Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    At 5:00 PM BST on 12 August 2025 a 2i2c engineer declared an incident. While deploying a new cluster called temple and running into NFS issues, the engineer had deleted the prod namespace; the deletion hung, and listing the pods showed many users from a different cluster. The engineer's first message suggested that the kubeconfig had somehow been mutated or corrupted and that some other cluster was being torn down.

    Trigger

    While working around a bug in the NFS deployment process for a new hub, an engineer ran a delete of the prod namespace with the kubeconfig context pointing at the LEAP cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The engineer who ran the deletion noticed when it hung and the pod list showed users of another cluster, and declared the incident at 5:00 PM BST, before the uptime check on leap.2i2c.cloud failed at 5:32 PM.

    Remediation
    • deleted the single remaining user pod in prod so the namespace deletion completed
    • killed the nfs-share-creator job that was blocking the deployment
    • redeployed the prod hub with the updated NFS server IP address
    • deleted the prod ingress during the deployment so that users could not start servers mid-deployment
    Action items
    • Write an incident report
    • Write a short incident response document for the case "I deleted prod, what next?"
    • Upgrade jupyterhub-home-nfs and remove the nfs-share-creator job
    • Add opt-in hardening against nested kubeconfig contexts to the deployer system
    • Change the engineer's shell configuration to show distinct kubeconfig contexts more clearly
    Lessons

    Provisioning persistent storage outside Kubernetes with Terraform meant a deleted namespace cost an hour of downtime and no data. The engineer had no visible cue for which kubeconfig context was active, which turned a workaround on a new cluster into a deletion on a production one. The engineer knew the fix but did not feel confident redeploying without first confirming with the tech lead, in another time zone, that there was no risk of losing persistent data, and reaching the tech lead took time.

  2. Symptoms

    Between 12 AM and 8 AM CEST on 11 May 2025, every ZenML Pro workspace server was unreachable, so customers could not use workspace UIs or pipelines. The ZenML Pro dashboard was not affected.

    Trigger

    At 23:38 on 10 May, secrets encryption with AWS KMS was enabled through Terraform as part of the EKS module upgrade.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers found the cluster degraded when they resumed the upgrade at 06:00.

    Remediation
    • deleted and recreated the EKS node group with the correct IAM permissions and configuration
    • restored service access across all affected ZenML Pro environments
    Action items
    • Upgrade all Terraform modules (EKS, VPC) to current supported versions
    • Complete the EKS cluster upgrades as planned
    • Review the strategy for periodic Kubernetes and infrastructure upgrades to prevent a recurrence
    Lessons

    A successful upgrade on a much smaller staging cluster understated the risk of the same change in production. Skipping Kubernetes and module versions let upgrade complexity build up until one upgrade carried many changes at once.

  3. Symptoms

    At 10:23 on 6 June 2023 a user of the Cloud Platform reported that all of their production pods had been deleted at the same moment. Several users received Pingdom alerts that their applications were down for a few minutes.

    Trigger

    The team changed the instance type of the cluster's worker nodes through Terraform.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their production pods had been deleted at once and that Pingdom alerts showed their applications down; the incident was declared at 11:00.

    Action items
    • Ask AWS, through a support ticket, for the steps to change the node instance type without an outage
    • Plan how to make instance type changes through Terraform without downtime and add a runbook with the steps for changing the node instance type
  4. Symptoms

    At 09:33 UTC on 14 February 2023 end users told the platform team that Kubernetes logs were not arriving in CloudWatch as expected. The investigation went through fluentd and found that the nodes were running containerd as their container runtime instead of docker-shim. A scheduled node rollover the day before, at 07:30 UTC on 13 February, had set containerd as the default runtime by accident.

    Trigger

    A scheduled node rollover had accidentally made containerd the default container runtime, which stopped log shipping to CloudWatch; the unscheduled rollover to revert it timed out, and the pipeline run that followed reduced the Auto Scaling group from 30 to 15 instances.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    End users reported the missing CloudWatch logs that started the work. The postmortem lists 2 minutes as the time to detection of the node failure.

    Remediation
    • ran the node rollover script to add new nodes, which failed on a timeout from Docker Hub
    • ran the node rollover script a second time, which added new nodes that the load balancer marked healthy at 11:01 UTC
    Action items
    • Document the rollover process, especially what can be done when it goes wrong
    • Investigate options for improving the rollover process
    • Add fluentd log collection to the QA test suite so logs are covered end to end
    • Add alarms for fluentd when too little or no log data is sent
    • Implement a staging environment
    • Implement guards against selecting an invalid container runtime
    Lessons

    When a change goes wrong, rolling back to a known working configuration is safer than rushing a fix, which can make the damage worse. Launching new worker nodes depends on the cloud-init script not failing in any way. The QA configuration differed from production, there was no staging environment, the QA tests did not cover fluentd log collection, and the rollover process had no documentation for when it fails.

  5. Symptoms

    At 08:29 UTC on 22 June 2021 alerts fired because all services in the Kubernetes cluster were returning 503. No inbound traffic was reaching the cluster. A customer reported the problem at 08:32.

    Trigger

    The pipeline replaced the AWS VPC CNI as part of a refactoring that moved EKS add-ons from kubectl to native Terraform management.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts fired at 08:29 UTC, eight minutes after the VPC CNI was replaced; a customer reported the issue at 08:32.

    Remediation
    • committed a fix that reverted the infrastructure-modules reference
    • re-triggered the pipeline after it failed on an AWS API timeout
    • let the pipeline reattach the target groups to the ALB
    Action items
    • Revert the ALB de-registration delay to the default of 300 seconds
    • Update the roll-over script to set the ALB de-registration delay to zero temporarily before a roll-over
    • Create an ingress test suite
    Lessons

    The change to the de-registration delay had been weighed mainly for performance. Critical pipeline runs should be watched while they run. Everyone should receive the alerts and react to them, and alert messages that were unclear should be reworded.

Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve Terraform and Node pool. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025

Software defect1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0078 Enabling EKS secrets encryption with KMS through Terraform removed worker node IAM permissions and took down all ZenML Pro workspaces
    ZenML2025

Configuration change3 cases

  1. IL-0091 Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods together
  2. IL-0109 A retried node rollover on a DFDS EKS cluster set the Auto Scaling group back to 15 instances, and the default termination policy removed every healthy worker node, leaving the cluster with no nodes
    DFDS2023
  3. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021