Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. Symptoms

    At 7:13 UTC on 20 October 2025, PlanetScale's continuous tests in production started failing because they could not create new database branches. The service that creates, resizes and configures database branches was unavailable, a near-total control plane outage, while existing database branches kept their capacity and connectivity.

    Trigger

    The incident started with a DNS misconfiguration at one of PlanetScale's service providers. An Amazon DynamoDB outage impacted AWS STS, and several hours of capacity constraints and network instability in AWS us-east-1 followed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    PlanetScale's continuous testing in production started failing and alerted engineers at 7:13 UTC. At 10:05 UTC an alert fired for a Kubernetes operator in a large single-tenant customer installation exhausting its resources.

    Remediation
    • Disallowed new databases in us-east-1 and made us-east-2 the default region for new databases
    • Delayed new backups and cancelled pending backups that were waiting for an EC2 instance
    • Advised PlanetScale Managed customers with vtgate autoscaling to shed load
    • Paused draining and terminating EC2 instances older than 30 days
    • Kept vacant EC2 instances for reuse instead of terminating them
    • Bin-packed vtgate processes more tightly for customers with autoscaling
    • Sent manual reparent requests to move primaries to healthier availability zones
    • Restarted the edge load balancer and vtgate processes that did not recover after the partitions healed
    Action items
    • Understand and become resilient to the failure modes of SaaS dependencies for CI/CD, SSO, web application hosting and incident communication
    • Investigate more ambitious ways to reduce runtime dependence on internal and AWS services
    • Look into using all six us-east-1 availability zones to tolerate zonal outages and partitions
    Lessons

    Keeping the control plane separate from the data plane meant the control plane outage did not affect customer databases, and redundancy, automated failover and zonal traffic routing limited the effect of the network partitions. Network partitions are hard to reason about, test and tolerate: with three availability zones a system survives losing one zone only if the other two can still reach each other reliably.

  2. Symptoms

    From 22:38 UTC on 28 November 2024, DigitalOcean's Cloud Control Panel stopped loading for customers, and sign-up and log-in failed. DigitalOcean declared the incident from monitoring and customer reports, an internal alert fired at 22:44 UTC, and Spaces buckets and the services that depend on them began to fail intermittently.

    Trigger

    At 22:38 UTC on 28 November 2024, DigitalOcean's domain registrar, Network Solutions, made an update to the digitaloceanspaces.com domain that added an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) clientHold status code to it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DigitalOcean declared the incident at 22:38 UTC based on monitoring and customer reports that the Cloud Control Panel would not load. An internal alert detected the issue at 22:44 UTC, and the first customer contact about the Control Panel came at 22:57 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Deployed a change that brought the Cloud Control Panel back online
    • Contacted Network Solutions to have the clientHold removed
    • Escalated to Verisign executives, the .com registry, until the clientHold was removed
    Action items
    • Work with Network Solutions to understand why the clientHold was applied to the domain
    • Review other domain registrars as possible new homes for DigitalOcean's domains
    • Review monitoring and alerting to detect registrar-imposed changes and DNS resolution problems sooner
  3. Symptoms

    At around 5.44pm UTC on 25 January 2022, Gitpod saw a high error rate when pulling images from Google Container Registry (gcr.io), with the error "cannot get manifest". About 10 minutes later users reported that they could not start workspaces.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed a high error rate on image pulls from GCR at around 5.44pm UTC; about 10 minutes later users reported that workspaces would not start, and the on-call team started incident response.

    Remediation
    • Created new workspace clusters in the EU and the US with a werft job
    • Redirected traffic to the new clusters
    Action items
    • Keep workspace data on cloud provider persistent volumes that survive node and cluster failures
    • Let users download their files from a workspace that cannot be started
    • Improve the workspace backup process
    • Use three DNS servers instead of one: a GCP-internal one, 8.8.8.8 and Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1
    • Do more DNS resiliency work, tracked in an epic
    • Improve support for multi-region clusters and later go multi-cloud
  4. Symptoms

    On 22 June 2021, within minutes of an update released at 8:25 AM UTC, bunny.net's global fleet of close to 100 DNS servers kept crashing and restarting, more than 60% of traffic was lost, hundreds of Gbits of throughput disappeared, and over 750,000 websites were affected. After 10 minutes the team realised that the DNS servers were restarting and dying and that nothing could bring them back up in that state.

    Trigger

    At 8:25 AM UTC bunny.net released an update meant to reduce the download size of the SmartEdge optimization database, and it uploaded a corrupted file to Edge Storage.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    About 10 minutes after the release, the team realised that the DNS servers were restarting and dying.

    Remediation
    • Deployed by hand an update that disabled the SmartEdge system on the DNS nodes
    • Routed all requests through Frankfurt instead of Madrid on a couple of DNS servers
    • Migrated the deployment systems and files to a third-party cloud storage service
    • Rewired the deployment system and DNS software to the new storage and deployed
    • Synced the databases and deployed the newest file sets through the third-party service
    Action items
    • Phase out the BinaryPack library as a hot-fix
    • Test third-party libraries more extensively
    • Migrate the internal APIs to an independent third-party service
    • Find how to stop non-critical software from becoming a single point of failure across clusters
    • Make the DNS system keep a local copy of all backup data with automatic failure detection
    Lessons

    bunny.net had built its systems to rely on each other, including the critical parts of its internal infrastructure, so one corrupted file brought down several layers of redundancy with no way back. A part of the infrastructure treated as non-critical turned out to be a single point of failure for several clusters at once, which canary deployments did not catch. Building infrastructure inside its own ecosystem lets one failure cascade through all of it. In the rush to fix the outage the team made typos and mistakes, and the final deployment came after it calmed down and double-checked everything.

Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve Object storage and Container registry and its credentials. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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