Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    Nodes that already existed kept running, but every new node, spot or standard, on either v1.32 or v1.33, failed to initialise and could not join the cluster. Spot nodes that were preempted and recreated never came back, so services degraded progressively: background workers on spot instances, reporting services and order allocation stopped completely, and the APIs on existing nodes kept answering but could not scale for load spikes.

    Trigger

    Google upgraded the GKE control plane from v1.32.x to v1.33.2 at the version deprecation deadline, although auto-upgrade was disabled on the node pools.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Created a new GKE cluster at v1.33, the version of the forced upgrade
    • Upgraded Istio to 1.27.1 for Kubernetes 1.33 compatibility
    • Updated the cert-manager configuration for Kubernetes 1.33
    • Migrated all production workloads to the new cluster and verified pod scheduling, DNS resolution, PVC mounting and external integrations
    • Decommissioned the broken cluster
    Action items
    • Configure all clusters to use the GKE stable release channel
    • Implement a separate management cluster for Argo CD, monitoring and other control components (Q4 2025)
    • Review spot instance usage for critical workloads and add on-demand fallback pools
    • Document the SRE upgrade procedure: management cluster first, production after a monitoring period of several days
    • Document a Kubernetes, Istio and cert-manager compatibility matrix
    • Create an automated upgrade testing pipeline
    • Reserve static IPs for quick migrations
    • Pin versions of Istio, cert-manager, CSI and DNS addons
    • Stay current with stable releases and regularly check GKE alerts and announcements to avoid deprecation deadlines
    Lessons

    GKE upgrades the control plane at a version's deprecation deadline even when auto-upgrade is disabled, so staying inside the supported version window is how to avoid a forced upgrade. A control plane upgrade can leave existing nodes healthy while every new node fails, and spot nodes that cannot rejoin after preemption turn this into cascading failures. Relying heavily on spot instances for critical workers turned a node join failure into a progressive outage. Kubernetes upgrades have to be planned together with dependent components such as Istio and cert-manager, and without a standby cluster on the same provider there was no immediate failover; the only recovery left was building a new cluster.

  2. Symptoms

    On 21 March 2025, between 21:10 and 21:41 UTC, part of the authentication and authorization requests to Twingate services failed with elevated error rates.

    Trigger

    Twingate saw anomalies in one of its GKE clusters and scaled down the deployments in that cluster to protect the rest of the system, which moved its traffic to the other clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Twingate observed anomalies in one of its GKE clusters at the start of the incident.

    Remediation
    • Reintroduced capacity in the cluster that had been scaled down, so traffic was rebalanced across regions
    Action items
    • Keep working with the cloud provider to find the cause of the unexpected timeouts and of the cluster update's impact
    • Run deployments in all regions with the same number of replicas in the HPA configuration
    • Raise the maximum node counts of the cluster node autoscalers to leave more room to scale up
    • Configure the HPA to scale up faster
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve GKE control plane and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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