Cases2 cases

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1. IL-0251 Most of Slack's HAProxy load balancers routed to a stale, shrinking set of webapp backends and served HTTP 503 errors

   Slack2020

   Symptoms

   At 4:45pm Pacific on 12 May 2020, Slack was alerted that it was serving more HTTP 503 errors than normal. A subset of the webapp fleet was under heavy load while the rest of the webapp instances were not.

   High error rateLoad imbalanceStale endpoint routing

   Trigger

   At the end of the US business day the webapp tier began its usual scale-down, and autoscaling terminated the oldest instances first, which were the only backends left in most HAProxy instances' state.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   HAProxyService discovery

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationNo alert on limit

   Detection

   An alert for more HTTP 503 errors than normal. The alerting meant to catch stale HAProxy state was not working.

   Remediation

   • Did a rolling restart of the HAProxy fleet

   Action items

   • Move all ingress load balancing from HAProxy to Envoy Proxy, with endpoint discovery through an xDS control plane

   Lessons

   The alerting for this exact failure had stopped working, and nobody noticed because the HAProxy stack had run for a long time without needing changes, so few engineers worked with its monitoring and alerting. A slot limit that had been ample a few months earlier was reached after pandemic-driven growth and one large autoscaling event.

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2. IL-0271 An empty etcd service entry crashed Discord's Elixir chat nodes, and Discord was down for most users for an hour

   Discord2020sev1

   Symptoms

   On 16 March 2020 at 14:19 PDT most of Discord's Elixir services, which handle real-time connections and chat message processing, crashed at once. Discord lost much of its real-time capacity, the failure cascaded into dependent systems, and most users could not connect for about an hour.

   Service outageHigh error rate

   Trigger

   At 14:18 the Google Cloud managed instance group autoscaler added a node to Discord's API cluster, and the TCP connection of its first announce request to etcd was reset after the request headers were sent but before the body.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Coordination and key-value storeService discovery

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplification

   Detection

   At 14:21 several internal alarms fired on a drop in key metrics, along with anomaly alerts for cluster utilization, and a SEV1 incident was declared.

   Remediation

   • Restarted the lost real-time capacity and repaired the failed nodes
   • Throttled connections to Discord to help services recover
   • Stopped anti-entropy repairs on two ScyllaDB clusters so reconnecting users would not starve them of resources
   • Raised the connection throttle step by step to let more users reconnect

   Action items

   • Make the etcd clients send each announce request in a single TCP packet, so headers and body arrive together or not at all
   • Add error handling that ignores services whose key value is corrupt instead of crash-looping
   • File an upstream bug report with the Go project about net/http not checking the body against Content-Length

   Lessons

   Discord's service discovery code handled many etcd failure modes but did not expect a client to write a key without a value because of a transient network error. Go's net/http accepts a request whose body is shorter than its Content-Length header, which breaks the HTTP 1.1 specification and added a failure case nobody had anticipated.

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