Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases10 cases

1 to 5 of 10

  1. Symptoms

    On 8 May 2026 IONOS Cloud reported "K8s Control Planes not available": some Managed Kubernetes customers in DE/TXL, DE/FRA and DE/FRA/2 had trouble connecting to the control plane and saw degraded Kubernetes functionality. Between 15:22 and 16:12 (UTC+2) applications meant for a new internal development cluster were installed on other customer clusters, which were also modified.

    Trigger

    A routine internal operation onboarded a new Managed Kubernetes development cluster. The scoping configuration file for the onboarding operator failed to reach the deployment branch because of a merge conflict, and at the same time a second change removed the operator from the exclusion list, which deployed it at once.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Corrected the onboarding operator so it needs an explicit namespace configuration before acting on any cluster
    • Reconfigured the deployment system to fail deployments when required configuration files are missing
    • Rolled back the identified changes on the affected resources
    • Ran a recovery script, validated in staging, that removed all unintended installations and updates from the affected clusters
    Action items
    • Add a mandatory CI/CD step that confirms all required configuration files reached the target branch before any deployment starts
    • Require additional peer review and change management approval for every deployment that touches production, whatever its size
    • Give teams a way to inform each affected customer in time about the status of post-incident cleanup
    Lessons

    IONOS treats the unintended change to cluster configurations as a failure of the controls that should keep internal operations from affecting customer environments.

  2. Symptoms

    On 4 March 2026 customers of the IONOS Container Registry got 504 Gateway Timeout errors when pushing or pulling container images, and deployments that relied on the registry were blocked. The status page first reported an increased error count on the registry at 09:23 UTC, saying customers might be unable to pull images.

    Trigger

    A migration combined with a temporary capacity constraint placed two critical control plane components on the same proxy instance, despite anti-affinity rules; the shared proxy then reached its concurrent connection limit.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Rolled back a component of the Kubernetes control plane to an earlier version
    • Provisioned additional proxy capacity
    • Moved the affected control plane components onto separate proxy instances
    Action items
    • Redesign registry-to-API connectivity so each node uses its own local proxy
    • Adjust alert thresholds to warn before proxy connection use approaches capacity
    • Deploy more infrastructure clusters and redistribute registries so no cluster exceeds safe capacity, with automation that keeps balancing load
  3. Symptoms

    At 1:47am GMT on 28 October 2025, Harness's automated synthetic checks that simulate SDK traffic for the Feature Flags service began failing, and some requests to http://config.ff.harness.io/client/auth received 502 responses.

    Trigger

    During a routine deployment, Kubernetes rescheduled some pods of a Feature Flags dependency onto new nodes that did not have the image cached locally.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated synthetic checks that simulate SDK traffic for the Feature Flags service began failing at 1:47am GMT.

    Remediation
    • Restored the missing image to Google Artifact Registry
    • Redeployed the impacted pods
    Action items
    • Review and strengthen the image retention policies in Google Artifact Registry to prevent unintended deletions
    • Validate automatically that all production images are kept for a defined minimum period
    • Add monitoring and alerting for image pull errors
  4. Symptoms

    From about 21:38 UTC on 5 February 2025, image pulls from Docker Hub over IPv6 failed with 429 Too Many Requests errors across several Linode regions. Both unauthenticated and authenticated pull requests were refused.

    Trigger

    Docker Hub's abuse prevention measures started rate-limiting image pulls coming from Linode's IPv6 address space.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The rate limiting began at about 21:38 UTC. The first status post, at 22:48 UTC, said Linode was aware of an issue with Docker Hub over IPv6 causing rate limiting and was investigating, and at 01:06 UTC on 6 February the status page said the issue had been identified as rate limiting of image pull requests to Docker Hub over IPv6.

    Remediation
    • changed the DNS resolvers to return an A record instead of an AAAA record so image pulls to Docker Hub used IPv4
    Action items
    • Find long-term solutions so that Docker Hub's abuse prevention measures do not affect Linode services
    Lessons

    A registry's abuse limit that groups IPv6 addresses by their first 64 bits can block a provider's whole address range at once, and authentication does not help. Answering DNS lookups with IPv4 addresses only was the quick way to move image pulls off the blocked range.

  5. Symptoms

    Aqua's research team Nautilus recorded the attack on one of its Kubernetes honeypots. What appeared in the cluster was a DaemonSet running the image kuberntesio/kube-controller:1.0.1 from Docker Hub on every node, using the nodes' CPU to mine Monero.

    Trigger

    An API server misconfigured to accept unauthenticated requests from anonymous users with privileges.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Aqua recorded the attacker's API requests on its honeypot; planted AWS access keys raised a beacon when the attacker tried to use them.

    Lessons

    Fixing an exposed API server is not enough once an attacker has been in: a ClusterRoleBinding to an attacker-created ServiceAccount keeps working after anonymous access is closed. Attackers name these objects and images after real Kubernetes components so they blend into the API audit logs and pass for legitimate deployments. Aqua recommends scanning clusters for vulnerabilities, exposed secrets and misconfigurations with a tool such as Trivy.

Check your cluster for this

These 10 cases involve Container registry and its credentials and CI system. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause8

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0234 An onboarding operator deployed without its scope file installed dev applications on other IONOS Kubernetes clusters

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

  1. IL-0465 IONOS Container Registry image pushes and pulls failed with 504 Gateway Timeout
  2. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances

Data loss or corruption1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0474 Harness Feature Flags auth returned 502s when rescheduled pods could not get an image deleted from Artifact Registry

Dependency failure1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0159 Docker Hub rate-limited Linode's IPv6 address space with 429 Too Many Requests, breaking image pulls for LKE and LKE-E clusters
    Linode2025

Configuration change1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0068 Anonymous access to the Kubernetes API server used to plant a ClusterRoleBinding backdoor and a cryptominer DaemonSet

Operator error1 case

  1. IL-0018 A Docker Hub password rotation left EKS nodes and Concourse locked out of Docker Hub and unable to pull images

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0144 A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOff

DNS or network fault2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0517 Gitpod workspaces failed to start worldwide and lost data when CoreDNS lookups to 8.8.8.8 timed out in its clusters
    Gitpod2022
  2. IL-0199 A non-essential container exceeding its memory limit made GitHub's production pods unavailable, and their restarts failed because a DNS maintenance change had left the clusters unable to reach the image registry
    GitHub2020