Cases3 cases
1 to 3 of 3
IL-0478A failed GPU network adapter made NCCL silently reroute through GPU 0's adapter and slowed MoE training stepsAmazon2026- Symptoms
In Amazon's large-scale foundation model training, training steps took about 0.3 seconds longer (8.7 s instead of 8.4 s) when a node had a GPU whose network adapter had failed. No hardware failure alert fired, and standard node checks such as GPU burn-in and short NCCL tests rarely catch such nodes.
- Trigger
The network adapter of one GPU on a node failed.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
No hardware alert or standard health check showed the fault. It showed as slower training steps, in the per-node network device status and transmission rate that Guard monitors, and as elevated latency or reduced bandwidth in a 2-node sweep.
- Remediation
- Resolved the degraded communication path, which brought training step time from 8.7 s back to 8.4 s
- Action items
- Monitor each node's network device status continuously to find and isolate nodes whose traffic NCCL rerouted
- Remove a node flagged by online monitoring from the healthy node pool and schedule it for offline verification
- Run a multi-node sweep that stresses cross-node collective communication to expose degraded links and misrouted traffic
- Trigger node sweeps after anomalies found by online monitoring and after repairs, before a node re-enters production
- Lessons
NCCL's transparent rerouting keeps both the job and NCCL tests working while it hides a failed adapter, so checks that verify functional correctness do not find the node. Amazon relies on performance-aware monitoring during training, with step time as the main signal, and on offline verification under realistic load before nodes return to service.
IL-0586Four NIC-to-T0 links flapped in rapid succession and cut a 50K-GPU pretraining job's throughput about 25% for a minuteOpenAI2026- Symptoms
During a 50K GPU production pretraining job at OpenAI on Cluster A, all four links of one optical transceiver on a T0 switch flapped in rapid succession, and the job's throughput dropped by about 25% for the minute of flaps. The four links went to NICs on four different nodes, three of which were running in the job.
- Trigger
An optical transceiver on a T0 switch had a glitch.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- –
- Detection
The NICs detected their links going down and the T0 switch recorded the same links as down; the event is shown in the job's throughput and per-node packet loss graphs.
- Remediation
- MRC recovered the packets lost during the flaps quickly, so the impact on the job stayed relatively small
- Lessons
With MRC, failures of T0-to-T1 links and T1 switches have almost no effect on training, but NIC-to-T0 links and T0 switches still have a measurable effect and need more care. Most NIC-to-T0 link losses are transient, and a job can often recover to full speed quickly without evicting nodes.
IL-0418Machine, ICI link and optical circuit switch failures interrupted training jobs on Google's TPU v4 supercomputersGoogle2024- Symptoms
On Google's TPU v4 supercomputers, a failed TPU machine, inter-chip interconnect (ICI) link or optical circuit switch (OCS) stopped the training jobs that used it, because a job's TPU processes all have to be up to update weights together over ICI collectives. Hardware outages hit about 1% of training jobs; jobs on a failed machine or ICI link were evicted, rescheduled onto healthy cubes and resumed from their latest checkpoint.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- –
- Detection
healthd on each machine monitors ICI links, PCIe channels and TPU chips against modelled values and thresholds, a PCIe MSI-X interrupt reaches libtpunet when a link goes down, a TPU errors or the driver panics and libtpunet notifies Borg, a preflight check runs before every job, and the Pod Manager queries OCS health over RPC.
- Remediation
- Marked the affected TPU machines unavailable and evicted running jobs with notice
- Notified affected jobs so they could write an up-to-date checkpoint, and resumed rescheduled jobs from the latest checkpoint
- Reconfigured jobs through the optical circuit switches to use spare healthy cubes after machine and ICI link outages
- Routed traffic around links broken by an unavailable OCS with fault-tolerant wild-first routing
- Drained broken ICI links and repaired them online while the TPUs stayed in use
- Sent faulty hardware to a repair workflow and returned it to the pool after automated QA
- Prioritised recovery time for OCS components over other components
- Upgraded OCS parts across the fleet in a planned upgrade to improve reliability
- Action items
- Add randomized routing to ICI switches for better load balancing in the presence of faults
- Provision a hot-standby cube on an outage and migrate accelerator state to it without writing a persistent checkpoint
- Lessons
In a static pod every resource in a contiguous block must be healthy at once, which becomes less likely as jobs grow, so job availability falls with size. Reconfiguring at the granularity of 16-machine cubes keeps the blast radius of a failure small while letting jobs use any healthy cubes, and fault-tolerant routing keeps cubes usable through rare OCS outages at a small cost in step time.
These 3 cases involve NIC, cable and switch port link and NCCL. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Hardware failure3 cases
- Contributing factor
IL-0478A failed GPU network adapter made NCCL silently reroute through GPU 0's adapter and slowed MoE training stepsAmazon2026IL-0586Four NIC-to-T0 links flapped in rapid succession and cut a 50K-GPU pretraining job's throughput about 25% for a minuteOpenAI2026IL-0418Machine, ICI link and optical circuit switch failures interrupted training jobs on Google's TPU v4 supercomputersGoogle2024