notebooks and services.

    Trigger

    Migrating clients' Python, R and container scripts from the in-house Bocce system to Kubernetes (the project called Croquet) pushed the cluster to about 290 EC2 instances under a large script load.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Developer reports of slow kubectl commands and user reports of notebooks and services failing to start, then high CPU on the master nodes.

    Remediation
    • moved internal users back to the old Bocce infrastructure
    • resized the three master nodes from m4.large to m4.4xlarge
    • changed the Datadog setup so per-node agents no longer polled the API server for service metadata
    • raised max-requests-inflight for non-mutating requests from 400 to 1200
    • grew the etcd EBS volumes from 20 to 100 GB (100 to 300 IOPS)
    • switched client scripts from the ClusterFirst DNS policy to Default
    Action items
    • Upgrade etcd from 2.2.1 to 3.x once Kops supports a safe migration
    • Solve the in-cluster DNS timeouts so client scripts can talk to other workloads in the cluster
    Lessons

    Kubernetes can reach thousands of nodes only after tuning, and third-party DaemonSets are a common cause of control plane load: an agent on every node that polls or watches the API server multiplies with the cluster size. Datadog, kube2iam and the fluentd metadata filter all showed this. A small configuration change often fixes it, but finding it took load testing and the API server access logs.

  5. Symptoms

    The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

    Trigger

    Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

    Remediation
    • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts
    Action items
    • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
    • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages
    Lessons

    Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

Check your cluster for this

These 6 cases involve etcd and Kubernetes API server. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Dependency failure1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026

Configuration change1 case

Component
Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0200 Newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes ran an incompatible etcd version and broke cluster consensus in several GitHub production clusters, causing 5XX errors on Git operations and page loads
    GitHub2026

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe

Software defect1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017