Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 4 March 2026 customers of the IONOS Container Registry got 504 Gateway Timeout errors when pushing or pulling container images, and deployments that relied on the registry were blocked. The status page first reported an increased error count on the registry at 09:23 UTC, saying customers might be unable to pull images.

    Trigger

    A migration combined with a temporary capacity constraint placed two critical control plane components on the same proxy instance, despite anti-affinity rules; the shared proxy then reached its concurrent connection limit.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Rolled back a component of the Kubernetes control plane to an earlier version
    • Provisioned additional proxy capacity
    • Moved the affected control plane components onto separate proxy instances
    Action items
    • Redesign registry-to-API connectivity so each node uses its own local proxy
    • Adjust alert thresholds to warn before proxy connection use approaches capacity
    • Deploy more infrastructure clusters and redistribute registries so no cluster exceeds safe capacity, with automation that keeps balancing load
  2. Symptoms

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.

    Trigger

    A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.

    Remediation
    • replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
    • reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
    Action items
    • Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
    • Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
    Lessons

    The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Container registry and its credentials and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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