Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    A user of the LIS JupyterHub reported a "backoff after failed scale-up" error, and user servers would not start. An engineer opened incident #36, "LIS hub cannot scale", at 5:40 AM Pacific on 14 November 2022.

    Trigger

    At 10 AM UK time on 14 November 2022, the B zone of Google Cloud's europe-west2 region (London) ran out of resources to allocate. The LIS cluster's nodes were restricted to that zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A user reported the "backoff after failed scale-up" error; an engineer opened the incident at 5:40 AM Pacific, about three hours and forty minutes after the zone ran out of resources.

    Remediation
    • edited the node pool in the GCP console to allow node creation in the A and C zones of europe-west2, which were not exhausted
    Action items
    • Either restrict the node pool back to the B zone after the Black Friday event, or move the cluster and the NFS Filestore to the A zone (infrastructure issue #1944)
    • Investigate an enterprise plan that allows a regional NFS, at higher cost (infrastructure issue #1945)
    • Make sure PagerDuty notifications always get through to engineers (team-compass issue #574)
    Lessons

    A node pool pinned to one zone for storage performance cannot scale when the cloud provider runs out of capacity in that zone. The autoscaler's "backoff after failed scale-up" message usually points to quotas, and raising quotas does nothing here; the ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED error in the logs is what identifies a zone without capacity. The review found that one engineer wearing many hats (incident commander, comms and debugging), with pages not reaching the other responders, made the response harder; a team response would have given more support.

  2. Symptoms

    At 08:52 PM IST a report came in from WER that many students could not access the JupyterHub and that it was frozen; pages were stuck and nothing was usable. A rise in activity was visible by 09:02 PM, but the usual fixes, such as opening an incognito window and restarting servers, did not help.

    Trigger

    WER students' pods used a good chunk of their memory limit (tests had shown they almost always use just under 1G of their 2G limit, against a 512M guarantee) on nodes shared with the hub's core pods.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    WER reported stuck pages and students unable to reach the hub in a GitHub issue (2i2c-org/docs#27).

    Remediation
    • removed memory overcommit for the WER students
    • raised resource guarantees for all core pods, which restarted them and moved some to a new node
    Action items
    • Put user pods in a separate pool so they do not create pressure on the core pods (infrastructure#89)
    • Set limits on the support infrastructure (Prometheus, Grafana, ingress) as well (infrastructure#90)
    • Document and think about overcommit ratios for memory usage (infrastructure#91)
    • Set up better Grafana dashboards to monitor resource usage (infrastructure#92)
    • Document how people can get kubectl access to the cluster so others can look into issues too (infrastructure#87)
    Lessons

    Core pods without resource guarantees get whatever is left on a node, so when user pods on the same nodes fill the CPU and memory, the hub that serves everyone freezes. The memory overcommit ratio has to come from measured use: WER students used just under 1G against a 512M guarantee, which a 4x overcommit could not hold.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Node pool and Cluster autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2