Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

    Trigger

    On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
    • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
    • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
    • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
    • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
    • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
    • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
    • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call
    Action items
    • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
    • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
    • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
    • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
    • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
    • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
    • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
    • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
    • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
    • Build a production-scale load testing framework
    • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
    • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms
    Lessons

    Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

  2. Symptoms

    Nodes that already existed kept running, but every new node, spot or standard, on either v1.32 or v1.33, failed to initialise and could not join the cluster. Spot nodes that were preempted and recreated never came back, so services degraded progressively: background workers on spot instances, reporting services and order allocation stopped completely, and the APIs on existing nodes kept answering but could not scale for load spikes.

    Trigger

    Google upgraded the GKE control plane from v1.32.x to v1.33.2 at the version deprecation deadline, although auto-upgrade was disabled on the node pools.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Created a new GKE cluster at v1.33, the version of the forced upgrade
    • Upgraded Istio to 1.27.1 for Kubernetes 1.33 compatibility
    • Updated the cert-manager configuration for Kubernetes 1.33
    • Migrated all production workloads to the new cluster and verified pod scheduling, DNS resolution, PVC mounting and external integrations
    • Decommissioned the broken cluster
    Action items
    • Configure all clusters to use the GKE stable release channel
    • Implement a separate management cluster for Argo CD, monitoring and other control components (Q4 2025)
    • Review spot instance usage for critical workloads and add on-demand fallback pools
    • Document the SRE upgrade procedure: management cluster first, production after a monitoring period of several days
    • Document a Kubernetes, Istio and cert-manager compatibility matrix
    • Create an automated upgrade testing pipeline
    • Reserve static IPs for quick migrations
    • Pin versions of Istio, cert-manager, CSI and DNS addons
    • Stay current with stable releases and regularly check GKE alerts and announcements to avoid deprecation deadlines
    Lessons

    GKE upgrades the control plane at a version's deprecation deadline even when auto-upgrade is disabled, so staying inside the supported version window is how to avoid a forced upgrade. A control plane upgrade can leave existing nodes healthy while every new node fails, and spot nodes that cannot rejoin after preemption turn this into cascading failures. Relying heavily on spot instances for critical workers turned a node join failure into a progressive outage. Kubernetes upgrades have to be planned together with dependent components such as Istio and cert-manager, and without a standby cluster on the same provider there was no immediate failover; the only recovery left was building a new cluster.

  3. Symptoms

    Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

    Trigger

    All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

    Remediation
    • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
    • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
    • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments
    Lessons

    The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

  4. Symptoms

    A user of the LIS JupyterHub reported a "backoff after failed scale-up" error, and user servers would not start. An engineer opened incident #36, "LIS hub cannot scale", at 5:40 AM Pacific on 14 November 2022.

    Trigger

    At 10 AM UK time on 14 November 2022, the B zone of Google Cloud's europe-west2 region (London) ran out of resources to allocate. The LIS cluster's nodes were restricted to that zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A user reported the "backoff after failed scale-up" error; an engineer opened the incident at 5:40 AM Pacific, about three hours and forty minutes after the zone ran out of resources.

    Remediation
    • edited the node pool in the GCP console to allow node creation in the A and C zones of europe-west2, which were not exhausted
    Action items
    • Either restrict the node pool back to the B zone after the Black Friday event, or move the cluster and the NFS Filestore to the A zone (infrastructure issue #1944)
    • Investigate an enterprise plan that allows a regional NFS, at higher cost (infrastructure issue #1945)
    • Make sure PagerDuty notifications always get through to engineers (team-compass issue #574)
    Lessons

    A node pool pinned to one zone for storage performance cannot scale when the cloud provider runs out of capacity in that zone. The autoscaler's "backoff after failed scale-up" message usually points to quotas, and raising quotas does nothing here; the ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED error in the logs is what identifies a zone without capacity. The review found that one engineer wearing many hats (incident commander, comms and debugging), with pages not reaching the other responders, made the response harder; a team response would have given more support.

  5. Symptoms

    At 12:00 EST the health check system reported that the backend APIs, the frontend and the tunnels in the EU region were down. The team first took it for a transient error, such as an interrupted client request or a server evicted for memory or CPU pressure, but the main dashboard was offline as well.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The health check system sent a notification that the service was down; the team then found the main dashboard offline.

    Remediation
    • recreated the node pools by hand after the credential rotation failed to recreate them
    • duplicated the main cluster's services into a newly created GKE cluster
    • deleted the Kubernetes Service records in the old cluster so its load balancers could be attached to the new cluster
    • detached the StatefulSet from the old cluster and switched all writes to the main disk
    • exported the data from the temporary ClickHouse instance and inserted it into the main instance
    Action items
    • Change the deployment manifests so services can be switched between clusters quickly without a complicated persistent disk migration
    Lessons

    Recovery of existing infrastructure needs a time limit. Throughout the outage the old cluster looked about to recover, and the reluctance to give up on the salvage effort kept the team from starting over with a new cluster much sooner, which would have been the right call. On older GKE clusters, check the validity of the cluster CA certificate, for example by decoding masterAuth.clusterCaCertificate from gcloud container clusters describe and reading it with openssl x509. GKE's multiple availability zones made no difference in this failure.

Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve Node pool and Client-side DNS resolver and cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries
  2. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0101 After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hours

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0096 A GKE node pool pinned to the europe-west2-b zone could not scale for 6.5 hours because Google ran out of resources in that zone (ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED)
    2i2c2022

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0113 The managed GKE control plane of Webhook Relay's main cluster failed because its API server certificates had never been rotated, and a manual credential rotation reported success without taking effect