Cases4 cases
1 to 4 of 4
- Symptoms
At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.
- Trigger
One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.
- Remediation
- applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
- restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
- throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
- reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
- disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
- relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
- Action items
- Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
- Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
- Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
- Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
- Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
- Lessons
A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.
IL-0182Too few CoreDNS replicas on EKS were overloaded during traffic spikes, raising latency and cutting the network for task pods, and the over-provisioned, tightly spread CoreDNS pods added later blocked Karpenter consolidation이언철2024- Symptoms
When traffic changed sharply, CoreDNS came under heavy load, and the cluster saw network problems and a sudden rise in latency. The horizontal pod autoscaler then added pods, database connections surged, and the impact spread to the whole service.
- Trigger
Sharp changes in traffic loaded the small number of CoreDNS pods beyond what they could handle.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Remediation
- Set up the Cluster Proportional Autoscaler for CoreDNS with nodesPerReplica and coresPerReplica chosen for the instance types in use
- Spread CoreDNS with soft topologySpreadConstraints (ScheduleAnyway) instead of anti-affinity so Karpenter could consolidate nodes
- Added alert thresholds on CoreDNS error rate, panics, request duration and request rate
- Deployed NodeLocal DNSCache so each node answers DNS from a local cache and forwards misses to the main CoreDNS
- Lessons
A fixed, small number of CoreDNS pods cannot follow a cluster whose nodes and pods change quickly with traffic, and the damage spreads: DNS latency triggers autoscaling, which in turn floods the database with connections. Simply adding many CoreDNS replicas created a different problem, because with tainted nodes and a maxSkew: 1 spread constraint the pods piled onto a few nodes and blocked Karpenter consolidation. Scaling CoreDNS in proportion to the cluster and putting a DNS cache on every node handled both.
IL-0112The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeoutsDFDS2022- Symptoms
On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.
- Trigger
At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.
- Remediation
- cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
- changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
- rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
- Action items
- Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
- Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
- Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
- Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
- Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
- Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
- Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
- Collect logs from nodes centrally
- Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
- Lessons
When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.
IL-0064CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was downMoonlight2019- Symptoms
On Friday, January 18, Moonlight's API began returning occasional errors that looked like connection problems with its Redis database. The API checks Redis on every authenticated request to validate the session. At the same time the Kubernetes monitoring reported some nodes and pods as unresponsive.
- Trigger
The Kubernetes scheduler put several CPU-heavy pods on the same node, including all three replicas of the website and the server-side rendering pods.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
API errors that looked like Redis connectivity problems, and Kubernetes monitoring that showed nodes and pods as unresponsive. Google Cloud Support later found the link between sustained 100% CPU and kernel panics.
- Remediation
- added anti-affinity rules to all major deployments so their pods spread across nodes
- Action items
- Keep working with Google Cloud support to find and fix the cause of the node kernel panics
- Lessons
Three replicas give no fault tolerance if the scheduler places them all on one node; anti-affinity rules make the spread explicit. A node failure that comes from the workload itself moves with the workload when the scheduler reschedules it.
These 4 cases involve Database and Linux kernel. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause2
Software defect2 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
IL-0150A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1IL-0112The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeoutsDFDS2022
Capacity exhaustion2 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
IL-0182Too few CoreDNS replicas on EKS were overloaded during traffic spikes, raising latency and cutting the network for task pods, and the over-provisioned, tightly spread CoreDNS pods added later blocked Karpenter consolidation이언철2024IL-0064CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was downMoonlight2019